Lew. Wallace to E.D. Townsend, July 10, 1864

: have the honor to report that I have reached this point with my column.

As I telegraphed you on the evening of the 8th instant, I left Frederick, and by a night march took position on the left bank of the Monocacy, with my left on the south side of the Washington pike, and my right covering the bridge on the Baltimore pike, about two miles and a half from Frederick City.

Early in the morning of the 9th instant the enemy moved out of Frederick City, and in skirmish order began the fight. About 9 o’clock he opened upon me with artillery, his guns being Napol-. eons, or 12-pounder howitzers, and mine one 6-gun battery 3-inch rifled guns, with one 24-pounder howitzer. His column of cavalry and artillery worked rapidly round to my left and crossed the river in face of my guard, and charged confidently upon Brigadier-General Ricketts, Third Division, Sixth Army Corps. The general changed front and repulsed them, and charged in turn and drove them gallantly. The enemy then advanced a second line. This the general also repulsed and drove. Mean tinie the enemy placed at least two batteries in position, sothat when he made his final charge with four lines. of infantry, about 3.30 p. m., the resistance of Ricketts’ division was under an enfilading fire of shell really terrific. The moment I saw the third rebei line advance I ordered the general to make such preparations as he could and retire his command by a county road up the river to the Baltimore pike. This was accomplished with an extraordinary steadiness. The men of the Third Division were not whipped, but retired reluctantly, under my orders. They bore the brunt of the battle with a coolness and steadiness which I venture to say has not been exceeded in any battle during the war. Too much credit cannot be given General Ricketts for his skill and courage.

*The original report telegraphed by General Wallace was received by General Halleck July 10, at 7 p. m., and copy was then forwarded to General Grant.

During the main fight skirmishing across the river went on uninterruptedly, and down at the Baltimore pike bridge assumed serious form. My right, extending from the railroad to the bridge mentioned, was under charge of Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler, now supposed to be a prisoner, who, though not tried by so severe a test, met every expectation, and performed his duty with ability and courage. Ido not now think myself seriously beaten ; there was not a flag nor gun lost. The rebels captured no stores whatever, and in face of their overwhelming force, I brought off my whole command, losing probably not over 200 prisoners. My casualty list will be quite severe, but cannot possibly equal that of the enemy, as they charged several times in close lines, and with a recklessness that can be justified only upon the ground that they supposed my command consisted of raw militia. Each one of his four lines of attack presented a front greater than that of General Ricketts’ division all deployed. By calculation this would give him about 18,000 men engaged on the left bank, while he had at least 2,000 more skirmishing and fighting in my front across the river.

Permit me to state that in fighting I had three objects in view: First, to keep open, if possible, the communication by rail to Harper’s Ferry ; second, to cover the roads to Washington and Baltimore; the last, to make the enemy develop his force. I failed in all but the last, and from what I saw it can be safely asserted that the enemy must have two corps of troops north of the Potomac. ,In the computation I include his column operating in the region of Hagerstown, that about Harper’s Ferry, and the one which fought me yesterday.

A rebel officer dying on the field told a staff officer of General Ricketts that Lee was managing these operations in person, and would shortly have three corps about the Potomac for business against Washington and Baltimore. This circumstance is true; give it what weight you please.

I regret to add that we were able to bring off but few of our wounded, and none of our dead. The 100-days’ men straggled badly, while the men of the Sixth Corps reached this place in perfect order, and covered the retreat. The Third Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Colonel Gilpin, of Tyler’s brigade, also maintained good order. I will make a more complete report, with your permission, when I receive the report of Brigadier-General Ricketts.

I wish to make honorable mention at this time of Lieut. Col. D. R. Clendenin, of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, of Capt. F. W. Alexander, whose battery was well served throughout the day, and of of Col. Charles Gilpin, who commanded during the fight of Frederick City, on the 7th instant, in which the enemy lost, killed and wounded, 140 men, while we lost 1 man killed and 18 wounded. The number of rebel casualties is given on the statements of citizens of Frederick.

I wish also to make honorable mention of Colonel Brown, of the One hundred and forty-ninth Ohio National Guards, who, assisted by Captain Leib, Fifth U.S. Cavalry, stubbornly held the Baltimore pike bridge, and thus kept open my line of retreat.

_ LEW. WALLACE, Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. Haturck, Chief of Staff, Washington.

Hpg@rs. MIDDLE DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, Baltimore, August —, 1864.

COLONEL: I beg leave to furnish the War Department with the following report in full of the operations of my command in the vicinity of Frederick City, Md., which resulted in the battle of Monocacy, fought 9th July last. The informal report telegraphed Major-General Halleck from Ellicott’s Mills, during the retreat, is appended hereto,* and will serve to make the record complete:

The situation in the Department of West Virginia, about the beginning of July, was very uncertain. Major-General Hunter had retreated westwardly from Lynchburg, leaving open the Shenandoah Valley, up which a column of rebels of unknown strength had marched and thrown General Sigel back from Martinsburg to Williamsport, thence down the left bank of the Potomac to Maryland Heights, where, with his command, he was supposed to be besieged.

The strength of the invading column, by whom it was commanded, what its objects were, the means provided to repel it, everything in fact connected with it, were, on my part, purely conjectural. All that I was. certain of was that my own department was seriously threatened.

July 5, information was brought to my headquarters in Baltimore that a column of rebel cavalry, the same that had been raiding in the border counties of Pennsylvania, was in the Middletown Valley, moving eastwardly. Taking this report as true, the enemy had turned his back upon the department of Major-General Couch, and reduced his probable objectives to Washington, Baltimore, or Maryland Heights. In this situation I felt it my duty to concentrate that portion of my scanty command available for field operations at some point on the Monocacy River, the western limit of the Middle Department. With an enemy north of the Potomac, and approaching from the west, having in view any or all the objectives mentioned, the importance of the position on which I ultimately gave battle cannot be overestimated. There, within the space of two miles, converge the pikes to Washington and Baltimore, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad ; there also is the iron bridge over the Monocacy, upon which depends railroad communication to Harper’s Ferry. Moreover, as a defensive position for an army seeking to cover the cities above named against a force marching from the direction I was threatened, the point is very strong; the river covers its entire front. Ina low stage of water the fords are few, and particularly difficult for artillery, and the commanding heights are all on the eastern bank, while the ground on the opposite side is level and almost without obstructions. At all events, I was confident of ability to repel any ordinary column of cavalry that might be bold enough to attack me there, and if the position should be turned on the right, I was not necessarily disabled from defending Baltimore. In that contingency I had only to take care of the railroad and use it at the right time. Accordingly, I went out and joined General Tyler at the railroad bridge. The information received in Baltimore was confirmed. Rebel cavalry had seized Middletown. Their scouting parties had even advanced to within three miles of Frederick City. By the evening of the 6th all my available troops were concentrated under General Tyler, making a force of scant_ 2,500 men of all arms, and composed as follows: Third Regiment Mary-

*See p. 191. 13 R R—VOL XXXVII, PT I

land Potomac Home Brigade, Col. Charles Gilpin; Eleventh Maryland Infantry, Colonel Landstreet; seven companies of the One hundred and forty-ninth and three companies of the One nundred and forty-fourth Ohio National Guard, consolidated temporarily, under Col. A. L. Brown; Captain Alexander’s (Maryland) batvc.,, and 100 men of the One hundred and fifty-ninth Ohio Nationai Guards, serving as mounted infantry, and commanded by Capt. H. E. H. Leib, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, and Capt. H. 8. Allen. In addition, I had the services of Lieutenant-Colone! Tlendenin’s squadron of cavalry, 250 men. and four companies «.. sne First Regiment Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, about 200 strong, under Captain and all the Ohio troops were 100-days’ men.

In the night of the 6th Colonel Clendenin received my orders to take the pike to Middletown and follow it until he found the enemy, and ascertained the strength and composition of hiscolumn. Leaving Frederick City at daybreak next morning (the 7th), with his cavalry, and a section of Alexander’s battery. he drove in a rebel outpost stationed in the mountain pass, and gained Middletown, where he was stopped by a body of cavalry largely superior to hisown, commanded by General Bradley T. Johnson. Afterasmart skirmish, in which both sides used artillery, Clendenin was forced back by movements on his flanks. About 10 o’clock he reported the rebels, 1,000 strong,

ushing him slowly to Frederick City, which they would reachintwo 1ours, unless I intended its defense. Though out of my department, it had become my duty to savethe town, if possible, and as i+ was but three miles distant, I thought that could be done without jeopardizing the position at the railroad bridge. By direction, therefore, General Tyler sent Colonel Gilpin with his regiment anu another gun to support Clendeninandengagetheenemy. The company of mounted infantry also went forward. In this movemen+ the railroad was. very useful. Colonel Gilpin reached the town 1. good time, and deployed his command in skirmish order across the Hagerstown pike, half a mile west of the suburbs. Clendenin fell back and joined him. About4 p. m. the enemy opened the fight with three pieces of artillery. The lines engaged shortly after. At 6 o’clock Captain Alexander, personally in charge of his pieces, dismounted one of Johnson’s guns. A little before dark Gilpin charged and drove the rebels, who, under cover of night, finally withdrew to the mountain. You will find the locality of this action indicated on the: map * herewith forwarded.

The forces opposed, it is worthy remark, were about equal in number, yet Johnson had the advantage; his men were veterans, while Gilpin’s, with the exception of Clendenin’s squadron, had not before been under fire, a circumstance much enhancing the credit gained by them. ‘

Relying upon intelligence received the evening the above affair: took place that a division of veterans of the Sixth Corps was coming by rail to my re-enforcement, about midnight General Tyler was. sent to Frederick City with Colonel Brown’s command to prepare for what might occur in the morning. About daybreak a portion of the First Brigade of the veterans arrived under Colonel Henry, which was also sent to Frederick. The reports of the enemy continued conflicting as before; some stated that Johnson’s cavalry, already whipped by Colonel Gilpin, were all the rebels north of the

*To appear in the Atlas.

Potomac ; others that McCausland, with a like column, was marching to join Johnson ; others, again, represented Early and Breckinridge behind the Catoctin Mountain, with 30,000 men, moving upon Frederick City. In short, the most reliable intelligence was of a character that reduced the detense of that town to a secondary consideration. If the enemy’s force was correctly reported, his designs were upon Washington or Baltimore. In the hope of evolving something definite out of the confusion of news, I went in person to Frederick City, leaving my inspector-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Catlin, at the railroad bridge, to stop such of the veteran regiments as arrived there. The Eleventh Maryland remained with him. My purpose was to conduct a reconnaissance over the mountain, to brush aside, if possible, the curtain that seemed to overhang it. In the midst of prenaralion for this movement, a telegram from Major-General Sigel reached me, stating that the enemy had that morning retired from before Maryland Heights, and was marching with his main body up the Middletown Valley toward Boonsborough. The question then was, Were the rebels marching for Pennsylvania or coming eastward by the Jefferson or Middletown pikes? Iconcluded to await events in Frederick City, satisfied they would not be long delayed.

As Johnson still held the mountain pass to Middletown, the day (8th) was spent in trying to draw him intothe valley with such re-enforcements as he might have received. A feigned retreat from the town was but partially successful ; he came down, but, under fire of Alexander’s guns, galloped back again. About 6o’clock in the afternoon Colonel Catlin telegraphed me that a heavy force of rebel infantry was moving toward Urbana by the Buckeystown road. This threatened my lines of retreat and the position at Monovacy bridge. What was more serious, it seemed to disclose a purpose to obtain the pike to Washington, important to the enemy for several causes, but especially so if his designs embraced that city, then in no condition, as I understood it, to resist an army like that attributed to Early by General Sigel. I claim no credit for understanding my duty in such a situation ; it was self-apparent. There was no force that could be thrown in time between the capital and the rebels but mine, which was probably too small to defeat them, but certainly strong enough to gain timé and compel them to expose their strength. If they were weak, by going back to the bridge I could keep open the communication with General Sigel; on the other hand, if they were ever so strong it was not possible to drive me from that position, except by turning one of my flanks; if my right, retreat was open by the Washington pike; if my left, the retirement could be by the pike to Baltimore. I made up my mind to fight, and accordingly telegraphed General Halleck :

I shall withdraw immediately from Frederick City, and put myself in position to cover road to Washington, if necessary.

This was done by marching in the night to the railroad bridge, where Brigadier-General Ricketts was in waiting. I had then the following regiments of his division :

First Brigade, Col. W. S. Truex commanding, 1,750 strong—One hundred and sixth New York, Captain Paine commanding; One hundred and fifty-first New York, Colonel Emerson; Fourteenth New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel Hall; Tenth Vermont, Colonel Henry ; Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Stahle.

Second Brigade, 1,600 men, Colonel McClennan commanding— One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania ; Ninth New York, Colonel Seward; One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, LieutenantColonel Ebright ; One hundred and tenth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Binkley.

The residue of the division, it was reported, would be up next day.

Early in the morning of the 9th disposition for battle was made. The right, forming an extended line from the railroad, was given General Tyler, who, by direction, had left Colonel Brown at the stone bridge on the Baltimore pike with his command, and the company of mounted infantry. Upon the holding of that bridge depended the security of my right,flank, and the line of retreat to Baltimore. Three companies of Colonel Gilpin’s regiment were posted to defend Crum’s Ford—midway the stone bridge and railroad. Landstreet and Gilpin were held in reserve at the railroad. The battery was divided—Ricketts and Tyler each received three guns. On the left, as it was likely to be the main point of attack, I directed General Ricketts to form his command in two lines across the Washington pike, so as to hold the rising ground south of it and the wooden bridge across the river. Still farther to the left, Colonel Clendenin took post to watch that flank and guard the lower fords with such detachments as he could spare. On the western bank of the river, Captain Brown’s detachment of the First Regiment Potomac Home Brigade was deployed as skirmishers, in a line three quarters of a mile to the front. A 24-pounder howitzer was left in a rude earthwork near the block-house by the railroad, where it could be used to defend the two bridges and cover the retirement and crossing of the skirmishers. While this disposition was going on, the railroad agent informed me that two more troop trains were on the road, and would arrive by 1 o’clock. These were the residue of General Ricketts’ division, three regiments making a very important re-enforcement. About 8 a. m. the enemy marched by the pike from Frederick, and threw out skirmishers, behind whom he put his guns in position, and began the engagement. His columns followed alittle after 9 o’clock. Passing through the fields, just out of range of my pieces, without attempting to drive in my skirmishers, they moved rapidly around to the left, and forced a passage of the river at a ford about one mile below Ricketts. From 9 o’clock to 10.30 the action was little more than a warm skirmish and experimental cannonading, in which, however, the enemy’s superiority in the number and caliber of his guns was fully shown. Against my six 3-inch rifles, he opposed not less than sixteen Napoleons. In this time, also, the fighting at the stone bridge, assumed serious proportions; Colonel Brown held his position with great difficulty. About 10.30 o’clock the enemy’s first line of battle made its appearance, and moved against Ricketts, who, mean time; had changed front to the left, so that his right rested upon the river-bank. This change unavoidably subjected his regiments to an unintermitted enfilading fire from the batteries across the stream. So great was the rebel front, also, that I was compelled to order the whole division into one line, thus leaving it without reserves. Still the enemy’s front was greatest.. Two more guns were sent to Ricketts. Finally, by burning the wooden bridge and the block-house atits further end, thus releasing the force left to defend them, I put into the engagement every available man except Tyler’s reserves, which, from the messages arriving, I expected momentarily to have to dispatch to Colonel Brown’s assistance. The enemy’s first line was badly defeated. His second line then ad- vanced, and was repulsed, but after a fierce and continuous struggle. In the time thus occupied I could probably have retired without much trouble, as the rebels were badly punished. The main objects of the battle, however, were unaccomplished, the rebel strength was not yet developed. At 1 o’clock the three re-enforcing regiments of veterans would be on the ground, and then the splendid behavior of Ricketts and his men inspired me with confidence. One o’clock came, but not the re-enforcements ; and it was impossible to get an order to them. My telegraph operator, and the railroad agent, with both his trains, had run away. An hour and a half later I’saw the third line of rebels move out of the woods and down the hill, behind which they made their formation; right after*it came the fourth. It was time to get away. Accordingly, I ordered General Ricketts to make preparations and retire to the Baltimore pike. About 4 o’clock he began the execution of the order. The stone bridge held by Colonel Brown now became all important ; its loss was the loss of my line of retreat, and I had reason to believe that the enemy, successful on my left, would redouble his efforts against the right. General Tyler had already marched with his reserves to Brown’s assistance ; but on receipt of notice of my intention, without waiting for Gilpin and Landstreet, he galloped to the bridge and took the command ‘in person. After the disengagement of Ricketts’ line, when the head of the retreating column reached the pike, I rode to the bridge, and ordered it to be held at all hazards by the force then there, until the enemy should be found in its rear, at least until the last regiment had cleared the country road by which the retreat was being effected. This order General Tyler obeyed. A little after 5 o’clock, when my column was well on the march toward New Market, an attack on his rear convinced him of the impracticability of longer maintaining his post. Many of his men then took to the woods, but by his direction the greater part kept their ranks, and manfully fought their way through. In this way Colonel Brown escaped. General Tyler, finding himself cut off, dashed into the woods, with the officers of his staff, and was happily saved. His gallantry and self-sacrificing devotion are above all commendation of words.

The enemy seemed to have stopped pursuit at the stone bridge. A few cavalry followed my rear guard to within a couple of miles of New Market, where they established a picket-post. The explanation of their failure to harass my column lies in facts that have since come to my knowledge, viz, Johnson’s cavalry was marching at the time of the battle toward Baltimore via the Liberty road, while McCausland’s was too badly cut up in the fight for anything like immediate and vigorous action after it. To have cut my column off at New Market the rebels had only to move their cavalry round my right by way of’ Urbana and Monrovia. Expecting such was his plan I used the utmost expedition to pass the command beyond that point. The danger proved imaginary. The re-enforcements for which I waited so anxiously the last two hours of the engagement reaching Monrovia in good time to have joined me, halted there—a singular proceeding, for which no explanation: has as yet been furnished me. Monrovia is but eight miles from the battle-ground. The commanding officer at that place must, therefore, have heard the guns. But besides this Colonel Clendenin was effectually contesting the road which offered the enemy the advantage I have mentioned. That gallant officer—as true a cavalry soldier as ever mounted a horse—while fighting on Ricketts’ extreme left, found himself cut off from the main body at the time the retreat began. Throwing himself into the village of Urbana he repeatedly repulsed the pursuing rebels, and in one bold charge, saber in hand, captured the battle-flag of the Seventeenth Virginia. The three regiments in Monrovia joined me at New Market and afterward served a good purpose in covering the march of the weary column, which bivouacked for the night about twelve miles from the battle-field.

It would be a difficult task to say too much in praise of the veterans who made this fight. For their reputation and for the truth’s sake, I wish it distinctly understood that, though the appearance of the enemy’s fourth line of battle made their ultimate defeat certain, they were not whipped ; on the contrary, they were fighting steadily in unbroken front when I otdered their retirement, all the shame of which, if shame there was, is mine, not theirs. The nine regiments enumerated as those participating in the action represented but 3,350 men, of whom over 1,600 were missing three days after, killed, wounded, or prisoners—lost on the field. The fact speaks for itself. ‘**Monocacy” on their flags cannot be a word of dishonor.

As to General Ricketts, attention is respectfully called to the mention made of him in the telegraph report* subjoined. Every word of it is as deserved as it was bravely earned. If we had had intrenchintg tools in time no doubt the losses of the veterans would have been greatly lessened. Another deficiency existed in the want of ambulances and wagons, but this I designed remedying by the use of the cars. That thedead and so many of the wounded were left suffering on the field and in the hands of the enemy is justly attributable to the base desertion by the railroad agent. I will also add that my dispatches would havé reached the War Office several hours sooner if the telegraph operator had remained at his post or within calling distance. My intention upon leaving the battle-field was to march the troops directly to Baltimore, which, by the concentration at Monocacy, had been left almost defenseless. Had this purpose been carried out they would have reached the city on the evening of the 10th in time to have driven off the marauders who, under Johnson, had moved by the Liberty road from Frederick City and taken post in the vicinity of Cockeysville. Such a result would very probably have saved the bridges on the Philadelphia railroad. But under an order received while en route to Ellicott’s Mills, directing me to ”rally my forces and make every possible effort to retard the enemy’s march on Baltimore,” I thought it my duty to halt Ricketts’ division with the cayalry and battery at the Mills, that being the first point on the pike at which it was possible to resupply the men with rations and ammunition. In doing this, however, I was careful to leave General Ricketts trains sufficient to bring his whole force away at a moment’s notice, and as soon as it was certainly known that the enemy had marched against Washington I ordered him to Baltimore. Before he arrived, however, I was temporarily superseded in the command of the troops by Major-General Ord.

The evening of the 10th I returned to Baltimore, and found the eity very naturally in a state of alarm, occasioned by the approach of Johnson’s cavalry. Thanks, however, to the energy of Lieut. Col. 5. B. Lawrence, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. Col. John Woolley, provost-marshal, every measure of safety had been taken that intelligence could suggest. The railroad communications north had been the subject of the former’s special care. The means of defense for the city, as already remarked, were very meager, but the

direction of them had, as soon as intelligence of the result on the Monocacy was received, very properly been assumed by BrigadierGenerals Lockwood and Morris, whose military experience was of very great value. To the former I feel particularly grateful. Loyal citizens took up arms by the thousand, were organized, manned the works, and did soldier duty nobly.

Besides the officers mentioned in my informal report of 10th of July, the following deserve similar notice for their excellent behayior in action, and the services they rendered: Lieut. Col. Lynde Catlin, assistant inspector-general ; Maj. Max. V. Z. Woodhull, acting assistant adjutant-general ; and Maj. James R. Ross, senior aide-decamp, all of my staff; also Capt. W. H. Wiegel, assistant adjutantgeneral to General Tyler ; Capt. Adam E. King, assistant adjutantgeneral to General Ricketts ; Captain Brown, First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, and Capt. H. 8. Allen, of the company serving as mounted infantry.

General Ricketts has not yet forwarded his official report. When received I shall promptly transmit it to the War Office.* It will doubtless disclose many other officers properly entitled to special mention. At this time I can only speak of commandants of brigades and regiments whose names have been already given, and repeat the commendation they have won from commanding officers in many a former battle. They are of the soldiers whose skill and courage have ennobled not merely themselves, but the army they have belonged to so long. The subjoined reportt contains my opinion of the rebel strength forwarded by telegram the day after the battle. Information since obtained corroborates that opinion. It is now well assured that General Early attacked me with one whole corps, not less than 18,000 strong, while Breckinridge, with two divisions, remained during the battle in quiet occupancy of Frederick City. It is also certain, as one of the results, that notwithstanding the disparity of forces, the enemy was not able to move from the battle-field, in prosecution of his march upon Washington, until the next day about noon.

As to the casualties, I regret that the speedy movement of some regiments of General Tyler’s brigade made it se for him to perfect his report as he himself desired. The following table, however, embraces the returns from that officer and from General Ricketts as accurately as was possible under the circumstances:

Killed. Wounded. Missing. ‘Command, . S . Boks, Q x to 2 Some 80 Cee Geode oe ew Glas €@)/o wo/e] o & & ® a0 S Selle he SMl teh ] Bb Se HE < = Third Division, Sixth Army Corps, co mmanded by Brigadier-General Ricketts : Geroralstant ) Ao iciccsccess sstecccewweneall oss wore leer LiL yerdares DI ichavatesftsfote arerseeel isreieee rare il POSTE STI AQC oe ciate asia seas el Ene ne aie a cene 8 54] 62/17 226) 248/ 38 429 $432 937 Becondebrigader acme: scisetes

aCapt. Adam E. King, assistant adjutant-general, severely wounded.

* Ricketts’ report not found.

tGreatly.in excess of the number reported by name. Many of the men here ‘counted as missing probably returned to duty before the preparation of the nominal lists. Such disagreements cannot in any other way be explained. See p. 202.

Killed. Wounded. Missing. – 5 © o Command. : g ; 3 ‘ =) a ‘a oo 2 to £ oo eboy 2 bee) ae) Se Me sn el Reamer Be\S ei\e/ 3 Se] & & 3 ON tO Se eC es < a Troops commanded by Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler: 3d Regiment Potomac Home Brigade ... .... 2/ 2 7 (nel 14 15 ist Regiment Potomac Home Brigade... .... 1} 1 ]. 13 13 . 5 5 19 11th Maryland Volunteers...............- Be el eee 2 BN eich Dibble nel Saas. ee 2 144th Ohio National Guard... ...... .... Peo deh ine hae 10 Leet 20 21 34 149th Ohio National Guard............... nome Aalimeeelb. 10 10 3 184 187 201 Baltimore Battery Light Artillery....... Seca orortallleceistett eee Wan aaeey ack sees 4 8th Regiment Dlinois Cavalry...........- 5 all pe: i) doa ia 19 DEAE Leet en eel Macca 26 Detachment 159th Ohio National Guarda, ....)....] 1 ....)...-..[-----eleeee eeee eee fo serving as mounted infantry. \ POC aE Siiscia.y-5 hae Poesia viva ayia w tartan stage a 1 ) 14/15} 8 65 68 5 223 236 319 Grand fotdleniiha eaten Se 12 87 99{33 546 579 15 1,267] 1,290 1,968

a Commanded by Capt. E. H. Leib, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

The aggregate shows a heavy loss, illustrating the obstinate valor of the command. I am satisfied, however, that the casualties of the rebels exceeded mine. To reach this conclusion one has only to make a calculation based upon the fact that the day after the battle over 400 men, too seriously wounded to be carried away, were captured in the hospital at Frederick City.

Orders have been given to collect the bodies of our dead in one burial ground on the battle-field, suitable for a monument upon ST hicliT: REONEES to write: ‘”‘These men died to save the National Capital, and they did save it.”

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,