Letter

Judson Kilpatrick to William H. Seward, April 2, 1866

Mr. Kilpatrick to Mr. Seward.

No. 3.]

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on the 15th ultimo Admiral Mendez, acting commander-in-chief of the naval forces of her Catholic Majesty in the Pacific, addressed me a note, informing me that the Queen had conferred upon him the full command of those forces, and also had commissioned him as her plenipotentiary, (A.)

I communicated this fact to the members of the diplomatic corps resident in Santiago, and on the 18th acknowledged the receipt of his excellency’s communication in a note, a copy of which is here enclosed, marked B.

On the 17th I received a note from the secretary of foreign relations, informing me that the President had issued a decree on the preceding day prohibiting neutral vessels which communicate with the ships of the Spanish squadrons, or furnish them fuel, provisions, or supplies of any kind, from touching at any port of the republic, and requesting me to inform my government of this fact, (C.)

Enclosed in this note was a certified copy of the decree alluded to, which I have the honor to transmit, accompanied by a translation of the same, (D.)

During the past fortnight I have, in conjunction with Commodore Rodgers, commanding our special squadron now in Valparaiso, labored earnestly to bring about, if possible, some pacific solution to the question pending between Chili and Spain.

The threatening tone of the Spanish press gave reason to believe that measures of extreme severity were about to be exercised, and sundry interviews which the commodore had with the Spanish admiral convinced him that, unless some effort were made to avert it, Valparaiso would soon suffer the horrors of a bombardment. I therefore sought an informal and unofficial interview with Mr. Covarrubias, accompanied by Commodore Rodgers and by Mr. Nelson, my predecessor, on the evening of the 19th ultimo, and stated to him my apprehensions.

Commodore Rodgers informed him that Admiral Mendez was disposed to modify the terms first proposed to Chili, and would accept a mutual salute; and that, in order to facilitate matters, he could hoist the Chilian and Spanish flags at his own mast-head and salute both, the Chilian and Spanish guns joining after the first had been fired from his flag-ship. Mr. Covarrubias replied that these terms would have been acceptable in the beginning of the war, but that Chili now deemed herself the offended party, and did not consider that, after all the sufferings and outrage inflicted upon her by Spain, the two countries occupied positions so parallel as to justify his acceptance of this offer. I then asked what terms Chili did desire, for the purpose of arriving at a settlement; to which he replied that they would be found in his counter-manifesto of the 26th of October, 1865.

Mr. Covarrubias further stated that any terms proposed by or accepted by Spain must of necessity include the republic of Peru and others, which had, since the opening of hostilities, allied themselves to Chili; that public faith and national honor demanded that she should accept no terms which did not include them.

Finding our efforts unavailing for the present, Commodore Rodgers accompanied me on the following morning to Valparaiso, and we appointed the 23d ultimo for an interview with the Spanish admiral on the United States steamer Vanderbilt, there freely to discuss the question in all its bearings, with a view, if possible, to a peaceful solution.

On that day the interview took place as agreed upon. I opened the conversation by stating that as a friend of both nations I was extremely anxious that some amicable arrangement, honorable to both, might be made, and I suggested that as the whole difficulty between the two nations appeared to have arisen in questions of honor, it seemed to me by no means impossible to arrive at some arrangement whereby these vexed questions could be honorably and permanently settled at once. Mendez replied that as far as he was personally concerned he would be most happy to enter into any negotiations that would bring about an amicable arrangement of the difficulties, but unfortunately he had written instructions from his government ordering him to pursue a certain line of conduct, which he as a soldier could not deviate from. He stated that the only terms that Spain would accept were the following:

1. That a note be sent to the Spanish admiral from the government of Chili, stating that it had no wish or intention to insult Spain, with whom it desired to maintain amicable relations; and considered the treaty of peace between the two countries only interrupted, not broken, by the declaration of war.

In proof of this Chili would return the Covadonga, flag, arms, guns, crew, and officers, and all other prizes she may have made.

2. That Spain would say in reply that she was well pleased to return to her ancient friendship with Chili, forgetting all past quarrels, and declaring that she had no desire for conquest in America or of exclusive influence in American republics, whose independence she respects.

In proof of this she returns all the prizes now in the possession of the Spanish squadron, in the condition in which they now are, and all the prisoners of war.

3. After these notes have been exchanged, the friendly intercourse is to be established in the following way:

A reciprocal salute of twenty-one guns is to be fired, the first gun to be fired from the Chilian forts; that then the Spanish admiral will proceed to Santiago, present his credentials as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and enter into negotiations for the permanent settlement of the difficulties.

These propositions the admiral stated were not made by him in his official capacity, but were communicated by him to Commodore Rodgers and myself, in order that if we deemed proper we might communicate them to the government of Chili unofficially, and informed us that he would wait until eight o’clock of the morning of the 27th ultimo, at which time, if the government of Chili had refused to accede to his proposals, or if no answer were received, he would proceed to act.

The next morning I returned to Santiago and sought an interview with Mr. Covarrubias. I informed him of the foregoing conference and of the terms mentioned by Admiral Mendez.

He asked whether they were to be considered as an ultimatum, since, if so, he could neither entertain nor discuss them. I replied that I presumed not, since Admiral Mendez desired no official character to attach to the conversation. He then repeated a remark made by him in my former interview, that he could neither offer nor accept any settlement that did not include an honorable arrangement of the difficulties between the recent allies of the republic and Spain. I informed him that this difficulty having suggested itself to me, I had mentioned it in my conversation with the admiral, who said that if these terms were agreed upon by Chili, similar ones would be offered to the other allied republics. He further stated that it would be impossible to take any steps in the matter without the concurrence of the representatives of those allies, and that the absence of the minister of Peru would render it impossible to give a reply prior to the 27th ultimo, the date upon which I had engaged to inform Admiral Mendez of the result of my conference. He said, however, that he would call a meeting of those representatives and would inform me of the result, if the admiral would wait a few days longer. I gave it as my opinion that he would, and the interview closed.

On the night of the 25th, Commodore Rodgers, accompanied by Commodore de Courcey of the British navy, arrived at Santiago in a special train, and the next morning at 9 o’clock an informal meeting of the diplomatic corps was held, at which it was agreed that the representatives of England, France, Prussia, and Italy should accompany me to Valparaiso to make still further efforts to avert the terrible calamity of a bombardment. A special train was placed at our disposal, and at noon we left for the port.

At 8 o’clock next morning I called upon Admiral Mendez, accompanied by Commodore Rodgers, and briefly informed him of the result of my interview with Mr. Covarrubias. He replied that while he regretted, most deeply, the painful duty which devolved upon him, he as a military man could not but implicitly obey the instructions of his sovereign, and that, complying therewith, he would open his batteries upon the city of Valparaiso on Saturday morning, the 31st ultimo, at 8 o’clock; thus giving four days to non-combatants for their removal. He stated that he would endeavor to injure only public property, but that if private property were destroyed, he could not but place the entire responsibility upon the government of Chili, which had had the opportunity of averting this calamity, and had failed to avail itself thereof.

I returned to the flag-ship Vanderbilt, where, a few minutes later, an officer arrived from the Spanish admiral, bringing a note addressed to me, (E,) begging me to transmit the enclosed manifesto, addressed by him to the diplomatic corps, to its destination.

This latter document, a copy and translation of which form enclosure F, sets forth the reasons which, in the opinion of the writer, justify him in the extreme measures about to be put in force. After asserting that the conduct of Spain, from the earliest moments of the war, had been characterized by extreme moderation and courtesy, a moderation which had induced Chili to believe that she could refuse with impunity the satisfaction due by her to Spain, the admiral states that the forces under his command had made two ineffectual attempts to seriously engage the allied fleets of Chili and Peru in the waters of Chiloe, where he found them defended by narrow passages, and behind natural bulwarks of rock; that having passed through grave perils in those unknown regions, never entered before by vessels of the draught of his own, and having found it impossible to bring on a decisive action, he had determined for that reason, and on account of the obstinacy of Chili in refusing the amends demanded, to bombard this city at the expiration of the four days above mentioned.

I at once issued a circular (G) to the members of the diplomatic corps then in Valparaiso, informing them of the grave events about to take place, and requesting them to meet me at 2 p. m. for the purpose of devising, if possible, some means to prevent such a cruel and inhuman act of warfare. I also addressed a note to the French minister, stating that inasmuch as there were no French naval forces present in the bay, I desired to place at his disposition those of the United States, for the protection of the lives and interests of his fellow-subjects, (H.) It was my earnest desire that the diplomatic representatives of France and England should join with me, or at least should request that our forces should protect their respective peoples as well as our own. Mr. Thompson, the English charge, requested that the meeting be postponed until 9 p. m. to give him time to receive his despatches expected by the steamer then due, in which he hoped to receive definite instructions from his government. The postponement was of course made. Meanwhile petitions were handed to me and to Commodore Rodgers from the American, German, Danish and Hamburg citizens and subjects, (I, K, L, and M,) imploring our protection from the imminent peril which threatened them, and deputations of all nationalities waited upon me with like requests. The French residents called upon their representative, the English merchants made an earnest appeal to Mr. Thompson, and alarm and apprehension were every where visible.

At the same time that the admiral addressed me the communication transmitting me his manifesto, he transmitted to Commodore Rodgers a similar communication to the dean of the consular corps, and a brief note of like purport to the commandant of Valparaiso, (N,) to which the latter replied in a note, accepting calmly the coming evil, and maintaining throughout a dignified but earnest style, (O.)

On the same day the intendente or civil governor of Valparaiso issued a proclamation to the people, announcing the threatened bombardment, urging them to accept the sacrifice with resignation, and to avoid the slightest disorder, (P.)

The steamer arrived as anticipated, at 3 p. m., but brought no intelligence of importance. In the evening the chargé d’affaires of Prussia informed me that the English minister, being engaged to dine on board the Sutley, the British flag-ship, would prefer that the conference, which was to take place at 9 p. m., be postponed until the following morning at 10 a. m. To this I also consented. I was, however, totally unprepared for the announcement which met me the following morning, that the British and French ministers, having vainly endeavored to obtain a special train in the middle of the night, had determined at all events to proceed to Santiago by the 10 o’clock ordinary train, and were about starting for the station.

They departed without either acknowledging my note of invitation or giving any reason for so abrupt and discourteous a proceeding.

I asked the English minister if he desired the co-operation of the United States forces to prevent the wanton destruction of millions of property belonging to English subjects, and I stated that it was in his power to prevent that destruction by merely uttering one word. That word he refused to utter.

At 10 a. m. the remaining members of the diplomatic corps, the representatives of Prussia and Italy, met at my rooms, and a brief conference resulted in the decision that it was inexpedient and unwise for the American naval forces to oppose the bombardment of Valparaiso, in the face of the refusal of the representatives of France and England to make any effort for its protection. Had those representatives asked that our forces co-operate with those of England to that end, and thus given us moral support in our contemplated action, neither Commodore Rodgers nor myself would have hesitated to have used force to prevent the destruction of this city.

The port of Valparaiso is a purely commercial town, of from 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. Its trade with Europe and the United States is immense, and its public warehouses have generally within them from thirty to fifty millions of dollars of foreign property. Its merchants are Americans, French, English, and Germans, by whom its real estate is owned; and the public property of the government is represented by the bonded warehouses, railroad station, and the intendente’s palace. Upon the hill to the west of the city is a saluting battery, in front of a building used as a cuartel for a few artillerymen, and called by the people the “fort.” For many months there has not been a single gun mounted there, and Valparaiso cannot, by even the most strained imagination, be considered a fortified town.

Some weeks since Admiral Mendez notified the British naval commander that if a single torpedo boat were launched, or any attempt were made to destroy any of the ships under his command by means of torpedoes, he would bombard the town. Was not the inference natural, that if they were not used he would not proceed to that extremity?

Writers upon international law have repeatedly laid down that it is not lawful to bombard purely commercial places where their destruction does not advance the military operations of the war, and that even then private property should be respected. But the very form of Valparaiso, built as it is upon a narrow strip of sand, on the sides and at the foot of steep hills, renders a conflagration of a most disastrous character most imminent in case of a bombardment.

Believing, therefore, that the threatened bombardment was an act of vandalism, in contravention of custom and international law, inasmuch as foreign interests alone would suffer, I have done all in my power to avert or oppose it.

But while these were my feelings and belief—while I desired to protect the lives and property of innocent neutrals and non-combatants, and especially of our countrymen—I felt that I owed a higher duty to the broader interests of my country at home, and that I could not risk the certainty of a war with Spain at this moment when we have just emerged, bleeding and exhausted, from the mightiest struggle the world ever saw, unless England and France, who are tenfold more deeply concerned than we in the preservation of the material interests of Valparaiso, would compromise themselves by asking that protection from us which they were unable themselves to give.

When, therefore, the consular corps of Valparaiso (with the exception of the consuls of France and England) called upon me at 10½ o’clock on the 28th ultimo, to make another united appeal for protection, I frankly defined my position, told them how earnestly and faithfully I had labored, first to bring about peace, and then to throw a barrier between them and the threatened danger; that I had failed in both attempts, and could not feel justified in assuming alone the responsibility of protecting the foreign property in this city; that while the co-operation of those most interested was wanting, the American fleet would not, by force, prevent the action of the Spanish admiral.

One of the number then proposed a vote of thanks to Commodore Rodgers and myself for our exertions to protect foreign property, and the consul general of Portugal, dean of the corps, proposed that they rise to their feet and confirm the proposition by acclamation, which was done, each member of the corps pressing forward to grasp the hands of the commodore and myself. Mr. Lyon, consul general of Portugal, an English subject by birth, was painfully affected, and with difficulty controlled his emotion.

I at once proceeded to the intendencia, and informed the governor and commandant of what had passed. He stated that he was not surprised, that the government did not expect the American fleet to act unsupported, and, in its name and that of the people of Chili, he desired to express their grateful sense of our endeavors.

The commandant informed me, in reply to a question, that it was not the intention to fire a single shot from shore; that, on the contrary, it would be prohibited; that they desired the barbarity of the act to be patent to the world, and would not give the Spaniards the opportunity of reporting a combat in which the forces were so infinitely disproportioned.

I then addressed Admiral Mendez a note acknowledging the receipt of his manifesto of the 27th, and in the name of my government protesting against the bombardment as an unusual, unnecessary, and cruel mode of warfare, (P bis.)

Similar notes were addressed by a majority of the consular corps, by the consuls of France, England, and the Argentine Republic, and by the consul of Belgium, (Q, R, and S.)

That of the consular corps, being deemed by Admiral Mendez disrespectful, was returned to the dean of that body. He replied, however, to that of the Belgian consul, (T.)

On the 29th ultimo the president issued a proclamation to the people of Chili, which was published here on the 30th ultimo, (U.)

On the morning of the 29th ultimo I telegraphed to Santiago for Mr. Covarrubias, minister of foreign relations, the despatch being signed by Commodore Rodgers, Mr. Nelson and myself. We assumed this responsibility in consequence of an intimation from the Spanish admiral that he was disposed to address a note to the commandant of the place, stating that, “inasmuch as Valparaiso was a purely commercial and unfortified port, &c., &c., the magnanimity of Spain would not permit its destruction, if Chili, in reply, would state that she yielded to magnanimity what she refused to force;” and the road to negotiation being thus opened, interviews might take place on board our flagships, leading ultimately to arbitration or some such peaceful solution.

He arrived at midnight, and at an early hour on the following morning I called upon him with the commodore and Mr. Nelson, and asked him what reply would be given by the government of Chili in case such a note were addressed by Admiral Mendez. Mr. Covarrubias begged to reply by another proposition. He stated that as Admiral Mendez had given as a reason for bombarding Valparaiso the fact that he could not meet the Chilian and Peruvian vessels, he would now, in order to save defenceless neutrals, and non-combatants, suggest a plan which he trusted would be accepted by the admiral. He offered to place the allied squadron ten miles from the port of Valparaiso, there to meet an equal or even greater Spanish force than their own, and there give battle, the result of which should be decisive.

He asked Commodore Rodgers, if he would accept the position of umpire, and indicate what ships should go into action from the Spanish squadron, excluding only the iron-clad ram Numancia (7,000 tons) from the list. Commodore Rodgers informed him that the proposed position was a delicate one, but that if he could, by any proper means, avert the bombardment, he would do so, and that he accepted the office of arbiter, premising that he would insist upon a Spanish and a Chilian naval officer being detailed to inform him of the relative size and armament of the vessels.

Shortly afterward Commodore Rodgers proceeded on board the Numancia, bearing the offer of Mr. Covarrubias, addressed to the Spanish admiral through the commandant of the place, Colonel Villalon, (V.)

Admiral Mendez declined the offer, stating that as a military man he knew the superiority of his forces, and should of course avail himself thereof; that the bombardment would take place the following morning, two blank shots being fired at 8 o’clock, and the bombardment to follow an hour later.

Commodore Rodgers came on shore at once and informed Mr. Covarrubias of the result. The latter denounced the impending destruction as barbarous and inhuman, and stated that Chili at least would not disgrace humanity, but would carry on the war according to the laws and customs of civilized nations. At 8 o’clock that evening he returned to Santiago in a special train. On the morning of the 31st the Spanish admiral fulfilled his threat, and for three hours the cannonading was almost incessant. The frigates Villa de Madrid, Blanca, and Resolution, and the gunboat Vencedora, participated in it, and the shots were principally directed to the custom-house stores, the intendencia or governor’s residence, and the railroad station. The first shot was fired at 9 a. m., the last at noon, at which hour the Spanish flag was hoisted at the fore yard of the Numancia, as a signal that the bombardment was at an end. The intendencia was riddled, as was the exchange, which stood between it and the sea. Four of the public warehouses were set on fire and destroyed with their contents, and some twenty-five private dwellings in another portion of the city shared the same fate. Although, at the request of Mendez, white flags were placed on the hospitals and churches, they were not spared, several such buildings, completely out of the line of fire, being repeatedly struck with shot and shell.

The casualties were slight, as far as I have been able to ascertain, some two or three killed, and as many wounded, although not less than two thousand shots were fired. The amount of property destroyed is estimated at from fifteen to twenty millions of dollars, of which loss less than five per cent will fall upon Chili, it being nearly all foreign property and merchandise. Great alarm was experienced during the rest of the day and the following morning, in consequence of the rumor that the bombardment was to be resumed on Wednesday. On Friday Commodore Rodgers had written a brief bulletin upon his return from his last interview with the admiral, (W,) informing the public that two blank shots would be fired one hour before the beginning of the bombardment, and that the Spanish flag hoisted at the fore yard-arm of the Numancia would signalize its close, after which no bombardment would take place without further notification.

To calm this excitement, I requested Commodore Rodgers to see Admiral Mendez, and ask him if he intended continuing the work of destruction. He did so, and informed me that the admiral replied verbally, that he had no intention, at present, of continuing the bombardment. This reply was speedily embodied in a note and given to the public, (X.)

The news was received with distrust, but the street cars began their usual trips, and a feeling of relief was soon manifested in the handful of residents remaining in the city. The distress caused by this savage act of revenge is deep. Tens of thousands of people, unable to afford the expense of distant removal, were scattered over the hills in the rear of the city, cowering in fear, and trembling as the shot and shell flew shrieking over their heads and buried themselves in the soil beyond. Others, panic-stricken, fled from the devoted city, carrying with them their little all, and passed the night, without food or shelter, on the bleak and barren mountains. In the destruction of the western section of the city by fire was included a vast number of small dealers, mechanics, and others, all foreigners, whose entire means were swept away, since they had trusted implicitly in the promises of Admiral Mendez not to injure private property, and had removed nothing.

As the fleet continued its fire for an hour and a half after the first appearance of the flames, preventing all access to the spot, the conflagration had assumed gigantic proportions by noon when the signal to cease firing was given, and all that could be done was to save the surrounding property. It is presumed that the Spanish fleet will now proceed to Coquimbo, Caldera, and other ports on this coast, and will lay them also in ashes. As there are in those ports, especially in Caldera, large American interests, I have requested Commodore Rodgers to proceed with his fleet to whatever port may be next visited, and there defend by force, if necessary, American property and interests whenever he may find them isolated from those of others.

If this vandal-like warfare be permitted to continue unchecked and unrebuked, American interests on this coast will be utterly ruined. The Valparaiso partner of one American house informed me to-day that his firm had lost by the destruction of goods in the bonded warehouses about $80,000; other American houses have been equally unfortunate, and they all speak most despondently in regard to any future commercial operations on this coast. I have instructed our consuls on the Chilian sea-board to point out distinctly to Admiral Mendez the property of American citizens, where disconnected from that of other foreigners, and to appeal for real and tangible protection to the commodore, who, at my request, will protect them until I receive other and distinct orders from the department.

Without such orders, without clear and precise instructions how to act in cases of emergency, such as the one through which we have just passed, I am placed in a position of no ordinary embarrassment, and I most earnestly request that they be transmitted to me without delay. I omitted to state that the representatives of England, France, Prussia, and Italy also protested against the bombardment, but neither the documents nor the replies have seen the light. The reply of Admiral Mendez to my own forms enclosure Y, here with. I likewise enclose, marked Z, a copy of the note of the Austrian consul general to Commodore Rodgers, dated the 26th ultimo, asking his protection.

I trust that the confusion and inconveniences naturally attending the preparations of a despatch as voluminous as the present, during a bombardment, may account for the apparent carelessness of its style, and inelegance of its execution.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. KILPATRICK.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

The Intendente of the province to the inhabitants of Valparaiso.

[Translation.]

The chief of the Spanish squadron stationed in our bay is disposed to consummate the outrage of opening the fire of his batteries upon this defenceless city on the 31st instant, at 8 o’clock a. m. Such is the announcement issued by the chief himself to the commandant of this port.

The people of Valparaiso, who have given so many proofs of their patriotic self-denial will know how to support with calmness the sacrifice demanded of them for the preservatian intact of the honor of the republic. This very people who would know how to chastise the enemy, who might dare to assail them, without the advantages affored by the distance and impunity enjoyed by the Spanish squadron, is deficient in the elements necessary to make the slightest resistance to the bombardment with which we are threatened; but they possess the indomitable energy to hazard a sepulture beneath the ruins of their homes, rather than consent to the humiliation which Spain proposes to us.

With the same decision and energy with which we accept the wanton and unjust war to which she has provoked us, we ought also to accept the barbarous sacrifice of extermination with which we are threatened.

Such is the conviction of all, and the authorities as well as the citizens well know how to remain worthy of our antecedents. But besides serenity in danger, we ought to present to the world a heroic example of a people wantonly destroyed; but not sullied by the slightest stain upon their reputation for culture or civilization. Let no disorder take place in this city, which is about to become the theatre of martyrdom and heroism of our entire people. Let the Spaniards, and them only, be covered with shame at the contemplation of the smoking ruins of a city which has been the emporium of commerce in the South Pacific, and which is about to be converted into a field of ruin and desolation.

The authorities in concert with the citizens will fulfil the honorable duty of consecrating their watchfulness to the protection of the victims of Spanish fury. Let all the inhabitants of Valparaiso comprehend in the same manner the lofty duties to their country and their fellow-citizens. Our recompense will be the greatest satisfaction that Providence can dispense to a people, that of preserving spotless their dignity and their honor.

J. RAMON LIRA.

The President of the republic to the citizens.

[Translation.]

Fellow-citizens: The bombardment of Valparaiso will be the scandal of the world in the nineteenth century; the desolation of a commercial port, unprovided with walls to protect and cannon to defend it, is neither more nor less than an outrage against civilization.

To our enemies will belong the shame of having basely destroyed more houses, factories, railroads, telegraphs, and public and private buildings, in a flourishing port of the Pacific, where all foreigners, including even the Spaniards themselves, have ever found hospitality and protection. Chili, as you know, was at length compelled to accept the war which Admiral Pareja declared against her on the 18th of September—a day of glorious memory. We have fought nobly. In the waters of Papudo we obtained a splendid triumph. From Abtao our enemies fled ingloriously, and now they seek vengeance by venting their fury against the roofs of a city which cannot oppose any resistance to a squadron which commands it from afar to destroy it.

Is this the proof they have come to give us of their ancient Castilian pride, and of the nobility of modern Spain, which is at this moment boasting that she has a history which relates a glory on every page ! The admiral who asked from us amends for imaginary offences to the Spanish flag, with his own hands now drags it in the dust, and stains it in the blood of children and the aged.

Chilinos, trust in your government, who faithfully interpreting your noble sentiments, will sign no agreement dishonorable to the republic, great as may be their desire to be at peace with all nations of the world.

Chilinos, the brave are always magnanimous. Moderate your just wrath, and cause the contrast to be clear between the brutal acts of the enemy and the noble conduct of a cultivated people.

JOSÉ JOAQUIN PEREZ.
Notes
1. P.
2. U.
Sources
FRUS u2014 Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty View original source ↗
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty.