John Pope to Henry H. Sibley, February 20, 1863

Brig. Gen. H. H. SIBLEY, Commanding District of Minnesoto:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 16th has been received, and I must express to you my surprise and regret at its contents. You have under your command five and a half regiments of infantry, one regiment nearly full of cavalry, and as much artillery as is needed for the force. You have plenty of horses to mount as much infantry as you desire, independent of the cavalry regiment, and yet you ask for more troops. So far as I know, there never yet has been assembled more than one. half of this force in this country for operations against Indian tribes, and, until the beginning of this civil war, 1 know no general who has ever commanded the amount of force now under your immediate orders. So far from thinking you have too little force, my impression is, and has been, that there are more troops in Minnesota than are needed there, and I beg you will make, as soon as practicable, every preparation to move against the Indians in the spring. The large garrisons at every frontier village will be wholly unnecessary after you commence your campaign. In fact, I only left them where they are, to winter, to restore confidence to a population panic-stricken at the outrages lately committed upon the frontier settlements, and not because they are really necessary to protect these places from danger. There are no troops in this State except the Thirty-first Regiment, now under orders from Washington to leave for the South. I shall not refer your letter to Washington, where I am sure it will occasion as much surprise as it did me, until I hear from you again. Just consider, general, that you have under your command quite one-half of the force constituting the whole of the old army before the war, and which was scattered over our whole country, from the Mississippi to the Pacific. Two thousand ep has always been considered a very large force, a8 it has been a very upusual amount of force to be used in any of our most important expeditions against the Indians; and surely now, when the country is in the most pressing need of troops at Murfreesborough and Vicksburg, you should consider carefully before, with more than twice that number of men in Minneso’a alone, you apply for additional troops. I am sure you know, general, that 1 am very desirous of supporting you in every possible way, and of assuring success in all your operations, but your application for more troops has so surprised me that I scarcely know what to expect. Be good enough to send me, at once, a return of alk the troops in your district, and, if you continue to ask for re-enforcements, I must refer your letter to Washington, for the information of the Government. A vigorous campaign must be opened against the Indians as soon as the spring opens, both from Minnesota and from the Missouri River. The routes of travel can only be made secure in this way. I shall with difficulty be able to assemble one-third of your force on the Upper Missouri (certainly I shall not be able to assemble one-half), and that force is considered abundant by both officers and agents in that section. I have little idea that any attack will be directed toward Minnesota while such a force as you have is in that certain to my mind that if the Indians make any concerted movement it will be against the settlements in Dakota and along the Missouri region, and yet no one living there has placed the amount of force necessary for security, and to crush out the Indians, at more than 2,500. I beg you to reconsider carefully your application for more troops, as I shall dislike much to be obliged to forward it to Washington. I am, general,

respectfully, your obedient servant,