John Mercer Langston to L. Ethéart, January 18, 1879

Mr. Langston to Mr. Ethéart.

Sir: I have heretofore, on the 26th of December last, acknowledged the receipt of your dispatch dated December 7, 1878, having reference to consular impositions made under the law of the 23d of August, 1877. I desire now to offer in answer to your dispatch, several considerations. If I repeat and insist upon the correctness of the objections already submitted, it is because I am still of the opinion that the arguments made by you and your excellent predecessor, in defense of the legislation referred to, and the consular charges enjoined, are inconclusive and unsatisfactory. And, besides, I beg you, if in the sequel it appears that I have not made direct and special allusion to each consideration Offered by you in your dispatch, not to conclude that I admit as true the consideration not thus specially mentioned. As heretofore, the general scope and purview of any one, certainly the whole of the reasons which I shall now offer, will reach, and, as I believe, discover, the fallacious character of all that is contained in the correspondence on the part of your government as matter of defense of the consular charges in debate.

In considering the matter in difference between us, the course which justice, duty, and interest enjoin upon your government with regard thereto, it is well that you remember that the Republic of Hayti has made with no other nation such treaty as the one made by it with the United States of America. The words of such treaty, especially those of its preamble, which were intended to illuminate and illustrate the phraseology of its several provisions, cannot be held in this discussion as without special meaning, but the rather, as significant in the broadest and best sense. I refer to such words as these:

“And to place their [the United States of America and the Republic of Hayti] commercial relations upon the most liberal basis, have resolved to fix, in a manner clear, distinct, and positive, the rules which shall, in future, be religiously observed between the one and the other, by means of a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation.”

What is the promise, and what the pledge of these words? Certainly that in dealing with the commercial interests of the one and other government, the rule to be adopted is that founded upon “the most liberal basis.” Is such the rule adopted and enforced under your law of the 23d of August, 1877? Let this question be answered in the light of what is attempted to be done by the law.

First of all, according to the very terms of the law, the charges are levied for a double purpose: first, to meet the consular exactions; and, secondly, to raise funds for the public treasury.

For the first purpose 15 per cent. of the amount collected is used; and for the second, 85 per cent. And this duty is levied upon articles, except perhaps the money mentioned in the second clause of the first article of the law, which, when they reach the ports of your country, are subject to other heavy custom-house duties, of which you have such abundant and exact knowledge, how can you reasonably maintain that the consular exactions referred to are not, under the circumstances, excessive? Nor do you meet this objection of exorbitance by saying, in reply, that they are eventually paid by the Haytian consumer. And more than this, being excessive in and of themselves, and especially so, in view of the circumstances mentioned, they tend to, and do, obstruct and retard the commercial interests of the two governments.

But in so far forth as the charges under consideration are levied, and collected for any other than consular purposes proper; in so far forth as they are levied and collected to meet the general wants of the government, as declared in the very terms of the law, and admitted in your dispatch, they are contrary to the well-defined usages, with relation to the consular service, as recognized by the great powers of the earth. I cannot conceive how it is possible for you to deny the correctness of this position. If so, you must destroy all those peculiar characteristics which distinguish the diplomatic and consular service, and make the charges connected therewith special and unique. You must show that one government has a right to levy of its own volition, without reference to international obligations, expressed or implied, and to collect by its consular agents within the jurisdiction of another, such taxes, without reference to the purpose for which they are to be used, as may suit its convenience and wants. Is it necessary that I suggest that such proceeding would be very justly regarded as altogether unusual and objectionable? But you reply that the charge levied by your law has to do simply with merchandise intended to be shipped from a foreign country to Hayti. I admit it. But the principle remains the same; and your charge is nothing, other than an old ad valorem duty levied upon merchandise in the country from which it is to be exported by the government of your country into which it is proposed to import it, such duty being levied upon the fallacious and indefensible doctrine, that through the indirect instrumentality of the consular service the foreign government may collect, after levying, by a law passed by its own legislature, such duty, within the territory and jurisdiction from which the merchandise is to be shipped.

And thus the objection which I now urge becomes double in character, not only violative of all well-defined and wise usages as regards the consular service, but violative of a fundamental rule of national sovereignty as regards the matter of taxation. And this last position you admit when in your dispatch you invoke, in defense of this tax, the doctrine so well illustrated in the designation “exterritoriality.” But here you can find no help, for this doctrine in this case can have no application, especially when these charges, according to the language of the law, are made general as to their purpose and are collected for the benefit of the public exchequer. The words of the law in its preamble being: “Qus l’impôt prélevé par les consulate ne profite ancunement à la caisse publique,” these words sufficiently reveal the object of your law, the purpose of your consular exactions.

For these good and all sufficient reasons, I beg to enter, with renewed earnestness and emphasis, the solemn protest of my government against the collection of the consular impositions and charges referred to, and to demand the reimbursement of all sums heretofore paid by American citizens.

Seizing this opportunity, Mr. Secretary, to tender you the assurance of my most distinguished consideration,

I am, &c.,