John G. Barnard to Charles P. Stone, September 28, 1861

General STONE:

SIR: I received your letter of this morning at 7 o’clock. We have sent the Twelfth Indiana, a good regiment, with a section of Captain Best’s artillery, to the relief of Colonel Geary. They start at once, and will reach Noland’s Ferry by nightfall.

Very truly, yours,

Washington, September 28, 1861. Maj-Gen. GEORGE B. MCULELLAN:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in compliance with your instruetions I went down the Potomac yesterday as far as Mathias

Sherburne, late of the rebel army. Lieutenant Wyman’s knowledge of the river was of great service in . pointing out the different localities. The first point available to the enemy for the erection of batteries to obstruct navigation is Whitestone. The lower part of this point is a bluff about 100 feet high, the face of which may have an extent of five or six hundred yards. From this bluff batteries would rake the channel below as far as shot or shell would reach. It is thickly wooded up to its very edge, and through a portion of the extent the woods extend down the face of the bluff to the water’s edge. The river opposite Whitestone Point is but slightly over a mile wide. The next location requiring notice is Hallowing

20 to 30 feet. Batteries on this point would be very effective, but it is so low and open to observation that we can prevent their con-

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> Char. XIV] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION.

struction or make it very difficult to. hold them if constructed. High Point comes next. The river is full 2 miles wide here. In the military sense of the term the channel could not be “obstructed” by a battery

so distant. Commercial.vessels would, however, be reluctant to pass

under its fire. The point I should not judge to be more than 30 or our own vessels of war cannot efficiently shell it. I think we may soon look for a battery here. Freestone Point comes next, and a battery exists there, supposed to have five guns, one of which (perhaps two) is said to be a rifled 30-pounder. In passing down the ship channel I found it impossible to distinguish this battery—the weather was not; clear—but I can readily judge of its position. Its elevation is probably 50 or 60 feet, the gun rising still higher behind it, and, though its front was concealed by a skirt of wood, a corn field extends behind it one or two hundred yards, and then woods again clothing the elevation behind. To the left and southward are open slopes extending down to the water. Probably, therefore, the rear of the battery would be quite accessible, so far as physical obstacles are concerned, to an attack. Why has a battery been placed here so far from the ship channel of the Potomac? Not unlikely it is for defensive purposes, as I presumed those at Aquia Creek five weeks ago to be.

Cockpit Point is 40 or 50 feet high, with a very low spit projecting a few hundred feet into the river. The height is wooded, if I recollect rightly. From this point to the Quantico the river bank rises in irregular hills, partly wooded, partly open, offering numerous points where batteries could be established to bear by cross-fire on the channel. Even here, however, the narrowest part of the river after passing Hallowing Point until Mathias Point is reached, vessels can keep themselves from one and a half to two miles from the batteries. Shipping Point (Evansport) lies between the Quantico and Chopawamsic. A plateau, generally cleared, forms the termination of this peninsula, very near behind which the hills rise, and are generally wooded. The point next the Quantico is the most favorable for a battery, but it is level, open, and not more than 20 or 30 feet high, and easily accessible to our vessels. After passing the Chopawamsic the river widens, and the – shores recede too much from the channel to offer favorable locations for batteries. The batteries of Aquia and Potomac Creeks need no special allusion in this brief communication. They are evidently defensive. Mathias Point is the one of the whole river (except perhaps Whitestone) where the navigation could be most effectually closed. The favorable location for batteries is the northern extremity, comprising an area of no great extent, and thickly covered with young pines. Why has not this point been before this occupied by hostile batteries? Simply, I believe, because it would require a good many guns and a good many men to protect those guns at a remote point, where the men and guns would be lost for any other purpose than this subordinate one of interrupting our navigation. The enemy would not risk a battery here without either a strong field work for 1,000 men or a large field force in the vicinity. Such a field work we are perfectly sure has not been built, and the evidence is in favor of the opinion that there are no batteries there. The best way to prevent their construction seems to me to cut or burn off the pine wood. A regiment, I think, would cut it off in a few hours if protected by our vessels. If the timber will burn standing, an operation on a smaller scale will do the business. In the same manner the construction of batteries on Whitestone Point may be prevented.

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Batteries at High Point, at Cockpit Point, and thence down to the Chopawamsic, cannot be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on certain points, but along here somewhere the enemy can

establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as.he chooses What is the `

remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be certainly anticipated nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack and capture of a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture all, and by new attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front can prevent us building and maintaining field works to protect Arlington and Alexandria by capturing them one and all as fast as they are built. As long as the enemy is master of the other shore he can build and maintain as many batteries as he chooses. If we cannot take his batteries, we can counter-batter them—that is, we can on Stump Neck and Budd’s Ferry Point establish superior batteries to his, and it is probable we can so molest him on all points where his batteries could be effectually treated as to cause him to abandon his

effort. It must be considered, however, that this is an operation costly »

in men and munitions. We must have numerous and powerful guns; we must have several strong field works, the location of which may have to be changed by some unexpected change in the disposition of an antagonist’s batteries. I should estimate that we should require ten to twenty heavy guns on Indian Head and fifty established on the shore from opposite Cockpit Point to opposite Evansport. In the same manner, should the enemy actually succeed in establishing batteries on Whitestone Point and Mathias Point, we could counter- ‘ batter them from the opposite shores. At Mathias the shore just ` north of Upper Cedar Point and the bluff north of Pope’s Creek furnish, at 2 miles’ distance, good employment for batteries. My apprehension that the enemy will actually occupy those points is not suffcient to induce mé to recommend (particularly should the timber be

cut off) the construction of the necessary batteries and the inclosing field works as a preventive measure. As to counter-batteries for the portion of the river between High Point and Evansport, I would wait

until the disposition and ability of the enemy seriously to molest the .

navigation is more fully developed before commencing. I am,

very respectfully, your most obedient,