John Brown Cutting to John Adams, June 3, 1790

London June 3 d 1790

Dear Sir

I inclosed You a few days ago a parcel of printed papers some of
which I conceived might contain interesting intelligence especially if the dispute
between Britain & Spain shoud terminate in hostilities, as in such an event the
government of the United States woud at least be involved in discussions of considerable
importance to our country with one or both of those nations.

Among the rest you have an authentic copy of the memorial or
narrative of M r Mears on the seisure of the british vessels
in Nootka sound—as also a sketch of the debate in parliament occasion’d by the message
of his britannic majesty on that affair. 1 You will not however obtain from the sketch an adequate conception of the high tone in
which the minister spoke. It was thoroughly understood on all sides of the house—(I
speak this from having been an auditor) that in unanimously promising his majesty
national support against the insult of Spain the minister on his part was pledged to
obtain not only pecuniary reparation for the confiscated property and for the insult
offered to the british flag, but also a full dereliction from the Court of Spain of its
claim to exclusive sovereignty over the coasts in the vicinity of Nootka Sound and on
the northwest coasts of America and of exclusive navigation and commerce in those seas.
A categorical answer to a demand of this sort is pretended by the Court of London to be
expected from Madrid by the return of a messenger sent with it just four weeks ago.
Meanwhile the warlike preparations in every port and corner of the Island are most
vigourous and extensive. Ever since the summer of 1787 Spain has been putting her fleets
in the most formidable condition.— Nor can one believe that the mere menace of Britain
will make her under such circumstances yield the point in contest. In such a crisis it
was natural for both nations to turn their eyes on France with considerable anxiety. The
late discussion and determination in her national assembly of the great constitutional
question whether the power of declaring war shou’d be lodged with the Legislature or be
confided to the Executive was doubtless hasten’d
by this anxiety. The settlement of this point in favour of the Legislative body is
conceived by many here as decisive that the french nation will take no part in a war
between Spain and Britain. But a more erroneous conclusion never was made. The military
spirit of the nation is more alive than ever—and if a majority of its representatives
shou’d after public discussion and debate decree to go to war, it wou’d be carried on
with more vigour than ever. A partial sale of the ecclesiastical remains for a paper
currency has opend a resource of finance that in case of state necessity might be vastly
amplified. 2 And as to the supposed
hazard that Spain might interfere to attempt a counter-revolution in France the idea is
already scouted by the partizans of the reform. Two points only are wanting to produce a
decree of the french national assembly for war. 1. A persuasion that the spanish have
justice on their side in the present quarrel. and 2 dly: That
it is for the interest of the french that the mines of South America shoud not become
british property. I expect to see both positions established by fact and argument shoud
Britain manifestly overstep the limits of equity in her claims. In the interim the naval
preparations in the ports of France will keep pace with those in the ports of
Britain.

From the moment that a spanish war was publicly known to be
impending—the people of the United States began to rise in the estimation of all ranks
of men here. Instead of being considered as heretofore a sort of republican banditti
enemies to kings and good order on land, and on the ocean one grade above the algerines
only—in the course of a very few days we became popular in the City and bearable I am
told even in the Cabinet! 3 The unkind
behaviour of Cap t Hendricks an american navigator at Nootka
sound—in not quarreling with the spanish Commodore was overlooked: 4 and the leading Editors of the ministerial
newspapers have now orders to affirm that the offer of a treaty offensive and defensive
between Britain and America is already dispatchd across the atlantic. 5 The principal inducements to an acceptance of
such a treaty on the part of Congress—is a guarantee of a free navigation of the river
Missisippi—a participation of some farther indulgencies as to the west india traffic—an
adjustment of all disputed boundaries and a speedy surrender of the posts.

I wish the present juncture cou’d be improved for the adjustment of
some criterion whereby our seamen might be discriminated from british seamen and
consequently exempted from the outrages of the british press gangs. The great point to
be guarded against on our part is—the first violence of having our mariners forced from
on board our ships under a pretext that they are britons.— To do
away all colour for committing it some palpable species of prima facie evidence is
wanted—such as being immediately produced might stare every officer of a press gang in
the face and leave him without excuse if he ventured to depart from the orders of the
Admiralty Board by which he is ever directed to take no foreigners. A few days after I
had memorializ’d the Lords of the Admiralty and almost exacted by dint of diligent and
remonstrating assiduity the liberation of those six crews, or parts of crews which had
been impress’d, M r Governeur Morris to whom I had
communicated my toils and their termination sent a note to the duke of Leeds and asking
for an hours conversation with him—stated verry forcibly to him the pernicious effect
that impressing our mariners must have on the commerce of Britain. 6 The Duke listen’d to him, thanked him, seemed to
believe him and said orders shou’d be issued and measures taken to prevent the american
seamen from being impress’d in future. But there are real difficulties in the business
that general commands of this nature do not meet. As a zealous citizen I do wish some
effectual remedy to such a national mischief and indignity coud be devised. No moment
can be more favourable for attempting something of the sort than the present. The
perfect protection of our mariners from being impressed or impeded is just now a
desirable object to the commercial part of this nation. In former wars when the british
seamen were press’d to mann the navy—the merchants coud generally procure Swedes
Hollanders and other european seamen to supply their places—but at present all those
foreign seamen are engaged by their sovereigns , Start deletion, in
war , End, or by their fellow subjects—and the british merchant will be compeld to
resort to the United States for american seamen in lieu of them.

As I send this letter one post later than that by which the mail is
conveyed to Falmouth—it is necessary for me to close it immediately to obtain the chance
of its reaching M r Rutledge at Falmouth.

I intreat M rs Adams to accept with
yourself the best compliments and sincere good wishes of / Your respectful affectionate
/ and most obed t ser t:

John Brown Cutting