Letter

John B. Floyd to Simon Cameron, November 7, 1861

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF KANAWHA,

SIR:

I asked instructions from the War Department nearly two weeks since as to the best point to be occupied by this command as winter quarters.* In my previous dispatches I attempted to present such facts and reasons as would possess the Department of my views upon the general policy which might be considered.in determining the point. Since that time I have marched to this point, and have driven the enemy entirely across the Kanawha, where, except the very hurried predatory parties, he is now strictly confined. I send you herewith a sketcht of the country immediately around here, which will enable you to see at a glance our position, that of the enemy, and to understand what has been accomplished by the movement to the Kanawha.

When I crossed New River the enemy were in possession of all the country on the south side of Kanawha River as far as Raleigh Court- try upon their lines of march. They had penetrated within 70 miles of

the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and had produced the greatest alarm amongst the people of Mercer, Giles, and Monroe, who felt that whilst the enemy could with impunity occupy this region (Fayette and Raleigh Counties), there could be no safety for them even in their homes. The feeling of confidence and security is now fully realized by all the country in the rear of us, and it becomes a question of great importance to select a proper point for winter quarters, that the advantage we have gained may not be lost, and that the people may remain at their homes following their regular pursuits. This point itself presents many advantages. The position is strong. Our right flank is completely protected by the cliffs of New River and the Gorge of Piney for the dis-

tance of 40 miles. Our front can be easily rendered impregnable to five times our number. It is in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, where.we annoy him constantly, and holding it, he is unable to advance upon us except with an overwhelming force, or to advance upon Lewisburg, orto leave his position without abandoning the great connecting

link between the northwest proper, the railroad at Clarksburg, and the Kanawha Valley, and I think it would be impossible for the enemy to hold his position if we had guns of large caliber. : Fuel here is extremely abundant and the exposure a good one for the mountains. The chief obstacle to this point is the difficulty of transportation. The line is 100 miles long from the railroad, over a mountain road (not macadamized) which becomes very deep and muddy in the winter. Probably most of the advantages pertaining to this position could be realized by falling back to the point at or near Raleigh Court-House, 35 miles nearer the railroad, but to fall back beyond that point, I am very clearly convinced, would prove extremely disastrous to the country and to our cause in this region. Colonel Russell, of Mississippi, takes this communication, and is fully possessed

of my views, which he can, if you choose, explain more in detail.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

– JOHN B. FLOYD,
Commanding Army of Kanawha.
Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of War.
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Editor's Notes
From: Operations in Maryland, N. Virginia, W. Virginia, 1861–62. Location: Camp Dickerson.
Sources
The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 5 View original source ↗