John A. McClernand to Edwin M. Stanton, October 21, 1862

October 21, 1862.

Steamer Tigress, Milltken’s Bend, Mississippi River, Jan. 3, 1863.

Hon. BE. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Siz: Notwithstanding your order of October 21, 1862, authorizing the Mississippi River Expedition and assigning me to the command of the same, I have reason to suppose that prior to my dispatch of the 16th [17th] of December, 1862, informing you that I believed I had been superseded, Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief, had assigned MajorGeneral Grant to the same command.

On the 21st ultimo Major-General Halleck’s assistant adjutant-general communicated to me a copy of a telegram to Major-General Grant, dated December 18, 1862, assigning the latter to the general command of the expedition and me to the immediate command of the land forces composing the same. This, as far as I can recollect, was the first and only recognition, and that an indirect one, which the General-in-Chief had ever made of my connection with the expedition, and I attribute that to your interference as a consequence of my telegram of the 16th [17th] to you and the President, touching my supersedure.

A portion of the forces designed for the expedition having been detached from General Grant’s army and marched to Memphis by General Sherman, preparatory to embarkation for Vicksburg, prior to the 16th ultimo, it would appear conclusively that Generals Grant and Sherman had received orders in the premises prior to that date. More over, it is worthy of especial notice that General Sherman started with the expedition from Memphis on the 20th ultimo, and that not until the second day after—the 22d—did I receive notice of Major-General Halleck’s telegram to General Grant.

On the 23d I was relieved from duty at Springfield, I1l., and immediately started south to find and receive orders from General Grant, according to your instructions. Arriving at Memphis on Sunday, the 28th, I immediately dispatched Major Schwartz and Captain Freeman, of my staff, across the country, which was infested by guerrilla bands, to communicate with General Grant at Holly Springs, 45 miles from Memphis. leaching there the same night these officers were informed that orders assigning me to the immediate command of the expedition had been forwarded on the same day. These orders reached me on Monday, the 29th, one day after the repulse of our forces near Vicks. burg, and before I had had time to leave Memphis. This explanation is made for the purpose of establishing the fact that either through the intention of the General-in-Chief or a strange occurrence of accidents, the authority of the President and yourself, as evidenced by your acts, has been set at naught, and I have been deprived of the command that had been committed to me.

I will not say that in consequence of this circumstance the Mississippi River Expedition has so far failed, for that would do injustice. to General Sherman, whom I deem, indeed know, to be a brave and meritorious officer. He has probably done all in the present case that any one could have done, and I would not detract anything from him, but give in all credit for good purposes, which unfortunately failed in execuion.

The explanation of the failure is simply this:

1st. Much valuable time was lost in setting the expedition on foot, and thus ample opportunity was furnished to the enemy to prepare him. self and strongly fortify against attack.

Cuar. XXIX.} CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION. 529

2d. The movement to Vicksburg lacked every kind of co-operation. General Grant’s cessation of his advance toward Grenada and Jackson, Miss., afforded the enemy’s forces at those points and at Port Hudson opportunity to concentrate a considerable army for the defense of Vicksburg. Nor is it altogether improbable that troops from Bragg’s army and even from Virginia had been brought to this neighborhood, not being needed in Tennessee or in Virginia on account of the seeming cessation of hostilities in those quarters.

3d. The organization of the different arms composing the expeditionary army was essentially defective. In my communication of October 16, 1862, to you and to the Commander-in-Chief the estimate of troops required for the reduction of Vicksburg was as follows: Twenty-four thousand infantry, 1,000 sharpshooters, 400 sappers and miners, 3,000 cavalry, 1,500 light artillery, and 100 heavy artillery. The number of batteries to be assigned to the artillery arm was ten, of six guns each, consisting of fourteen 10-pounder Parrott guns, twenty-eight 12-pounder Napoleon guns, six 24-pounder howitzers (brass), four 12-pounder howitzers, eight 6-pounder smooth-bore guns; also eight 30-pounder Parrott guns and four 10-inch mortars.

Instead of with these proportions the expedition was constructed without the least harmony in its elements, and with no regard to that effectiveness which is alone to be obtained by giving to each arm its proper proportion.

Since the attack of our forces on Sunday, according to reports, the enemy’s forces at Vicksburg have been increased to 50,000 or 60,000.

The attack on Monday, notwithstanding signal instances of courage and heroism on the part of the officers and the display of much endurance and bravery among the men, entirely failed of success. I am ipformed that the position of the enemy at Vicksburg is of unusual) strength. A continual series of bluffs extends, as will be seen from the accompanying drawings, from the city to Haines’ Bluff, on the Yazoo River, a distance of from 12 to 14 miles. Haines’ Bluff has been strongly fortified and is defended by batteries of heavy caliber. It is reported to be a fortress in itself; besides seven field works are said to be located in front of it and near the river. The Yazoo is blocked up, and lakes and bayous in the low and swamp lands between the Mississippi and Yazoo Rivers are lined with rifle-pits, while the rear of the position, from the Yazoo to the Black River, is reported as being defended by rifle-pits and other field works. Moreover, the heavy rain pouring down at the moment of writing this hasty report will strengthen the enemy’s position, and the lands between the Mississippi and the Yazoo Rivers will become impassable. .

The guuboats being unable to reduce the fortifications at Haines’ Bluff, General Sherman proposed a night attack to carry them with the bayonet; but Rear-Admiral Porter declined to co-operate in such an undertaking, regarding it as too hazardous. The troops under General Sherman therefore descended the Yazoo and landed at Milliken’s Bend,

If I am asked for a plan by which Vicksburg might yet be taken I would suggest that General Grant immediately make Memphis his base of operations, put the Mississippi and Tennessee Railroad from Memphis toward Grenada in running order, and push forward his column to the latter place and to Jackson, marching upon the rear of Vicksburg, vhile the forces here and those below Port Hudson co-operate by such demonstrations as may be found practicable.

530 WES1 TENN. AND NORTHERN MISS. [Cuar. XXIX.

So soon as I shall have verified the condition of the army—perhapr to-day—I will assume command of it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLERNAND,
Major-General, Commanding.