James Shields to Schriver, June 13, 1862

The telegrams from General Banks* and giving extracts from Richmond papers received.

The engagement of Monday, the 9th instant, was between General Jackson’s whole force and the advance of this division, under BrigadierGeneral Tyler, near Port Republic. The unequal contest was maintained successfully for four hours.

On Sunday, at 6.30 a. m., Colonel Carroll, leading a small body in advance, found Jackson’s army and train on the opposite side of the river at Port Republic. The river was impassable, and the bridge across it still standing. By some unaccountable misapprehension he neglected to burn it, although he held possession of it three-quarters of an hour. The destruction of the bridge would have insured the destruction of Jackson’s army, placing him between General Frémont and us, with an impassable river in his front. This first fundamental error was not redeemed afterward either by Colonel Carroll or General Tyler, who commanded the advance, by falling back at once upon a defensible position. On the contrary, they took up a position utterly indefensible, within 2 miles from Port Republic.

Jackson crossed his whole army over the bridge, thus left, as it were, for his use, on Sunday night and on Monday morning, and attacked our advance, consisting of about 2,500 men, with his whole force. The folly of attempting to hold such a position against such overwhelming odds was redeemed by the fearless and reckless courage of our troops.

They repulsed the enemy at every point for four hours. Our artillery hurled destruction through his ranks. The infantry drove the enemy back from the guns at the point of the bayonet. The artillerists stood to their guns, especially those of Captain Clark’s battery (E), Fourth Artillery, until their horses were killed, and then defended themselves in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy’s infantry, and were only compelled to abandon the field at length by a fatal mistake of General Tyler’s in stripping the left flank of all infantry support. They then fell back in good order, carrying off all the guns except those whose

horses were killed. I reached them ia time to cover the retreat with the residue of the command, and took up a strong and defensible position between Conrad’s Store and Port Republic, which Jackson feared to attack, falling back at once.

On the evening of the 9th I was concerting a combined attack on Jackson next morning with General Frémont, with whom I kept up constant communication by means of a ferry which we had previously established, when I received a positive and peremptory order to return to Luray. There was no option left me. I never obeyed an order with such reluctance, but I had to return.

Jackson, with that sagacity which characterizes his course, burned the bridge between himself and Frémont after having crossed the river to our side, but General Frémont, whose conduct throughout cannot be too highly praised, had a pontoon bridge to throw across next morning to attack Jackson’s flank, while I with my whole command should attack him in front. The result could not have been doubtful. Thus lay a kind of fatality. This man, who dared to insult our capital, whom 2,500 of this division fought for four hours, who fell back in haste before my whole division, not deeming himself safe until he put 5 miles between us, is left to escape. The first fatality was in not burning the bridge on Sunday morning. Colonel Carroll, in whom I placed implicit confidence, was hurried on by an excess of daring to neglect this important duty in his pursuit of the enemy. The second was in ‘ attempting to maintain an indefensible position in the face of such tremendous odds. Brigadier-General Tyler, in command of the advance, must have had unbounded confidence to have hazarded this. The third was in recalling my command peremptorily to Luray when General Frémont and myself had the enemy still in our grasp.

The plan for Jackson’s destruction was perfect. The execution of it, from inexplicable causes, was not what was to be expected, but the hardihood and indomitable courage of my brave but misguided advance in giving battle to the whole of Jackson’s army, in repulsing him for four hours, in destroying numbers of the enemy, which he himself admits was much heavier than in the battle of the previous day with the whole of Frémont’s force, and then in carrying everything off the field but the unhorsed guns, is an exhibition of fearless confidence and courage that must extort admiration even from the enemy. This division has not been defeated. The advance, instead of falling back upon the main body as it should have done, gave battle and was repulsed, after killing, as the citizens report, 1,000 of the enemy. Few prisoners were taken on either side.

This is in brief the history of the affair of the 9th, which will be given in detail in the reports now in course of preparation. I beg that this may be forwarded to the War Department, to relieve the President and Secretary from their natural solicitude on our account.

very respectfully, your obedient servant,