James Chesnut, Jr to P.G.T. Beauregard, July 16, 1861

July 16, 1861.

July 16, 1861. Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD, Commanding Army of the Potomac:

Str: In obedience to your order, I proceeded on Sunday last, 14th instant, to Richmond, with the purpose of laying before the President for his consideration your views and plans for the combined operation of the two armies under the command of General Joseph EK. Johnston and yourself, respectively. I arrived in Richmond at 3.30 on the same day 1 left your quarters, and without delay reported to the President, who, although sick in bed, received me with great kindness and cordiality. After stating to him the object of my visit, he appointed an hour to meet him with General R. HE. Lee, and Adjutant and Inspector General Cooper. Atthe appointed time the President, Generals Lee and Cooper, and Colonel Preston, of your staff, met me in private conference. Being requested by the President to lay before those present the subjectmatter with which I was charged, I submitted on your part the following propositions :

That the Confederate armies were in front of the enemy with greatly inferior forces at all points; that it was desirable by uniting a portion of our forces to outnumber the enemy at some important point; that the point now occupied by you was at present in reference to the armies considered the most important. I stated also that the enemy were. at present at or near Falls Church, with eight or ten thousand men, on the Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad, and also with some portion of his force at Springfield, on the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, with every indication of a purpose to advance on both lines, and that it was most probable the enemy would threaten our camp at Manassas with about ten thousand men, while the main body, twenty thousand or more, would advance towards Vienna, Frying Pan, and Pleasant Valley, to Hay Market, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, with a view to cut off our communication with General Johnston. To accomplish this, possession would be taken of passes of the Blue Ridge at Manassas, Ashby’s, and Snicker’s Gaps. He would then endeavor to cut off your communication with Richmond by the Alexandria and Orange

Railroad, and force you either to fight in open field with greatly inferior numbers or to retire towards Fredericksburg by way of Brentsville, to join forces with General Holmes, or to withdraw from the intrenched camp and retire by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad before the enemy could reach it.

Under these circumstances I stated you would propose, and did propose, that General Johnston should, with the bulk of his forces, say twenty thousand, unite with you, leaving from three to five thousand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge and to hold Patterson in check. Then, with the combined forces of General Johnston and yourself, you would move rapidly forward on Fairfax Court-House, establish yourself between the two lines of the enemy, attack them separately with larger masses, and thus exterminate them or drive them into the Potomac. This being done, General Johnston, with ten thousand of your forces in addition to his own, and rallying as he went those left to guard the passes, would return at once with superior numbers, say thirty-five thousand, to attack and destroy Patterson at Winchester or

_ wherever he might be. One week from the time of leaving Winchester

would be sufficient to accomplish all this. You would then either occupy the enemy’s works in front of Washington if he should abandon them, or fall back on your present positions, according to circumstances. General Johnston, having disposed of Patterson, would detach a sufficient number from his force to re-enforce Garnett and make him superior to General McClellan. Having defeated McClellan, General Garnett could then unite with Johnston, and the two cross the Potomac at the nearest point for Maryland, and, arousing the people as they proceeded, march to the rear of Washington, while you would attack it in front.

To these propositions respectful and earnest consideration was given by the President and the two generals I have mentioned. The scheme was considered brilliant and comprehensive, but to its adoption at this time two leading objections were urged by the President and by General Lee. One was that General Johnston’s force was not now sufficiently strong to allow of the withdrawal of numbers sufficient to effect your object, and at the same time leave enough to keep Patterson in check and keep him from coming down upon your left. And the other and main objection was that the enemy was as yet too close to their cover to allow the reasonable expectation of the accomplishment of your object; that they would immediately fall back upon their intrenchments, or, being so close to their large reserves, would be quickly re-enforced in numbers sufficient to regain the superiority of numbers, and thus defeat your purpose; that the combination might be made at a later period, when the objection would be removed by a sufficient increase of your armies and by the lengthening of the enemy’s lines and increase of distance from cover and reserves for quick re-enforcement.

Respectfully submitted.

RIcHMOND, VA., August 4, 1861.
General G. T. BEAUREGARD:
My DEAR Sim: Inclosed I transmit copies of a resolution of inquiry
and the reply to it.* You will perceive that the answer was made in
view of the telegram which I inclose to you, that being the only information then before me. Since that time it has been communicated to
* Not found.