James Barbour to Richard S. Ewell, June 11, 1862

In compliance with the orders of Major-General Ewell I send a statement of the operations of my brigade on the 8th and 9th instant in the battle of Cross Keys:

At your request I rode forward with you on the morning of the 8th at about 10 o’clock to examine the ground most desirable for defense. It was decided to post my artillery (Courtney battery) on the hill to the south of the small stream, and immediately on the left of the road from Union Church to Port Republic. You directed my brigade to take the right of our line of defense and occupy the pine hill to the east of the road and the battery, but somewhat retired from the front, en échelon position. Previous to assigning my brigade its position in line of battle I rode forward in front and to the right about half a mile, and examined a wooded hill running nearly parallel to our line of battle. Finding this position advantageous, with its left in view and protected by my artillery and its right by a ravine and densely-wooded hill, I at once occupied this position with two regiments (the Sixteenth Mississippi and Twenty-first Georgia) about 10.30 o’clock, leaving the Twenty-first North Carolina with the battery to protect it.

Colonel Cantey, of the Fifteenth Alabama, by General Ewell’s orders, had been left on picket at Union Church, one mile in advance. This regiment was the first engaged, resisting the enemy’s advance by a destructive fire from the church, the grave-yard, and the woods. Their force was checked, and they did not pursue the regiment, which soon after retired, finding itself outflanked on right and left, and narrowly escaped being cut entirely off from the failure of [the] cavalry picket to do their duty. Colonel Cantey’s own pickets, thrown out as a precaution, though told the cavalry was on that duty, alone saved his regiment. In retreating in good order he passed the enemy’s flanking forces on the right and left within long gun-shot range, and succeeded in reaching my position with trifling loss. Colonel Cantey was placed on the right of the two regiments before named.

Half an hour later the enemy were seen to advance with General

Blenker’s old brigade (among the regiments, as prisoners informed us, the Eighth New York and Bucktail Rifles from Pennsylvania), driving in our pickets before a heavy fire. I ordered the three regiments to rest quietly in the edge of an open wood until the enemy, who were advancing in regular order across the field and hollow, should come within 50 steps of our line. The order was mainly observed, and as the enemy appeared above the crest of the hill a deadly fire was delivered along our whole front, beginning on the right, dropping the deluded victims of Northern fanaticism and misrule by scores. The repulse of the enemy was complete, followed by an advance, ordered by me, in pursuit. As the enemy’s rear regiments had halted in the

wood on the other side of the valley, I deemed it prudent, after the «

field in our front had been cleared, to resume our position on the hill and await their further advance.

Remaining in our position some fifteen minutes, and finding the enemy not disposed to renew the contest, and observing from its fire a battery on the enemy’s left, half a mile in advance of us, I promptly decided to make a move from our right flank and try to capture the battery, as I reported at the time to General Ewell, who at this stage of the action sent to know our success and to ask if I wanted re-enforcements. To which I replied I had driven back the enemy; wanted no aid; but thought I could take their battery, and was moving for that purpose. I accordingly in person moved the Fifteenth Alabama to the right along a ravine, and, unperceived, got upon the enemy’s left flank and in his rear, marching up in fine order as on drill. I had on leaving with this regiment ordered the other two to advance rapidly in front as soon as they heard I was hotly engaged with the enemy. These regiments, before the order was executed, stood calmly under a heavy fire of the enemy’s artillery, directed at the woods. The Fifteenth Alabama completely surprised the force in their front (the enemy’s left flank), and drove them by a heavy fire, hotly returned, from behind logs and trees along the wood to the westward.

Meantime the Twenty-first Georgia and Sixteenth Mississippi moved across the field and fell in with the remainder of the enemy’s brigade, which had reformed in the woods to our left, and delivered a galling fire upon the Sixteenth Mississippi, which omitted to turn up the woods to its left, after the main body of the enemy, thus exposing its men to enfilading fire. Colonel Mercer, of the Twenty-first Georgia, came to their timely rescue, and both soon gallantly drove the enemy out of the woods, killing and wounding large numbers. On marching to the right flank with the Fifteenth Alabama I found parts of the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiments, under command of Col. J. A. Walker, of General Elzey’s brigade, had been ordered to my support by General Ewell. I ordered Colonel Walker to move on my right through the woods and advance on the enemy in line of battle perpendicularly to his line and in rear of the battery. Unluckily, as the woods tended to his right, he marched directly on, fell in with my regiment (Fifteenth Alabama), and lost time by having to move by the flank to regain his position. In doing this he was exposed to the view of the battery, which turned its fire on him with galling effect, compelling a resort to the woods. At this time the right wing of the Fifteenth Alabama had advanced unperceived, under my direction, to within 300 yards of the battery, then playing rapidly over their heads on the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia. Perceiving the Sixteenth Mississippi and Twenty-first Georgia had advanced, I gave orders to charge the battery. Upon reaching the top of the hill I found it had limbered up and rap- idly retired, having lost several horses by our fire. Five minutes’ gain in time would have captured the guns. This was lost by the Mississippi regiment in misconstruing my orders.

Another brigade of the enemy supporting the battery 200 yards to its left, our right advanced into the open ground, and at the time the [Fifteenth] Alabama and the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia reached their position this force was driven back by their united action and retired with the battery. After some minutes’ brisk fire by the enemy’s sharpshooters their entire left wing retreated to their first position, near Union Church, on the Keezletown road.

At this time General Taylor, with his brigade, joined me. He had previously been ordered to my support, and I had directed him to march up in the open ground between the woods, but he passed too far to the right, and lost time by falling in behind the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiments. I called General Taylor to an interview on an eminence in view of the enemy, then a mile distant, where a battery with an infantry force—of what strength we could not discern— was in sight. I proposed to move forward and renew the fight. General Taylor’s reply was that we could soon wipe out that force if it would do any good, but proposed to return his brigade to camp, as he had that morning marched rapidly to Port Republic and returned, and his men needed rest and food. I replied that we had better attack the enemy; but as he did not agree with me, and as I at that time understood that he was sent to aid me in the contest, which was then ended, I did not insist on his remaining. He left me about 4 p.m. I then disposed the three regiments in the woods in regular order about onehalf mile distant from the enemy, with skirmishers in front and on the flanks, sending word to General Ewell that the enemy had been repulsed on our right, and that I awaited orders.

About half an hour after General Taylor left Major Barbour came to me with orders from General Ewell to “move to the front,” and that a force would be sent forward on the enemy’s right to make a combined attack before night. It was too late to recall General Taylor. I moved through the woods and halted in line 500 yards from the enemy’s front (disposed along the Keezletown road), prepared to attack him as soon as I could hear from their fire that our force on his flank was engaged. I waited half an hour without any intimation of this attack, and sent a courier to General Ewell to say I awaited the movement on our left. Half an hour afterward I sent another courier with the same message, and soon after Lieutenant Lee, of my staff, to say that if the attack was made on their flank, to divert their attention from my movement, I thought I could overpower the enemy in front, but that it would be injudicious to do so alone, as I could plainly see three batteries of the enemy, all able to bear on our force, as we should advance across the open fields, and (what I estimated at) five brigades of infantry. I waited in suspense until after dark, saw the enemy go into camp, light their fires, draw rations, and otherwise dispose themselves

for the night, evidently not expecting any further attack. I then ~ sought General Ewell to recommend a night attack, and found he had gone to report to General Jackson. Before leaving I was strongly tempted to make the advance alone at night, and should have done so had I not felt it a duty to secure complete success by waiting for the combined attack before alluded to, and having some scruples in regard to a possible failure, if acting alone, which might have thwarted the plans of the commanding general, whose success the day after would be seriously jeopardized by even a partial reverse after the fortunate

results of the day. I regretted that I had not detained General Taylor until Major Barbour reached me, as with his brigade and my own the result would have been reasonably certain without consulting General Ewell.

Finally, convinced that we could make a successful night attack and disperse or capture General Frémont’s entire force—certain]y all his artillery—I awaited General Ewell’s return, and then urged more than ever the attack, and begged him to go with me and “see how easy it was.” He said he could not take the responsibility, and if it was to be doneI would have to see General Jackson. I accordingly rode 7 miles to see him, obtained his consent to have Colonel Patton’s battalion co-operate with me and his directions “‘to consult General Ewell and be guided by him.” On returning to General Ewell with this permission he declined taking the responsibility which he said thus rested on him, and continued, with General Taylor, to oppose it against my urgent entreaties to be permitted to make the attack alone with my brigade. He only replied, ” You have done well enough for one day, and even a partial reverse would interfere with General Jackson’s plans for the next day.” I replied that we should have the army of Frémont pressing us to-morrow if not driven off, and that we had better fight one army at atime. So ended the matter.

My regiments remained under arms all night, and I moved to camp at daybreak with reluctance.

Having received orders to retard the advance of the enemy on the Port Republic road, on the 9th I took up our old position and remained until 9 o’clock, when, being without artillery and finding the enemy had placed a battery to drive us out of the wood where they had sustained so fatal a repulse the day before, I slowly retired toward Port Republic. Receiving from General Jackson two messages in quick succession to hasten to the battle-field where he had engaged General Shields’ army, I marched rapidly to obey this order, crossed the bridge, burned it just before the enemy appeared, and reached the field after the contest had been decided in our favor.

To sum up the occurrences of the day, I may state that our handsome success on the right was due to the judicious position selected, as well as to the game spirit and eagerness of the men. The flank movement to the right, totally unexpected by the enemy and handsomely carried out by Colonel Cantey, completed our success, and although we failed to take their battery, it was not attributable to unskillful maneuvering, but to one of those accidents which often decide the result o battles and partial engagements.

To the bearing of all the officers (dismounted by my order except myself and staff) and the men I give most favorable testimony, and cannot withhold my highest admiration of their gallant conduct and fine discipline, and after the contest, as you witnessed, every regiment was in line, as composed as if they had been_on drill. The prisoners and wounded say two brigades were opposed to us—General Blenker’s old brigade (now Stahel’s) and General Train’s [?], with reserves—probably not less than 6,000 to 7,000 men (one regiment having brought 800 men on the field), with two batteries of artillery. My three regiments, counting 1,348 men and officers, repulsed the brigade of Blenker three times, and one hour after, with the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiments—whose conduct while observed by me was characterized by steadiness and gallantry—the other brigade of the enemy, with their battery, was driven from the field, 14 miles from the first scene of the contest. On the ground where we first opened fire 290 of the ers said that the famous HKighth New York Regiment and Bucktails, whose gallantry deserved a better fate, were entirely cut to pieces, Their flag was left on the field and secured by the Twenty-first Georgia.

Of the heroic conduct of the officers and men of Courtney’s battery, commanded by Captain Courtney, with Lieutenant Latimer as first lieutenant, in holding their position under the incessant fire of four batteries at one time, I cannot speak in terms which would do them full justice. The fact that they stood bravely up to their work for over five hours, exhausted all their shot and shell, and continued their fire with canister to the end of the battle, speaks more in their favor than the most labored panegyric. The most admirable position selected for the battery alone saved it from total destruction, if a special Providence did not guard it from harm.

The Twenty-first North Carolina, left to support this battery, was exposed to the effect of the terrific fire, but under cover of the hill happily escaped with few casualties. When the battery was threatened with an infantry force this regiment was called and readily took its position to repel the enemy’s attack, and stood modestly ready to do its duty as gallantly as heretofore.

To Colonel Mercer, for his judicious movements during the day, and to Colonel Cantey, for his skillful retreat from picket and prompt flank maneuver, I think especial praise is due, as well as to my staff, Captain Hall and Lieutenants McKim and Lee, for the promptness and coolness displayed in conveying orders.

I would also call the attention of the major-general to the services performed on this occasion and previously by Captain Brown, of Company A, Sixteenth Mississippi, who, with portions of his company, has within the last few weeks killed 12 of the enemy, captured 64, with their arms, and some 25 horses, with their equipments, and to the conspicuous gallantry of Private Long, of Company B, Twenty-first Georgia, who, while acting as skirmisher on the 8th instant, brought in 10 prisoners—5, with their arms, captured at one time—and shot an officer of General Frémont’s staff, obtaining from him the enemy’s order of march, herewith inclosed,* from which it appears they had or the field seven brigades of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery.

It is but an act of simple justice to the brave men of my command to say that this battle was fought by their infantry and artillery in fact alone. Colonel Walker’s Fifteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiments aided in the last repulse, General Taylor’s brigade not having been engaged or seen by the enemy. The infantry under BrigadierGeneral Steuart, on the left of the line, encountered at no time of the day more than the enemy’s skirmishers, as they made no demonstration on our left. The battery of General Steuart was in the early part of the fight, but was withdrawn after a severe loss of horses, leaving Captain Courtney’s battery to contend singly with four batteries of the enemy.

Herewith I hand a list of the killed and wounded.

Very respectfully, I. R. TRIMBLE