James A. Seddon to Jefferson Davis, April 28, 1864

Richmond, Va., April 28, 1864.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, , President Confederate States of America:

Str: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the operations of this Department:

In the brief period since my last report the inclemency of the season has enforced comparative inaction on the armies in the field. Operations on our part have been mainly defensive, but have been varied by some brilliant affairs of an offensive character, executed generally by cavalry detachments. The enemy have essayed several serious invasions and various marauding incursions. The results have been almost invariably honorable to our arms.

The large force thrown into Mississippi, with the purpose of marching to the attack of Mobile, expended itself along less than a third of its contemplated course in discreditable ravages against non-combatants and hasty damages of the railroads, speedily repaired.

More signal disaster punished their invasion to subjugate Florida. They were met promptly and gallantly by General Finegan, with a smaller number of hastily collected troops, and completely defeated, with heavy loss and utter rout, in the decisive battle of Olustee. Driven back to the protection of their ships of war, they received large re-enforcements, and for a time threatened the renewal of their invasion, but their most bloody experience of the prowess of our forces, and the great consequent discouragement of their troops, doubtless induced despair of success. They have since withdrawn nearly their entire force and relinquished as desperate the invasion of a State so courageously defended.

Various raids of the enemy have been made by cavalry, generally in indefensible portions of the Confederacy, and for the most part for purposes of mere rapine and destruction. They have been conducted with a precipitation most wasteful to their men and animals, and indicative of constant apprehension, but have been marked by a malignant spirit and practices of infamy and barbarity that would have disgraced brigands or savages. Their warfare has been almost exclusively on peaceful citizens, and their avowed object has been the destruction of private property; the taking off of the slaves, even by force; the waste of stores and the means of subsistence; the destruction of animals and implements of husbandry, and the privation of all means of future production and support to the whole people.

The most important of these raids, undertaken with an unusual force and a special aim, surpassed even their many inhuman enterprises in the atrocity of its discovered designs. It was avowed as an effort, with 5,000 picked horsemen, sustained by light artillery, to seize and hold temporarily the Capital of the Confederacy, and to liberate the large number of their prisoners held in its vicinity. Our pickets had been thinned by the withdrawal of our cavalry for recruitment and supply, and the enemy succeeded in starting, without observation, on their enterprise, but it was conducted with a timidity and feebleness that were in ludicrous contrast with the boldness of the conception and the extent of their means. Fifteen hundred of their number detached to Charlottesville, for the double purpose of destroying our railroad communications and distracting attention by varied attacks, with a view of subsequently reuniting with the main column, were easily repulsed by a mere handful of halfarmed artillerymen with a single gun when in a few miles of their contemplated prize of Charlottesville, and compelled to fly affrighted back to their main army. Another detachment of some thousand men, under an officer (Colonel Dahlgren) deemed by them one of especial merit, was sent across the country to pass some distance above the city to the south of the James, and coming rapidly on that side, where there was least reason to expect a defensive force, and near which, on an island, were the greater portion of the prisoners, to aid in a combined attack to be made on the north side by the great body of the troops under General Kilpatrick, esteemed among their most enterprising generals. Dahlgren marked his course to the river, unimpeded by any hostile force, only by ravage and incendiarism, but failed wholly to effect a crossing, and sought to cover the timidity that shrank from trying a doubtful ford by an act of savage vengeance on his negro guide, who indeed well merited his fate, but not at the hands of the enemy, for his treachery to an indulgent master and his attempted services to a cruel foe. Baffled in this part of his plan, he hastened toward the city on the north side of the river to unite with Kilpatrick in his proposed attack. Meantime, some hours before his arrival, that attack had been made by the great body of the forees under Kilpatrick, and repulsed, by only a few hundred men on one of the outer lines of the city defenses, with such ease as, but for the limited number engaged, would almost have deprived the victory of glory. Kilpatrick retired baffled, to find another opportunity, if not to beataretreat. Later, near night, Dahlgren approached on the road from the west, down the river, and encountered a few miles from the city the most advanced battalion of our forces, which happened to be of the local reserves, and to be composed of clerks, recently organized and untried in war. This, too, was in the open field, without defenses of any kind. Yet the charge of this select body of the enemy’s cavalry, in superior numbers, was speedily repelled, and they driven off in ignominious flight. Their only purpose seemed escape, but as they hastily pursued after the retreating column of Kilpatrick they learned that he, too, had been attacked in the night and his force dispersed. This gallant deed had been done by General Hampton. He, approaching with about 400 cavalry, hastily summoned to the aid of the city, had been apprised of the locality of the enemy by Col. Bradley T. Johnson, who, with a small party of horsemen, had been for many hours courageously scouting around and skirmishing with their forces. Despite his insignificant force General Hampton at once charged the enemy in his camp, and after a brief struggle routed them, capturing many men and horses. Being too weak to pursue, he was compelled to allow them to escape with impunity, but their only thought afterward seemed to be of rapid flight, and the next day they found a refuge in a supporting foree of cavalry that had been sent up the peninsula to their relief. Startled by the intelligence of this disaster, Dahlgren’s men seem,

many, to have scattered, finding their way to Kilpatrick’s column, while their leader with some hundreds of his choice men crossed the Pamunkey, with the hope of evading Hampton and escaping across the country to Gloucester Point. In King and Queen they were encountered by some few furloughed cavalry and a local company, hurriedly summoned for pursuit. Ambuscaded by them, Colonel Dahlgren and a few of his men were killed, and the residue of the force under his command speedily surrendered as prisoners. Thus ingloriously and disastrously terminated an expedition inaugurated with formidable forces and with high anticipations of great results. But the disgrace of failure was exceeded by the infamy of the base designs of the expedition. On the body of Colonel Dahlgren, the chosen and specially trusted leader, were found copies of the plan and purposes of the expedition, and the original of his address to his soldiers on starting. These disclosed, unequivocally, the nefarious purpose, after liberating their prisoners, to turn them loose, armed, and maddened by privation and every evil passion, and by them, with the aid and under the protection of the embodied forces, to sack, burn, and destroy the city, and to kill the President and the leading authorities of the Confederate Government. The dullest sensibility will sicken and revolt at the horrible brutalities and atrocities that must have attended such a carnival of crime. The perpetration of such deeds by an infuriated soldiery, under all the fierce impulses of a sanguinary struggle and in the flush of triumph, is by all nations felt to be a reproach on the character and humanity of man; but that such horrors should have been deliberately planned and ordered by the authorities of any people professing to be civilized and Christian, must inflict an indelible stigma of hypocrisy and infamy. Such fell designs might seem almost incredible of any other people, but they are supported by irrefragable evidence in the possession of the papers themselves, with conclusive indications, internal and external, of their authenticity. It is only the culmination of many inferior exhibitions of like malignity and atrocity. The captives taken in the abortive effort to perpetrate these or like atrocities must be admitted to have forfeited all rights to the privileges of civilized warfare, and might well be punished by their intended victims as the worst of criminals; but it has been thought to comport more with the dignity and self-command of an enlightened Government, as well as to be more consistent with the humanity, clemency, and Christianity that has, throughout this war, characterized our people and authorities, not to mete out bloody retaliation on the subordinate instruments of an infamous Government, but to consign them for retribution to the reprobation of outraged Christendom and the lasting stigma of recording history.

Our armies in the field are believed to be in excellent condition and spirits. Inured to war and practiced in habits of endurance, they have passed through the exposure and privations of the winter and inclement spring with remarkable health and content. Animated by an invincible resolution not to be subdued, and a zeal of patriotic selfdevotion beyond all praise, they have almost universally re-enlisted for the war, and voluntarily renewed the pledge of their all—their property, their labor, and themselves—to the sacred cause of the safety and independence of the country. They have reacted on the people everywhere, encouraging the bold and shaming the timid to a more confident reliance on a future of success, and have effectually hushed the whisperings of despondency or disaffection. They were never more confident and reliant on themselves and their commanders, and relatively, as is believed, more nearly than heretofore approximating the number of their enemies, they await with assurance and ardor the shock of the coming campaign.

The measures of legislation to secure meritorious officers and repress irregularities and desertion have operated beneficially on the discipline and morale of the Army. Thorough organization may not yet have been attained in forces which had to be suddenly and provisionally organized, but steady advance is being made to the attainment of the utmost discipline and efficiency. The recent assignment at the Capital of a supervising commander of all the armies, besides promoting the harmony and consistency of military movements, has brought to aid in the work of organization the experience, known administrative capacity, and acknowledged abilities of one of our leading generals, and may be expected to prove productive of salutary results.

Some deficiencies of organization yet require amendatory legislation. The staff, affording to the quick intelligence of the general his perceptive and administrative faculties, should be constituted of the best material, have the highest attainable experience and qualifications, and be animated by strong incentives to activity and improvement. Unfortunately, in our Army it has not enjoyed the repute, nor, perhaps in consequence, commanded the merits desirable for its efficiency. From unavoidable circumstances, probably, the staff has been too much the object of favoritism through the recommendations on behalf of personal friends, or the refuge of supernumeraries and those by nonelection or otherwise thrown out of the line of regular service. They have come to be considered in some measure as attachés to the persons and fortunes of their respective generals, rather than as officers selected for peculiar qualifications and assigned to special duties. In consequence of this kind of estimation, probably, they have not been allowed rank consistent with their importance or regulated appropriately by the standard of merit. These evils it is most desirable to remove, and it is respectfully suggested that the remedy may be found in organizing the respective departments of the staff into separate corps, with proper gradations in rank, and in affording the incentive of advance on the exhibition of qualifications or superior merit. Some increase in the numbers to be attached to the larger commands of the Army, as well as the proposed advance in rank, would also seem advisable. This is, indeed, almost a necessity in relation to the commissary and quartermaster branches of the staff service. The law has never made direct provision for the appointment of such officers to organizations larger than brigades. Experience has demonstrated them to be essential not only to the Army as a whole, to assure harmony and unity to its movements and due distribution of supplies, but likewise, from similar reasons, to corps and divisions, which not infrequently have to act independently and at wide intervals of distance. In consequence there has been no alternative but for the general in command, or the Department, to withdraw and assign, by detail from their proper brigades, the quartermasters and commissaries indispensable to the larger organizations of the Army. Such assignments have rendered oftentimes imperative the appointment of other officers of the same branch of service to the destitute brigades; and thus indirectly, and with only the rank and legal assignment of brigade officers, have these essential officers of the staff been secured to the

divisions, corps, and armies in the field. This has been so well understood that in one of the acts of Congress there has been implied sanction by reference to such division and corps officers. Still, action in such cases, without more direct authorization of law, is always embarrassing to the Department, and not incapable of mischievous effects in the establishment of precedents, and it is earnestly recommended that such appointments be directly sanctioned by law.

In another particular respecting the appointment of quartermasters and commissaries it is desirable the law should be made more explicit. The only authority for the appointment of these officers, not for commands in the field, but for the general service of the bureaus, is conferred by the act of the 15th day of February, 1862, which provides:

That in addition to the number of quartermasters, assistant quartermasters, commissaries, and assistant commissaries now allowed by law, the President

shall have authority to appoint as many of said officers as shall in his discretion be deemed necessary at permanent posts and depots.

This seems to contemplate that the officers of this class for the general service are only required at posts and depots. and are expected to be stationary there; but in reality there is an imperative necessity for a greater number to be distributed and actively engaged in all parts of the Confederacy, purchasing, accumulating, and moving supplies, and supervising the administration of the extended operations of the commissary and quartermaster’s service. As such officers are all remotely connected with and report to the respective bureaus stationed at the Capital, or more immediately to a superior officer at some post or depot, the above act was, from an early period after its passage, construed to authorize the appointment of as many quartermasters and commissaries as the necessities of the general service demanded, and such has been the continued practice of the Department. Doubt may, however, exist whether this be not a latitude of construction dictated rather by the necessity of the case than justified by the language and original conception of the act. The law should explicitly confer a power of appointment coextensive with the needs of the service, for the exercise of a questionable right of appointment is always to be deprecated. In such matters encroachment is facile and precedents dangerous, and as little latitude to excess as practicable should be left by the law-makers.

On another point of more importance ambiguity exists, which should be corrected by more explicit legislation. It is in relation to the appointment and tenure of office of the general officers of the Provisional Army. The system pervading the organization of the Provisional Army does not allow the appointment of officers at large assignable to any command appropriate to their grade of rank put only of the officers of each special organization, on the legal continuance of which their commissions are dependent. This is clear as to the company and field officers, as may be illustrated by the fact that such officer of a company or regiment is not a captain or colonel at large of the Provisional Army, but only the captain or colonel of his particular company or regiment. The disbandment or termination of the service of such special organization loses the officers their commissions. The same principle of organization seems to have been originally contemplated in the provision by the act of the Provisional Congress of the 6th of March, 1861, for the appointment of general officers to brigades and divisions, and by analogy, as is presumable likewise to the commanders of corps when they were authorized. It

CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES. Ay)

would thus have resulted that appointments of general officers could only be made to special brigades, divisions, or corps, and that if any general officer was either wounded, incapacitated temporarily, or otherwise withdrawn from his special command, no successor could be appointed; and that on any brigade, division, or corps being broken up or radically changed by the diversion or redistribution of its component parts, the general officer would go out of commission. The inconveniences and hardships hence resulting were so great and manifest that, although in the first instance a disposition was manifested by the Executive to maintain this scheme of appointment and tenure of office, almost of necessity it had to be practically overlooked in the many changes inevitable in the composition of such large organizations, and general officers came to be assignable from one brigade to another, or, to secure an actual commander in the field in ease of temporary disability of the general officer previously commanding, from capture, wounds, or other temporary cause, were appointed for the destitute organizations. This came to be recognized and acted on as a necessity by Congress, as well as the Executive, and to obviate the inconveniences or embarrassments which might result from a deficiency in the number of general officers, the act of the 13th of October, 1862, was adopted. This act provides ”that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint twenty general officers in the Provisional Army, and to assign them to such appropriate duties as he may deem expedient.” Under this law there is no doubt that the Executive may appoint, to a number not exceeding twenty, general officers of the Provisional Army at large, who may be assignable to any command or duty appropriate to their rank, whose commissions are not contingent on their special commands. As thus a number of supernumerary officers, not exceeding twenty in number, were authorized, it was considered, by construction, to obviate, so long as that number was not exceeded, any obligation of discharging such general officers as were, from any changes of the service or otherwise, thrown out of their special commands, and to allow even those originally appointed to such special commands, by being considered as among this number of supernumeraries, to be assigned to any other appropriate duties or commands. On these points, however, well-founded doubts exist, since the original appointments may perhaps more justly determine whether the general officer be the officer of a special command, dependent on its continuance, or be one of the supernumerary class assignable at will. Such construction, however sustainable by the language and apparent contemplation of the law, would be both unjust and mischievous. Very many of the most capable general officers in the service, oftentimes because of their superior merits selected for other more important stations, under the changes of the service are no longer attached to the special commands for which they were appointed, and successors have replaced them, or in the distribution of forces their original organizations have been broken up. Shall they be thrown out of commission and deprived of commands? Nor would the injustice be more than partially remedied by placing them among the supernumerary class, since for that a new appointment would be necessary, which would deprive them of their original date, and postpone them to all juniors previously in commission. On the other hand, if those originally appointed as supernumeraries are always to be considered as of that class, and not on assignment to a particular command to hold the relation of a commander originally appointed

for it, the number allowed by the law would be at once exceeded without meeting the deficiencies of the service. An invidious distinction would be established between officers of the same grade in the Provisional Army, founded solely on the accident of appointment, which could not fail to be prolific of jealousies, rivalries, and discontents.

In view of the whole subject, it is recommended that all general officers of the Provisional Army, like the supernumeraries, be made independent of their commands, and assignable, according to rank, to any appropriate command or duty.

A slight extension of the power of appointing chaplains for the Army is likewise desirable. There is, happily, a large religious element and much devotional feeling in our Army, which every consideration of ‘policy, no less than grateful duty, requires should be consulted and fostered. At present, chaplains can only be appointed to posts and regiments. Now, the men of one of the most important branches of service, the artillery, are not regimentally organized, but formed either in detached companies or arranged in battalions. Hence to them cannot be afforded the guidance or consolations of religious ministry. It is suggested that a chaplain should be allowed to every ten detached companies, or to two battalions, when so situated as to permit to them a common ministration.

The act of the late Congress for retiring disabled officers and men has been put in execution, and is working beneficially for the Army. Its provisions, however, do not seem to have been commensurate with the claims of equity and gratitude due to the gallant soldiers who have been shattered in health or maimed by the exposures and wounds of service. It is confined in its operation only to such as are still on the rolls of the Army, and has no respect to those who may have been, by resignation or otherwise, heretofore put out of service. No adequate cause, either in reason or justice, can be perceived for such limitation. Indeed, on the score of merit, the cases of those who had continued, while incapable of active duty in the field, on sick leave, or in positions of light duty, rather cumbering than aiding the service, appear less entitled to consideration than those more disinterested officers who sacrificed their commissions, often their sole dependence, from honorable sensibility, lest they should block the promotion of the inferior officers on whom their duties had been cast. Not a few cases of this kind have been known to the Department, in which the acceptance of the resignation, while constrained by the interest of the service, has been done with pain and regret at the necessity of allowing the self-sacrifice which a sense of honor imposed on the gallant officer. The sole consideration which can exist to prevent the extension to all such resigned officers of the privileges accorded by the act to those still in service, is the ungracious one of economy, which, in a liberal view, would be as inapplicable from true policy as from a due regard to the sentiment of justice and gratitude involved. As very many of these disabled and scarred veterans are still capable of much service at posts or other light duties, their restoration to rank would probably prove much more a gain than a burden to the country, while it would manifest grateful appreciation and secure some partial provision for the honored sufferers of our campaigns. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the privileges of the act be extended to embrace those who, from like causes of disability or wounds in service, have heretofore resigned or been discharged.

The corps of engineer troops authorized by the late Congress, after not a few impediments and delays resulting from the reluctance of commanders to part with, by details, their veterans from the line, have at last been organized in the main of new material, and have been provided with the requisite trains and implements of service. They have been the object of special interest and care to the able head of the Engineer Bureau, and to his intelligent supervision and persistent efforts are mainly due their efficient organization and complete provision. They are composed for the most part of picked men, and embody many valuable mechanics and skilled laborers, who, guided by the intelligence and experience of officers selected from their peculiar qualifications and training as engineers, cannot fail to prove eminently advantageous in facilitating the movements and providing the defenses of our armies. Their merits and value are already warmly appreciated and acknowledged by the generals who have enjoyed the advantages of their services, and it 1s not doubted they will so advance, with increased experience and practice, in estimation and utility, as to fully vindicate the wisdom of their organization.

The boards of examination, the military courts, and the provisions of the late law allowing officers to be dropped on the recommendation of commanding generals, are operating favorably on the discipline and efficiency of the Army. Grave doubts have, however, been expressed by one of our most distinguished generals whether changes by a lawof the late session in relation to the military courts have not so closely assimilated them, in the necessity of referring charges and having them reviewed in each case by the commanding general, to general courts-martial as to have diminished their efficiency in facilitating the dispatch of cases and promptitude of punishment. Modification of the law in these respects is therefore respectfully suggested. Indeed, the mass of business cast on the reviewing authorities—the commanding general, the Department, and the President—by these various modes of removing incompetency and punishing offenses, cannot be dispatched without neglecting other duties of higher import. The responsibilities, however, entailed are of so grave and delicate a character, and involve so much of personal discretion, that they cannot be discarded or consigned to others. Remedial legislation in these particulars is urgently demanded. It is with deference suggested that an officer, to be connected with the Adjutant-General’s Bureau, and to be designated the Judge-Advocate-General, with the rank at least of colonel, to be aided by assistants, one to be with the commanding general of each separate army in the field, with the rank at least of lieutenant-colonel, be authorized, whose duty it shall be to review in the first instance all the sentences of the military courts, courts-martial, and examining boards, with the right of appeal within a limited time, where the cases were tried in the field and the sentence deprived the accused of either commission or life. This appeal might be first to the general commanding, who might either decide it finally or suspend execution and refer it, through the Judge-Advocate-General, to the Department, to be decided by it, or, at its discretion, submitted to the President. In all cases not arising and tried with an army in the field, the review might be, in the first instance, by the Judge-Advocate-General, subject to the right of like appeal, when life or commission was the forfeiture of the sentence, to the Department, which should either decide or submit to the President. Of course, the privilege of interposing by Executive clemency, vested in

the President, would remain unaffected, and application in appropriate form might be made to him in all cases. By the plan proposed, or some similar one, all venial cases and a large proportion of grave ones would be disposed of without burdening the commanding general or the Department. So only those of special gravity would come to the Department, or claim the action of the President, while the gracious prerogative of mercy would in all be preserved to him. Promptitude and certainty in the disposition of all cases would be reconciled with due consideration and full revision.

More important advantage to the service, it is believed, would result from the extension of the power now intrusted to the Executive, of assigning to commands, with temporary rank, officers of the Confederate Army, to officers likewise of the Provisional Army. The power has been both useful and convenient with respect to the former, and the considerations that recommend it apply with daily increasing force to officers of the Provisional Army. In the service, the power of promptly rewarding and advancing decided merit presents an invaluable incentive to improvement and the display of high qualities. The right, too, of selecting from all ranks or branches of the service, without being restricted by the gradation of permanent rank, the officers who may have shown qualities eminently adapting them for special commands, must conduce greatly to the development and command of the highest qualifications of leadership. Surprise has not unfrequently been felt and expressed that, though happily blessed with not a few generals distinguished alike by skill and success, yet with our armies, composed in large degree of such intelligent and eultivated men, and characterized by such high courage and proclivities for war, more of conspicuous ability and military genius have not been elicited and displayed. That these rare and inestimable gifts exist latent within our armies cannot be doubted, but our system, especially in the Provisional Army, has not been calculated to foster or discover them. Officers are in that army made strictly dependent on and confined to limited organizations in special branches of the service, and, whatever their peculiar qualifications, cannot be permanently assigned nor be advanced, save by the accident of promotion by seniority, or even on the display of distinguished valor and skill, except in their limited organizations. As the officers of the Provisional Army improve in experience and military attainments it becomes more and more important that they should not be confined to special branches of service, but have varied or enlarged spheres of action, so as to be prepared for more general commands, and that their special capacities should be utilized to the greatest advantage. Besides the benefits attained by temporary assignments, grave inconveniences would likewise be avoided. All advancements, when made, especially with officers not trained by military education or experience antecedent to the war, must necessarily be in large measure experimental and of doubtful results, and yet they are permanent, however unsuited or inefficient. Unless positively incompetent, the officers must remain in their new commands, scarce equai to their duties and incapable of inspiring confidence or enthusiasm, and yet often by their rank overshadowing or blocking the way to their superiors in all the endowments for command. It would have been far better to have tested, by temporary assignment, the qualities of the officer for the increased rank and command before he was irretrievably fixed in it. It is often found that an admirable captain proves unequal to the command of a regiment, or an accomplished colonel fails in the wider command of a brigadier, and not unfrequently in even higher rank will the distinguished subordinate general prove inadequate to wider or independent command. The officer—especially in an army so improvised and hastily organized—should be tested and approved in each important advance by command with temporary assignment before being permanently established in his increased grade. In short, the practice of such assignments would afford the highest incentives; would give enlarged experience and opportunities of display; would foster and elicit special merits and military genius, and would assure in permanent commands approved capacities.

Serious inconvenience has been caused officers in the field and much suffering in some instances to officers at posts by the late law giving but restricting the former to one ration and allowing the latter the privilege of purchasing only one. It is respectfully recommended that the law be so amended as to give officers in the field one ration, and to allow to all the privilege of purchase, subject to such regulations as may be imposed by the Department. This cannot possibly result in any injury to the publie service, while the object of the late law will be attained, which was obviously to confer a benefit and not work a hardship.

In this connection it is appropriate to advert to the peculiar and rather anomalous provision of the existing law regulating the pay and allowances of general officers. No difference in these respects is made among them, with the sole exception (under the present exceptional rates of prices of trivial effect), that to the general actually commanding an army in the field there is an added allowance of $100 a month. No distinction otherwise in pay or allowances is made from a brigadier up to a general. As with increase of rank and command additional expenditures and charges are imposed, the simple consideration of justice would demand correspondingly increased pay and allowances. Equality in such cases is inequity, but, in addition, it is contrary to all experience and practice to have no consideration in compensation to increased dignity and more important service. A singular illustration of the present inequity of the law is presented by the fact that the veteran general recently assigned to the duty of directing, under the President, all our armies, and required to incur all the expenses of a residence at the capital, is deprived of the additional allowance he would have had as a general commanding an army in the field, and receives no more than the latest brigadier. It is surely only right that pay and allowances should have an appropriate relation to rank and extent of duties, entailing, as they must, larger expenditures, and it is confidently hoped that our general officers of the more advanced grades will not longer be enforced to the embarrassments, privations, and destitution of attendants by which, under the present compensation allowed and the restrictions on the subject of rations, in the midst of their anxieties and high responsibilities, they are now annoyed.

Attention is likewise called to the necessity for some adequate provision to defray the expenses of officers traveling under orders. The present allowances are insufficient to bear the charges, which no economy, or even parsimony, can avoid, and the inadequate pay of the officer little enables him to discharge such expenses. The simplest justice requires that at least the necessary expenses incurred in obedience to orders should be defrayed by the Government.

Some provision should likewise be made to compensate the commissioners directed to be appointed by the act suspending in certain

cases the writ of habeas corpus. The duties are of a delicate and responsible character, and the compensation should be liberal enough to engage the services of men of high character and intelligence.

The recent military bills increasing the range of conscription have engaged the constant attention and energetic efforts of the able head of the Conscript Bureau in their enforcement. His accompanying report, to which attention is invited, will exhibit results so far attained in recruiting the armies and at the same time explain the embarrassments and impediments which have hindered more rapid execution.* These have resulted very much from the necessity of examining the numerous claims presented for exemptions or details under the exceptions and avowed policy of the law, and from the difficulty of commanding the class and number of assistants and officers for the multifarious duties cast on the Bureau. Owing to the decadence of the volunteering spirit, a large proportion of those liable to enrollment prefer claims of exemption or detail which justice and a regard for the aims avowed in the law require to be investigated and decided. At the same time the omission of Congress to authorize the appointment of officers for enrolling service and the expectation that officers to be retired under the invalid bill would suffice by assignment for such duties have placed the conscription service under something like a temporary privation. The period of such transition from old to new agencies under the most favorable circumstances would have been embarrassing and retarding, but the delays have been increased by the necessity of awaiting the process of retiring officers under a contemporaneous law, which must inevitably be of slow and gradual execution. Even when such officers have been retired and can be commanded, they are new to their duties, and the retention of their full rank often makes it difficult to adjust them in appropriate relations with the few more experienced officers whom the laws had authorized to be appointed for the duties of conscription. This will readily be appreciated when it is recollected that the highest rank authorized for such service is that of major of a camp of instruction. It is earnestly recommended that power of appointing, with rank varying from a lieutenant to a colonel, for enrolling and for supervising conscription in each State, a limited number of competent officers, whether from the retired list or those having special training or qualifications for the duties, be conferred. The duties cast on the Conscript Bureau are multifarious and arduous, as well as of prime moment, and it surely is not unreasonable to ask the privilege of selecting and employing fitting instrumentalities for their accomplishment.

Another cause of some retardation in the execution of the laws of conscription results, necessarily, from the persistent policy of the Department to rely for its regular administration on the prestige of law and the support of intelligent public opinion to established authority, rather than on military coercion by sustaining forces. Thus, instead of the forced gathering up, as with a drag net, of all that come within prescribed ages, there is the accorded privilege of volunteering; thereafter enrollment, with due respect to the limitations of the law and the claims for exemption and details, and their appropriate assignment. As the regular administration of law is more tedious than thesummary judgments of arbitrary authority, so this system sacrifices

something of expedition to justice. But much greater advantages are, it is believed, secured by the equity and certainty of execution, and by the ieconcilement of the people to its severe requirements. Of course in some limited districts, where disaffection or desertion may have assembled open recusants to the law, the regular agencies employed have to be sustained by the local or regular forces. While so large a number of conscripts may not, under this system, be at once thrown into the Army, yet the continuous return of deserters and stragglers and the steady recruitment of our armies may be counted on to maintain and enhance their numbers and efficiency.

In natural connection with the maintenance of our armies the thought is attracted to the condition of numbers of our gallant soldiers now languishing in the prisons of the enemy. The sympathies of a grateful country are fixed upon them with the deepest interest, and the Department has but shared and responded to those feelings in making all the efforts consistent with dignity and honor for their relief and release. The protraction of their confinement has been due solely to the inhuman policy and perfidy of our enemies, whose Government has omitted and refused to maintain the faith pledged in the cartel of exchange. With the terms of that agreement our Goyernment has ever been ready and earnest to comply, and in a variety of modes, even by an extraordinary mission of the second officer of the Government, has sought to re-establish its operation or to arrange satisfactory measures of exchange. Its remonstrances and its overtures have alike proved futile, and the Government of the United States must stand responsible before the world and in the sight of a just God for all the privations, sufferings, and loss of life by disease or otherwise entailed by confinement on the prisoners held on either side, not less on their own than on ours. The latest, among the shifts and subterfuges adopted by them to evade compliance with their plighted engagements, has been the selection, with the ostensible purpose of renewing exchanges, for the mission of treating on the subject with our authorities, of General Butler, the infamous author of so many atrocities in a former command as to have received the execration of the world, and to have been banned by the proclamation of the President with the name and character of an outlaw and a felon, to whom were to be extended none of the privileges of civilized warfare, but whose crimes, if he came into our power, were to be visited with the condign punishment of an infamous death. It may well excite surprise and indignation that the Government of the United States should select, for any position of dignity and command, a man so notoriously stigmatized by the common sentiment of enlightened nations. But it is not for us to deny their right to appreciate and select whom they may, not inappropriately perhaps, deem a fitting type and representative of their power and characteristics. While we maintain belligerent relations with them, we must, of course, recognize the official character of whatever officers they may empower to act within their own limits and within the sphere of their separate action. We must, therefore, recognize the fact of official position being held by such a character, and this was done, contemporaneously and subsequently to the issue of the President’s proclamation, by our generals in the field, when compelled to necessary official relations with the Federal commander at New Orleans; but when option can be exercised by ourselves, and within the limits of our own territory or within the control of our armies, it is neither to be expected, nor would it comport with the honor or dignity of the Confederacy, that

an outlaw and a felon should be received and admitted to the courtesies or privileges of civilized warfare, or exempted from the liabilities of a criminal. It has held him up to the detestation of Christendom and obtained the answering award of moral condemnation from the tribunal of enlightened public sentiment everywhere. Within its limits, and wherever its power may enable it to execute justice, he has been and will be held an outlaw and a felon. To essay more would be mere brutwm fulmen against the criminal, yet entail inconveniences to our own Government and injury to innocent victims of his malevolence. In this view, the Government has sought to regulate its action. It has not denied the power or position, however unworthily bestowed by his own Government on General Butler within their limits, but has refused to receive or admit him within ours. If an honest purpose of effecting exchanges, in compliance with the cartel or on equitable terms, be really entertained by the enemy, all the arrangements essential thereto may be readily attained consistently with the position thus justly held by our Government; while, if the selection was intended merely as a pretext of avoidance, or for the purpose of gratuitous offense, the hypocrisy of the one design or the malignity of the other will be exposed. Since this relation has been held some limited exchanges by indirect communication have been effected, and hopes are entertained, especially in view of the increased number of prisoners which recent successes have given us, that the inhuman policy and delusive pretenses of the enemy will be abandoned and the equitable stipulations of the cartel be again acknowledged and executed. Such consummation would thrill with emotions of gratification the whole population of the Confederacy, and bear relief and consolation to thousands of families throughout the land. Fora fuller history and explanation of all the proceedings connected with the subject of exchange, reference is made and special attention invited to the accompanying report of Mr. Ould, our able commissioner of exchange. *

Since my last report the administrative operations of the respective bureaus have been conducted with ability and energy by the zealous officers in charge. They have had many difficulties to encounter from the fluctuating currency; from deficiency of supplies; from the withdrawal of workmen and imperfect means of transportation; yet despite of these and other impediments, they have, in all instances, it is believed, not only maintained, but have rather increased the efficiency and success of their varied working departments. One of their greatest embarrassments has resulted from the law of the late Congress prohibiting, under severe penalties, the employment or continuance in employment of any liable to military duty. As the operations of several of the most important bureaus required assistants as well as officers of great activity and energy, rarely to be found except in the prime of life, a large number of the most trusted and essential employés came within the prohibited classes. To dismiss them at once, without breaking up, at the most critical and important period, the operations of the essential bureaus of Subsistence, Supply, and Transportation, was plainly impossible. It became necessary, therefore, that the power of detail, which had been reposed, it is to be presumed, to guard against such, among other contingencies, should be exercised by the Department more liberally than would have been otherwise consistent with its views. Every exertion has, however,

*See Series II, Vol. VII, p. 108.

been made to restrict the details to the narrowest limits consistent with the continuance of efficient service in the bureaus, and they have not been made without strict scrutiny and assurance, as far as practicable, of their positive necessity. Instructions, too, have been given and efforts are being made to diminish gradually these details and to supply their places, as fast as substitutes can be found, from the disabled or infirm or from the reserve classes. The steadfast aim of the Department has been, and will continue to be, to place in our armies in active service every able-bodied man, liable to bear arms, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. If such result be attained it cannot be doubted armies will be maintained as large as the resources of the country would, in consistency with the permanent welfare of the people, justify, and fully adequate to achieve and assure independence and peace.

Another embarrassment in the administrative departments has resulted from the limitation by law to the compensation allowed to detailed men from the armies, who are generally skilled workmen or experts, and withdrawn on that account. Only $3 a day is by the law allowed them, and at existing inordinate rates it is, in the places where their duties compel their presence, simply impossible for them to support life, much less secure reasonable comforts or aid their families. What adds to the grievance is, that to the foreigners and others working by their sides three or four times as much compensation has to be given to retain them in theiremployments. Some additional provision for such detailed men must be made, and it is suggested that at least support, quarters, and clothing be secured to them. It is impracticable to provide them by any fixed rate of pay, for in our exceptional circumstances the necessary amount would vary largely in different localities and in brief intervals of time. In this connection, too, it is not inappropriate again to invoke earnestly consideration to the wholly inadequate compensation afforded to the clerks and employés of the Department. The financial measures of the late Congress, it is hoped, will, in their full development, compel reduction of inflated prices, but as yet they have been inoperative to afford any relief. Without means other than their salaries it is impossible for the clerks to obtain bare subsistence. They are faithful and laborious officers, and every consideration of justice and policy demands that they should receive at least a fair support. With the fluctuation of prices this cannot easily be secured by a moderate compensation in currency. Provision should be made to supply them with rations and clothing, or a part of the funds appropriated for their pay being employed in the purchase and export of cotton, they should receive a limited proportion, say a third or fourth, of their salaries in sterling exchange.

The supply departments are experiencing increased difficulties from the searcity existing in considerable portions of the Confederacy, and from the reluctance in all to sell under the expectation of advancing prices. The great resource is, und it is feared will have for some time at least to be, impressment. While it is certainly most desirable this mode of supply should be dispensed with, or at least made as equitable and regular as practicable, yet facility and rapidity of execution are indispensable. Some features of the late law regulating impressments, it is suggested with deference, retard and obstruct its operation, and might be modified to the great convenience of the Government and without serious prejudice to the citizen. The requirement, too, of

22 R R—SERIES IV, VOL III

local appraisements, without appeal to a general arbiter, seems a very defective mode of securing only just compensation, and is rather calculated to stimulate grasping desires and to foment the discontents which always spring from inequality and diversity of prices. Such appraisements, it is submitted, do not afford a fair criterion of just compensation under the exceptional circumstances of the Confederacy. A much juster rule would be the cost of production with a fair profit thereon, to be determined by selected officers of undoubted probity and intelligence. Recurrence to such system of general regulation, rather than to the fluctuating estimates of local appraisers, is earnestly recommended. Some positive provision and some regular process of enforcement against citizens resisting or evading impressments are also desirable, as the law is now almost without the sanction of a penalty or a mode of legal execution. Military coercion is ever to be deprecated as a dependence for the administration of law.

The expediency of the tithe tax has been fully vindicated, as it has proved a most valuable resource for the subsistence of the armies and the most acceptable form of imposition on the producers. It should certainly be continued, and, in my judgment, on some leading articles of subsistence, such as meat, wheat, rice, and products of the sugar cane, should be increased. Some delays have arisen in its collection from the lack of adequate transportation, and from the want of harmony between the assessors and collectors. As the supervision of both classes of officers is now reposed in the same department, more unity of action may hereafter be expected. In the amendments made to the law, however, at the last session, too limited a time has, according to the judgment and experience of the officers charged with its execution, been allowed for collection before the privilege of commutation. That period is limited to five months only, within which all collections must be completed. With the means of transport and storage possessed, this is physically impracticable throughout the whole of the Confederacy. An extension of the period to at least eight months is therefore reeommended.

Under the legislation of the late Congress efficient regulations have been adopted to make our great staples more available for providing funds and sustaining our credit abroad by exportation. Adequate precautions have, likewise, been taken to assure, on the export of these leading articles of commerce, when taken out of the Confederacy for private gain, fair returns of useful supplies for the Government and people. The period is yet too brief to allow full realization of the benefits to be expected from this policy, but enough is shown to vindicate its wisdom and call for its maintenance. It would be at once a great triumph over our enemies, and not an unprofitable lesson to neutral nations, that the malice of the former, as exhibited in their futile efforts, by a pretended blockade, to cut off the commerce of the Confederacy, and the stolid indifference of the latter to their violation of the law of nations and recent treaty stipulations, should, by the enhancement of prices consequently falling on consumers abroad, and especially their own people, prove the effective means of sustaining our credit and securing adequate supplies to the Confederacy. This is perfectly practicable by sufficient increase in the number of vessels, and by greater attention to affording facilities for evading the blockade, and rendering more directly the aid and countenance of the Government to the provision of the staples at the ports, and to the enlistment of private enterprise and capital in the trade.

The universal appreciation of the value of these great staples suggests the inquiry whether, as they cannot be exported at an approach to their production, they may not be employed within the Confederacy to maintain our internal as abroad they will our external credit. This subject belongs perhaps more appropriately to another department of the Administration, from whose matured thought and larger experience more reliable counsel may be obtained; but the great interest of this Department in utilizing all means of supply and securing acceptable securities for purchasing may excuse the suggestion. It is believed a plan might be devised by which the quantities of these great staples, which could be readily obtained for the Government, by the tithe and the exaction of the tax on them, as on gold in kind, rather than value, might be so disposed of as to provide a tempting mode of investment to capitalists, whether at home or abroad, and thus assure large available means for meeting the disbursements of the war, without the further issue of a redundant currency.

Of all the difficulties encountered by the administrative bureaus, perhaps the greatest has been the deficiency in transportation. With the coasting trade cut off and the command by the enemy, through their naval superiority, of all our great rivers, reliance for internal trade and communication has been necessarily on the railroads. These were never designed nor provided with means for the task now incumbent upon them. They have, besides, suffered much from inability to command the supplies of iron, implements, and machinery they habitually imported, and from many sacrifices and losses in the war. The deficiency of skilled labor has also been a great embarrassment, even in requisite repairs. It is impossible they can be maintained in efficiency, or that even the leading lines can be kept up, without the direct aid and interposition of the Government. Some of the shorter and least important roads must be sacrificed and the iron and machinery taken for the maintenance of the leading lines and for the construction of some essential and less exposed interior links of connection. They will also have to be supplied with sterling funds, or means of exporting our staples to command them, and facilities of purchasing and importing necessary supplies of machinery and the like. The Government will have to assist, by the construction of cars and locomotives, and to give facilities for procuring labor, and especially skilled labor, oftentimes even by details from the Army, in which, during the first stagnation of business attendant on the war, a very large proportion of the machinists and mechanics entered. It is recommended that by appropriate legislation aids in these various modes be authorized. In return for such privileges full command over all the resources and means of transport possessed by the roads whenever needed for the requirements of the Government should be established. It may be, indeed is, believed now to be absolutely essential for the support of leading armies that on certain lines all the means of transport that can be commanded should be exacted. The roads should be run under unity of management, without reference to their local limits or separate schedules, and with the rollingstock possessed by all, or which can be drawn from other sources. There should be the full power of commanding all this, and at the same time of requiring the continued service, as far as needed, of all officers and employés of the roads, so that there should not be even temporary (which might be fatal) delay or embarrassment in conducting the transportation. There should be also the power of at once

taking possession of and removing the iron on roads which must be sacrificed to maintain or construct others more essential, leaving the just compensation and all other questions of possible litigation to be settled by subsequent equitable and satisfactory processes of investigation and decision. The delays incident to previous settlement, often by vexed litigation, are fatal to the imperative uses which demand the sacrifice, and if permitted local and private interests will almost invariably invite them. No reflection is intended on the zeal or patriotism of the officers or members of these railroad companies. On the contrary, it is gratefully acknowledged that they have generally manifested a most commendable disposition to meet the requirements of the Government, and to make even large sacrifices for the common cause. Still, the measure of sacrifice which the need demands is dimmed to their perception by special interests, and is not unfrequently too great to be acquiesced in without the exhaustion of all means of procrastination and prevention. The boards of directors, too, where they would individually make the required sacrifice, feel constrained, by conscientious regard for their representative trust, to interpose all the obstruction and delays in their power. As the immediate possession and use of the iron in such eases is a pressing necessity, no alternative appears to exist but to give the power of seizure in the first instance, with the fullest precaution for after liberal settlement, and it is earnestly recommended this be done.

The distance and difficulty of communication cause imperfect knowledge of the transactions in the Trans-Mississippi Department since my last report, yet operations there are in the main believed to have been scarcely less encouraging and successful than on the eastern side of the river. It is true that under the pressure of superior numbers, from strategic considerations mainly, our forces retired from Little Rock, and have allowed the enemy to advance to considerable distances in the interior of Arkansas; but in such movements they expose themselves to imminent hazards, and will probably have only been lured to more complete destruction. Similar tacties in the war of our Revolution achieved the decisive triumphs of Saratoga and Yorktown, and the remembrance of these glorious results should enable the people overrun to endure the many sacrifices such policy of withdrawal must entail.

In Texas and Louisiana the invasions of the past winter have either accomplished ridiculously small results, in comparison with the formidable commands employed, or have been successfully repelled. In Western Louisiana especially the various advances of the enemy into the interior have met from our forces, under the skillful leadership of General Taylor, repeated and signal discomfitures. Of the most formidable of their invasions, attempted apparently for the subjugation of the whole country by several converging columns of their land forces, aided by a formidable fleet of gun-boats on the river, we are as yet imperfectly acquainted with results, as the wise policy of our able commander has withdrawn the scene of conflict to the far interior. We have only meager and glozing accounts through the journals of the enemy, yet they suffice to show reiterated disasters sustained and afford grounds for sanguine hope to us that they have met the retribution of fearful losses and may have been entirely captured or destroyed. Another San Jacinto may signalize the annals of the southwest and illustrate the fearful risk to an invading army of pressing, with the purpose of subjugation, to the interior defenses of a free and gallant people.

The abundant productions of this fertile region have fortunately precluded all deficiencies of supplies for subsistence to either the armies or the people. In this respect they are fully provided. Their needs are rather of munitions and manufactured stores. Even before the interruption of communication with the east efficient means had been adopted for the establishment of foundries, arsenals, and manufacturing establishments of various kinds and for the development of the mineral and other internal resources of the country. These efforts have been since pressed with increased vigor and with most creditable success. No long time will elapse before, in all material respects, the Trans-Mississippi Department will be made self-sustaining for war. Meantime, most liberal contracts and all other practicable measures have been adopted to afford them requisite supplies by importation of arms, munitions, and quartermaster’s stores. These have been at least partially successful, and have met the most pressing wants. The deficiency most to be deplored is of a full supply of arms, and this has resulted from no want of foresight or exertion on the part of the Government, but from casual miscarriages and unexpected and most unjustifiable seizures of large cargoes by neutral powers. The subsequent rendition of them, with acknowledgment of error, at distant points, by no means remedied the mischiefs the injustice had inflicted. Notwithstanding the frustration in this way of well-concerted arrangements for supplies of arms and munitions, others have been rewarded with success, and measures now in train of execution, it is confidently hoped, will soon remove existing deficiencies. It is not improbable this has been already more speedily and effectively accomplished by the triumph of our arms and the capture of the abundant stores of the enemy. It is certainly mortifying to think that brave men are kept trom the field, when their all is staked, by the want of arms; yet, if they can be supplied by the spoils of victory, they will find, in their equipment, at once encouragement and an inspiration of generous emulation to gallant achievements. They will know, too, the value of their arms and how they should be both guarded and used.

The legislation of the late Congress for the Trans-Mississippi Department was both liberal and provident. Provision was made for the peculiar needs incident to its comparative isolation from the supervision of the central Government and all the agencies of a partially independent government were authorized. In the same spirit has been the action of the Executive. Added rank and dignity have been bestowed upon the able commander and administrator at its head, and to him have been intrusted the full measure of executive powers, which, under our constitutional system, could be exercised by other than the President. Thus, full confidence has been manifested by both branches of the Government in his fidelity, capacity, and judgment, and all the incentives to effort and all the means of accomplishment which could be commanded have been imparted. It is not doubted such unusual trusts are merited and will be justified in their exercise, and that continuing confidence and sanction to his administration of affairs will be assured by its happy results. Accounts concur in representing him as enjoying likewise the esteem and confidence of the people of the department. They, notwithstanding the sacrifices and losses to which they have necessarily been subjected, are believed to be resolute, hopeful, and reliant both on themselves and their leaders. Portions of their country may be overrun or temporarily occupied by the hosts of their unscrupulous foes, but they

know that with the resources in men and means and the advantages for defense of their extensive department, employed with energy and skill, the attempt to subdue a people as brave and determined as themselves is one of folly and madness. They endure with fortitude their temporary ills, await with patience the hour of approaching retribution, and anticipate with confidence the overthrow of their hateful enemies and their final disgraceful expulsion or destruction. In view of the means at command, the invincible spirit of the people, the skill of their leaders, and the approved prowess of their soldiers, the Trans-Mississippi Department may be regarded as, no less than the States of the Confederacy east, prepared against the utmost efforts of their malignant enemies for successful defense, and assured of ultimate triumph.

Attention is invited to the accompanying report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.* Credit is due to that officer for the dangers and privations he has endured in twice visiting the distant abodes of the Indian tribes. His presence and influence among them have proved salutary in affording encouragement and maintaining fidelity. It is important they should be dealt with in a spirit of consideration and liberality. They should not suffer from the changes which have been made in our financial system, the necessity and wisdom of which they cannot be expected to have foreseen or now to understand. The recommendation, therefore, by the Commissioner of timely legislation to authorize substitution of the new currency for the old, without loss to them, is approved and seconded. The great body of the Indians, notwithstanding their losses, are attached to the Confederacy and confident in its fortunes, and with reasonable consideration for their peculiar wants and feelings may easily be retained in amity and fidelity.

We have now entered upon the fourth year of the war, and the end is not yet. Originating in the wrong and perfidy of our enemies, it is continued through their rage and hate. We have asked and seek only peace and separation from them. They profess to enforce a detested union, and wage really a war of conquest and extermination. Prostrating their own Constitution and surrendering their liberties, they are intent only to crush ours. A campaign of momentous events is impending on us. For it our people stand prepared and resolute. Nor have their representatives proved unworthy exponents of their indomitable purpose and self-sacrificing patriotism. The measures of the late Congress, considered as a combined system, are characterized by high resolve and enlarged statesmanship. They concentrate the energies and resources and command the men and property of the Confederacy in larger measure than have ever been done by any government. The whole male population capable of arms, from seventeen to fifty, are either marshaled to the field or organized in reserves, ready to be summoned. One-third of the currency of the Confederacy has been annulled, and taxation of unprecedented amount has been exacted from all values. One-tenth of productions in kind has been claimed without pay, and besides, the residue and all property has been subjected to seizure and conversion for public use at moderate rates of just compensation. The railroads, the great means of internal trade and communication, are made primarily subservient to the necessities of Government. Even the great writ of personal liberty is suspended in cases requisite to preclude evasion of military service, or to repress uprisings of disaffection or disloyalty. In short, by their representatives, the people, not reluctantly, but eagerly and fearful rather of shortcoming than excess, have, through regular constitutional action, commanded for their country and its cause the labor, property, and lives of all. In the consciousness of such devotion and sacrifice to a righteous cause they may well feel reliant and indomitable, and await with constancy and faith the shock of coming battle. They have, too, much to encourage and every incentive to nerve and animate. Our enemies exhibit unmistakable evidences of despondency, of approaching bankruptcy, and internal convulsion. They will be, during the year, in the throes of intense political struggle, distracted beyond all precedent by the jars and strifes of acrimonious factions contending for the prize of almost despotic power and madly extravagant expenditure. To a large proportion of their people, and among them the wisest and the best, the vile faction who are the authors and prosecutors of the war are scarce less odious than to ourselves, and with nearly as much reason, since its triumph is the practical subversion of their Constitution and laws, and the precursor of speedy destruction to their, as surely as to our, liberties. If any redemption remains to the people of the United States from the wickedness and madness that have urged them to this war, it can only be by recurrence to the principles of self-government in the people of the States and to the counsels of peace.

All the indications of the incipient campaign, too, are auspicious and inspiring. Cheering accounts of successes greet us from every quarter of the Confederacy. Since the penning of the first pages of this report the notes of decisive victory, imperfectly heard from the remote confines of the trans-Mississippi, have been swollen by the acclaim from Paducah and Fort Pillow, and have culminated in the shouts of complete triumph at the brilliant achievements of a young and rising general of North Carolina on his native soil. Many minor successes contribute to justify grateful exultation, but all should fail to excite presumption, and only animate to greater effort and to humbler trust in the blessing of Heaven on our arms.

The greatest incentive yet remains. Our only outlet to existence and safety is through the portals of victory. We have burned the ships behind us. It will not do to fail. Subjected to the hate and brutality of our malignant foes, to what depths of penury, misery, and baseness should we not be crushed? Our Confederacy would be extinct; our States broken up; our institutions, social and industrial, uprooted, and our people stripped of property, liberty, and all rights, now and in coming generations, the thralls of Yankees and their allied hordes of miscreant foreigners, held to the tasks of drudgery and infamy by the insolent ministry of our slaves in arms. No conquered people would have ever writhed under such masters, nor have been steeped in such bitterness and infamy. For this end, shall we have made such priceless sacrifices of blood and treasure, and done and dared as our Army and people have in this war? Shall the hosts of our gallant dead—our ”noble army of martyrs”—in vain have attested with their lives the sacredness and truth of their country’s cause? Are they to live in memory not enshrined amid the halo of fame for the inspiration and reverence of future generations, but branded for warning and execration, with the lasting stigma of a rebel’s name and a traitor’s fate? Are the thousands and tens of thousands of the invalided, the scarred and maimed heroes of this

war, instead of being followed through life with the homage of honor and gratitude, to drag out a wretched existence, the conspicuous objects of detestation, obloquy, and contempt? Shall we and ours, from the honored sires and beloved mothers to the maiden in her purity or the prattling innocent, with all our homes and means, be the victims or prey of Yankee insolence, cupidity, and hate? We cannot, in sober verity, afford to be conquered. Such existence offers no boon to tempt nor consolation to reconcile. In contrast, on the other hand, through the vista of no distant time, see the Confederacy of our choice established in power and dignity; our States in the benignant exercise of acknowledged sovereignty; the courage and virtue of our people tested and approved; our institutions, social and industrial, vindicated and freed from the malignant intermeddling of fanatic or insidious enemies, confirmed on the basis that so happily reconciles capital with labor and harmonizes dependence with protection, and the desolated homes and ravaged fields of our favored land restored and flourishing under the benignant smiles of peace and plenty. Let our people *’look on this picture, and then on that,” and choose. For it is a matter only of choice and the will to fulfill it. We have the numbers, the resources, and the means adequate to our certain redemption and triumph if only they be commanded, concentrated, and wielded with energy and unity by the will of a people unalterably fixed never to succumb, but to prefer release in the grave and refuge with God to the horrors and infamy of lasting slavery. We have only to act in this spirit, and humbly confiding in the favor of Heaven, we may be assured no distant day will witness the confusion and discomfiture of our enemies and the permanent attainment to us and our posterity, through the achievements of victory, of peace, freedom, and independence.

Respectfully submitted.

Secretary of War.