Jacob D. Cox to N. H. McLean, January 29, 1863
Maj. N. H. McLean, Chief of Staff, Department of the Ohio:
Magor: I have the honor to inclose a copy of a telegram received to-day from General Scammon, at Charleston, stating indirect receipt of information as to the purposes of the enemy in the direction of the Kanawha.
Mr. Thomas N. Ayers, to whom the dispatch refers, is the superintendeut of the coal-oil manufacturing company, which has works at Cannelton, 10 miles below Gauley Bridge, and which has its chief place of business at Maysville, Ky.
Reports of this sort have not been infrequent, and I attach little importance to them. Ihave given General Scammon directions to use his force with such activity as to compensate for its weakness as far as possible, and to look toward a concentration of it, with the determination to make a persistent stand at Gauley Bridge, even if the enemy advance by way of Sandy River, through Logan and Boone Court-House, to the Kanawha, belowhim. By keeping himself thus in their rear, the impossibility of keeping up supplies would make their stay short, whilst the withdrawal of Crook’s command leaves a considerable surplus of subsistence stores in the upper valley. Forage, however, is not abundant. In view, therefore, of the diminution of the force in the Kanawha, I have the honor to request from the general commanding a statement of his views of the policy to be pursued in the contingency referred to by General Scammon, or any other similar one which may arise.
I believe I have before stated to the general that the chief embarrassment of the officer commanding in the Kanawhais not in reference to his direct front, but as to his flanks, raids of cavalry being possible, either by the route taken by [A. G.] Jenkins last season, i. ¢., through the mountains between Summerville and Beverly, thence down the Little Kanawha Valley to the Ohio, reaching the Great Kanawha anywhere between Charleston and the mouth; or by the valley of the Big Sandy, and thence, as above stated, to the Kanawha above Charleston, at the Salines, or anywhere below. In either case it will be important to know what policy it is desired to have pursued—whether to attempt to hold Gauley Bridge, leaving the enemy to occupy the lower valley, or penetrate into Ohio, trusting to the necessity of their making but a brief visit, or to retreat to the Ohio. Of course these questions could only arise when the enemy is in greatly superior force. The line is not one which would be available to the enemy for permanent operations on a large scale, but they would, no doubt, be very glad to repossess the valley on account of the salt, as also on account of the diversion it would make in behalf of their forces elsewhere.
Political reasons also weigh with them in the desire to keep a foothold in Western Virginia.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
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