J. H. Wilson to Fle, July 3, 1864

GENERAL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of oper. ations of the troops under my command during the recent expedition against the South Side and Danville railroads.

On the 21st of June I received instructions from Major-General Meade, through his chief of staff, to move with my division and four regiments of General Kautz’s, against the above-mentioned railroads for the purpose of destroying them, and to continue my operations till driven from them by a force of the enemy so strong that I could no longer contend with it successfully. Having accomplished the object of the expedition I was directed to return to the Army of the Potomac. In pursuance of these instructions the forces under my command marched from their camp in the vicinity of Prince George CourtHouse at 2 a.m. on the 22d of June, General Kautz’s division in advance. They pursued an intricate route to Reams’ Station on the Weldon railroad, and thence through Dinwiddie Court-House to a point on the South Side road about fourteen miles from Petersburg. The enemy’s cavalry pickets were met at first on the Jerusalem plank road, but no resistance was made to the march. Just as the rear of the column was passing Reams’ Station it was attacked by a considerable force of cavalry, afterward ascertained to be the division of W. H. F. Lee. Kautz’s advance reached Ford’s Station about 4 p. m., capturing 2 locomotive engines and 16 cars, all in good order, burning the depot buildings, water-tanks, ties, wood, and destroying the railroad completely for several miles. The Third Division, moving more slowly, took ample time to destroy the track all the way from the Sixteen-Mile Turnout to Ford’s, and burnt a large saw-mill used in preparing lumber for the road. The men of the whole command were kept diligently at work in the vicinity of that place till nearly midnight. About 6 p.m. Chapman’s brigade, constituting the rear guard, was attacked again by rebel cavalry, but after a sharp fight drove the enemy off.

At 2 a.m. the 23d General Kautz’s division proceeded rapidly to the Burkeville Junction, where it arrived in the afternoon, meeting but slight resistance. The men were at once put to work burning the depots, tanks, track, trestle-work, and wood in all directions. The Third Division, Colonel McIntosh commanding, was ordered to march more slowly, and destroy the railroad completely. The men worked cheerfully, and by piling fence rails over the railroad iron lengthwise with the road and burning them the rails were warped by expansion and ties so destroyed as to compel the entire reconstruction of that part ot the road between the Sixteen-Mile Turnout and Blacks and Whites Station. At the latter place the advance of Kautz’s division was misled and thereby caused the Third Division to leave the direct road and lose

* For continuation of report, see Vol. XLII, Part I. 40 R R—VOL XL, PT I three or four miles by passing to the southeast and crossing the Nottoway River. By the time its advance had regained the road the enemy’s cavalry, by pursuing a direct road from near Ford’s, had succeeded in reaching it near Nottoway Station and interposing themselves between the two divisions of my command. Chapman’s brigade was at once deployed and pushed the enemy for some distance, getting possession of his battery, but in turn was driven back a part of the distance over which it had advanced. From 1 p. m. until nearly 9 the contest was continued with considerable intensity, the enemy making several determined efforts to drive us from the railroad. The First Brigade was held on the road to Hungarytown, in order that when Kautz’s position became known exactly I might have choice of roads and the certainty of forming a junction with him. Captain Whitaker, of my staff, was detached with a squadron to communicate with him. He carried orders for Kautz to join by the road from the railroad junction to Lewiston in case he found it necessary to leave the railroad. Late in the evening, finding that the enemy did not seem disposed to trouble the First Brigade, two regiments were detached to support Colonel Chapman. This was one of the most determined cavalry engagements in which this division has participated, and resulted in serious injury to the enemy. Prisoners captured reported the force of the rebels as two brigades of W. H. F. Lee’s division. Our loss was about 75 killed, wounded, and missing, among the latter Captain Sayles, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, a most gallant and accomplished young officer. He is supposed to have been wounded in the leg during the first advance of his regiment.

At 5 a.m. on the 24th, having heard of Kautz’s success at Burkeville, and that he proposed to move to Meherrin Station, on the Danville road, the Third Division was directed to march by the road through Hungarytown to the same point. Instructions were sent to General Kautz to hold on at that point, destroying the track up and down the road till the whole command could be reunited and the work assigned it prosecuted with system. He was also instructed to detach one regiment to proceed at once to the Roanoke or Staunton bridge, but moved toward Keysville, lower down the road, before my order reached him. The Third Division reached the Danville road, two miles north of Meherrin Station, at 2 p.m., and continued the destruction of the track from that place to Keysville, arriving at the latter place about night. The whole command continued work till all the track in the vicinity of its camps had been completely destroyed. The Danville road, having been laid with flat iron on wooden side rails notched into large ties, was easily and effectively destroyed by using the fence rails, as previously indicated in this report.

On the morning of the 25th the forces proceeded along the railroad toward the Staunton River, burning the track effectually and destroying the depots at Drake’s and Mossing Ford, as well as all the sawmills along the line; a very large one at Mossing Ford, owned by the railroad company, and used for sawing the string pieces for the railway was burnt, with the view of delaying the preparation of lumber to reconstruct the road. Every depot, turn-table, water-tank, and trestlework between the Sixteen-Mile Turnout on the South Side Railroad to the Roanoke bridge on the Danville road was destroyed. At 6 p.m.on the 25th, the advance having arrived at Roanoke Station, General Kautz’s division made an attack upon the bridge across the Staunton River hoping to reach the northern end and hold it long enough to burn it, but the enemy having six guns in position in works on the south side of the river and four lines of rifle-trench between them and the river-bank,

‘ defended by the militia of eight counties and a small force from Danville, our forces were not able to get closer than seventy or eighty yards to the bridge. After a determined effort, lasting till after dark, the attack was terminated and the troops directed to hold an advanced position, covering the road crossing at Roanoke Station. Simultanieously with Kautz’s attack of the bridge Lee’s cavalry attacked our rear, under Chapman, but as usual was held in check without any serious difficulty or loss. Finding that the bridge could not be carried without severe loss, if at all, the enemy being again close upon our rear, the Staunton too deep for fording and uuprovided with bridges or steam ferries, I determined to push no farther south, but to endeavor to reach the army by returning toward Petersburg. Our position, from the peculiar topography of the site, was rather dangerous, and in order to extricate the command it became necessary to move it by night by a road crossing the railroad running to the southeast along the foot of the bluffs and within 500 or 600 yards of the enemy’s guns. The march was therefore begun about midnight, McIntosh in advance, followed by the trains and Chapman’s brigade, Kautz’s division covering the movement. The following sketch will show the details of this as well as of the position and defenses of Roanoke bridge.*

The advance reached Wylliesburg by daylight on the morning of the 26th and halted. Two hours were allowed for the men to make coffee, and the march resumed through Christianville and Greensborough to the Buckhorn Creek, in Mecklenburg County, and camped for the night, or rather for four or five hours. Early the next morning the march was resumed, the column crossing the Meherrin at Saffold’s Bridge and going thence east to Great Creek on the Boydton plank road. From this place it moved to Poplar Mountain, in Greensville County, crossing the Nottoway at the Double Bridges near the mouth of Hardwood Creek. I arrived there about noon on the 28th, where I learned that the enemy had a small force of infantry at Stony Creek Depot, on the Weldon road, and two small detachments of cavalry which had been cut off from Lee’s division when we marched southward. The most diligent inquiry from the negroes and captured pickets gave no information of any other force. This, together with the fact that the road from Double Bridges to Prince George Court-House passes two miles to the westward of Stony Creek Depot, induced me to take that route, and accordingly the advance was pushed forward with the utmost rapidity with orders to drive in the reserve picket at the crossing of the road just mentioned, and the one from Stony Creek Depot to Dinwiddie Court-House, and clear the road for the main column. This order was handsomely executed under the directions of Captain Whitaker, of my staff, and state of affairs found to be nearly as represented. Shortly after the rebel picket had been driven in our advance was attacked by a strong force of dismounted cavalry and driven back. Colonel McIntosh immediately deployed the First Brigade, Third Division, and in turn pressed the enemy back to the position near an old church. In accomplishing this a few prisoners were taken, from whom we learned that the advance of a part of Hampton’s cavalry had just arrived from Richmond. Although it was then night a fierce fight ensued, lasting to nearly 10 o’clock, the enemy making several determined attacks but gaining no ground. It was at once apparent that the prospect of penetrating their line at this place was by no means flattering and that a new route must be chosen. Directing Colonel McIntosh, with the Third Division, to cover the road upon which he was, I ordered Kautz, with his division

*See p. 631, and the train, to take a road to the westward leading to the old stage road to Petersburg and running close to the north side of the Sappony follow, having been but little traveled.

It was broad daylight on the morning of the 29th, before the troops confronting the rebel position could be withdrawn, and by that time the enemy, who had been busy all night in strengthening his line and in attacking ours, was ready to make an advance in force. Colonels McIntosh and Chapman exerted themselves to the utmost to hold the enemy in check, and the troops held on with great tenacity. The first line was withdrawn without difficulty, but the second was taken in flank by the enemy and driven to the rear on the road to the Double Bridges. Some of the troops succeeded in joining the main column by the county road, but the main body, under the guidance of Colonel Chapman, were compelled to move through the woods and did not join till later in the day. These operations will be understood by reference to the following sketch.* By 7 a. m. of the 29th General Kautz’s advance reached Reams’ Station and drove in the enemy’s infantry pickets, unexpectedly found there, and was in turn driven back and thrown into some confusion. Rallying his line and re-enforcing it, anew advaice was made, driving the enemy back and capturing between 50 and 60 prisoners from Finegan’s brigade, of Mahone’s division of infantry. Shortly after this I arrived with the balance of the force and found General Kautz’s command in position on the road leading from the stage road to the station. The general informed me of the situation of his command and gave me some information in regard to the enemy’s movements. McIntosh was ordered to advance his command along the road toward Petersburg and prepare for an attempt to break through the enemy’s line between Reams’ and the Six-Mile House. For the first time I then learned that, contrary to my expectations, no part of the Weldon railroad was in possession of the infantry investing Petersburg, and that instead of my command being in the immediate vicinity of our lines the enemy held the road and interposed a strong force to prevent our junction. From information obtained from negroes and others I was led to believe that the enemy had most of his force in my front in the neighborhood of the station, and that the interval between there and the Six-Mile House was almost unguarded. Presuming this to be reliable I determined to mass my whole force, with ambulances and wagons in rear and. make a vigorous attempt to break through. I had ordered the dispositions of the troops accordingly, when a large force of infantry in line of battle, covered by a heavy skirmish line, was reported advancing down the main road from Petersburg with a heavy line of skirmishers deployed across the fields through.which I proposed passing. Colonel McIntosh, my staff officers, and I, reconnoitered the road and found not less than a brigade of infantry, with guns in position. To render our position more perilous, my scouts soon reported the movement of troops toward our extreme left flank. In the mean time, anticipating difficulty of a serious nature, I endeavored to open communication with the infantry in front of Petersburg, and finally detached Capt. E. W. Whitaker First Connecticut Cavalry, of my staff, with about forty men of the veteran Third New York Cavalry. I have since learned he succeeded in reaching army headquarters about 10 a.m. On his way he gallantly rode through the enemy’s cavalry and infantry columns in motion, escaping with twenty men. Seeing no possible chance of getting through to our lines by this route or of receiving succor in time to

Cuap, LIZ.) THE Richmond CAMPAIGN.

benefit us any, and fearing the loss of my entire command without the utmost promptitude and rapidity of movement, I ordered the issue of all the amimunition the troops could carry, the immediate destruction of the wagons and caissons, and that as soon as these dispositions could be made, the whole force should move by the stage road and the Double Bridges to the south side of the Nottoway again. Shortly after 12 m. the movement began, but the enemy having perfected his arrangements advanced simultaneously, and by the strength of an overwhelming force of infantry swept away our covering force, breaking in between McIntosh and Kautz, and taking McIntosh’s line in reverse and left flank, threw the whole rear into confusion. Fitzhugh’s battery, having an advantageous position, swung to the left in echelon and drove the enemy back into the woods, but the check was only temporary. The Second Ohio and Fifth New York swung around toward Kautz’s division, followed by Fitzhugh’s battery; these forces were not able to get back to the main road and moved off when closely pressed through the woods. The artillery succeeded in getting off the field, but had finally to be abandoned because it could not penetrate the woods. Lieutenant Fitzhugh, finding himself isolated and pressed on all sides by the enemy, spiked his guns, and with about fitty of his gunners, armed with carbines and pistols picked up from the field, turned back and rode gallantly through the lines of the enemy, crossed the railroad, and reached our infantry. Lieutenants Fuger and Leahy also succeeded in getting through with a few men. Lieutenant Ward, of Maynadier’s battery, took off one gun but was compelled to abandon it during the night march which ensued. It was thrown into a stream. Lieutenants Maynadier and Egan are missing. The officers of artillery behaved themselves in the handsomest manner.

General Kautz’s division marched parallel to this (Third) for some time, but did not succeed in joining the main column. Shortly after I had crossed the Rowanty I received a message from General Kautz, saying that he would endeavor to follow me, but failing would try to find his way into the lines of the infantry by some other route. The enemy continued to press heavily upon Colonel McIntosh, who made the most determined efforts to rally his men and cover the retreat. His exertions soon resulted in the establishment of a strong rear guard, consisting of the Second New York, Fifth New York, and the First Connecticut. At Stony Creek the enemy made a vigorous push with dismounted cavalry, but the command having been reformed and all of the First Brigade added to the rear guard they were held until everything had crossed. The bridge being bad and the creek unfordable, at one time the situation was critical in the extreme. The enemy opened with artillery before our men were all across, throwing the rear into some confusion. The negroes who had joined our columns in large numbers in all parts of the route added greatly to the embarrassment. It is reported that those who were unable to get across the bridge or to keep up with the column in its rapid movements were sabered or shot by the rebels. About 500 of Kautz’s men succeeded in joining my command and came in with it. Regarding it of the greatest importance that no time should be lost, I pushed with the utmost rapidity to the Nottoway, crossed at the Double Bridges between 10 and 11 p. m. and took the road to Jarratt’s Station. The head of the column reached a point within two miles of Jarratt’s by 2 a. m., and while waiting for a guide the column rested on the road nearly two hours. At dawn on the 30th of June it pushed on by the station, meeting no resistance except from a picket of the rebels. Taking a country road the column marched rapidly to the east, crossing the Nottoway again at Peters’ Ford, near Littleton, about 1 p.m. As soon as the river was crossed the troops were allowed to rest, and resumed their march again at 6.30 p. m. for Blunt’s Bridge, on the Blackwater. During the night the flankers of Chapman’s brigade met the enemy’s scouting parties and brought in prisoners who said that Chambliss’ brigade had left Stony Creek that morning at 9 o’clock to intercept us on the Jerusalem road. This caused my column to expedite its movements. Its advance reached the Blackwater to find the bridge gone and the stream utterly unfordable. I immediately began the repair of the bridge, and, with the assistance of the advanced guard, soon had it fit for crossing by file, but the materials having been partly burned gave way. With the assistance of Colonel Chapman it was promptly repaired, but after crossing a few more men again failed. New string pieces were cut from the woods, and by 3 a. mn. it was again covered with rails and ready for use. The whole command was over by 6.15 a. m., and the bridge destroyed. Shortly afterward a small force of the enemy made its appearance on the opposite side of the river. The command rested a few hours and then moved through Cabin Point to Chipoak Creek, where it camped.

Yesterday at 3 p. m. it arrived in camp at this place, having been gone ten days and a half and marched something over 300 miles, destroyed troops rest longer than six hours, and during the last four days at no time stopped longer than four hours. The artillery, ammunition wagons, and ambulances were kept supplied with fresh horses and mules by parties under charge of Capt. G. I. Taggart, division commissary of subsistence, acting chief quartermaster of the expedition. The work on the railroad was pushed during night and day, mostly by fire. The implements with which the expedition was to have been furnished had not arrived when the expedition started. The greatest credit is due to officers and men for their endurance, sleepless exertion, and gallantry. General Kautz, Colonels McIntosh, Chapman, Spear, and West did all in their power to make the expedition successful. Colonel Hammond, of the Fifth New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Purington, Second Ohio; Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton, Eighteenth Pennsylvania; Major Wells, First Vermont; Major Pope, Eighth New York; Major Bacon, Fifth New York; Major Moore, Eighth New York; Major Patton, Third Indiana; Major McIrvin, Second New York, the last two wounded, and many other officers are specially worthy of commendation for their gallantry and uniform good conduct. My own staff—particularly Captain Whitaker, First Connecticut Volunteers; Capt. J. N. Andrews, Eighth [U.S.] Infantry, and Capt. K. B. Beaumont—did their duty with great intelligence and unceasing industry. The reports of division and brigade commanders will give more detailed accounts of the operations of different parts of the command. A full list of casualties will be furnished in afew days. The missing cannot yet be fully estimated, though it will be much less than I feared at first.

The country through which we passed seemed well supplied with supplies of wheat, ripening oats, and cattle; but scarcely an ablebodied man out of the army was seen during the whole march. The negroes everywhere showed the liveliest desire to follow us.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,