J. Bankhead Magruder to W. R. Boaas, September 4, 1863

Brig. Gen. W. R. Boaas, Chief of Staff;

GENERAL: Ihave received your letter of the 28th ultimo, and notified you of the same a few days since.

You directed me to—

Concentrate all of your [my] available force near the Red River and remove your [my] headquarters to some point near the troops, and personally supervise their movements.

In pursuance of these orders, which I received at Houston, I accompanied the Third Regiment of Texas Infantry to a point near this place, arriving here last night. Millican, 7 miles from here, is the northern terminus of the railroad in this direction. There is no water, though, at that point, and the troops have to be encamped in the neighborhood where they can find it. Idirected Griffin’s battalion from Sabine Pass and Gould’s regiment from the mouth of the Brazos to be concentrated in this neighborhood, where a battery of artiliery had also been sent en route to Bonham. I ordered that portion of Pyron’s regiment which is at San Antonio to move to Bonham, and constituted a brigade of these troops, to be commanded by Acting Brigadier-General Luckett. Acting Brigadier General Bankhead reports that he has 1,300 troops and a battery of mountain howitzers, with which he has proceeded to the support of Brigadier-General Steele, who has fallen back, being pursued by the enemy, to Boggy Depot. I also ordered about 1,800 of the State cavalry to proceed to Bonham, and report to Brigadier-General tirely unarmed. It is my duty to state, for the information of the lieutenant- general commanding, that in taking these troops from the defense of the coast, I am compelled to leave vital points on the coast almost destitute of the means of defense. These troops concentrated near here will remain where they are, waiting wagons for transportation, until the lieutenant-general commanding, if he answers promptly, will be enabled to decide as to their further disposition.

The question now presents itself, and cannot be avoided, as to the relative importance of the different sections of Texas to be defended ; and, in the first place, I would remark that, in consequence of the scarcity of water between this place and Bonham at this season of the year, it is almost impossible to march a regiment of infantry in a body to that point, and that not more than two companies of cavalry can be sent forward in a body, and, further, when the rains do commence, the

904 wW. FLA, 8. ALA., 8. MISS., L. A., TEX., N. MEX. (Car. XXXVIIL

return of those troops will be extremely difficult, and, if effected, will occupy much time, in consequence of the nature of the soil in wet weather. When once, therefore, we part with them, they can no longer be depended upon in case of emergency on the coast, and I have reason to believe, from the concentration of troops at New Orleans from above, that the enemy will attempt to get possession of the Sabine River from its mouth to Niblett’s Bluff, in order to cut off communications with Louisiana, and thus enable him to occupy the State of Louisiana without danger to his communications, whilst with his naval forces, and perhaps others, he will possess himself of Aransas Bay, and threaten San Antonio, cutting off at least our cotton trade with Mexico, and making preparation to take San Antonio, only 120 miles from Saint Mary’s, on a route which affords wood and water. The small force at Brownsville, on the Rio Grande—only one regiment and a battery—will then have to abandon that river, and unite itself with the forces in the east. The 5,000 troops sent to Louisiana left me about 11,000 men, exclusive of State troops, the latter not available under present orders. This is the force with which I have to defend a coast of about 400 miles, besides the Louisiana frontier.

I propose to give up, in case of necessity, the Rio Grande and the coast as far as Saluria, the entrance to Lavaca, which will reduce it to about west, and Sabine on the east, defending the Brazos country and the Caney, if possible, and removing everything from San Antonio, should that place be likely to fall into the hands of the enemy.

However important the wheat region may be to us as a source of supply, he who commands between these lines, the Brazos and the Sabine, controls the heart of Texas, and will have beef and corn enough, even if he should not obtain flour enough, to support his army for an indefinite period. Should the enemy succeed in forcing the Sabine, or Galveston, or the Brazos, he will soon take possession of the country here indicated, and will virtually’-be master of Texas. I think, therefore, that it would be very imprudent to send to Bonham the troops which are being concentrated here, with the following exceptions: Three companies of Griffin’s battalion, who will desert unless they are ordered there, as they are from a country in which 17 women and children have already been scalped by the Indians; Gould’s regiment, for similar reasons; and a battery of artillery which can be spared, ordering to the coast in the place of these a corresponding number of mounted State troops now ordered to Bonham.

T acted promptly in obedience to Lieutenant-General Smith’s orders, but contrary tomy own judgment, as I did not understand the injunetion in regard to the personal supervision of the movements of these troops and the removal of headquarters, having always superintended personally all movements of my troops when it was possible, having headquarters at Houston, Galveston, and the extreme northern terminus of the Central Railroad.

I believe, however, it was my duty to put the movement in a state of forwardness, and then explain my reasons to the lieutenant-general commanding, that there might be no delay in carrying out his instructions.

Ihave reason to believe that within a month, or perhaps within a less time, we shall begin to receive arms. Every conceivable step has been taken to procure them, from the time I received orders from Richmond to the present moment.

It is to be hoped that the junction of Steele and Bankhead may enable them to assume offensive operations against Blunt (if so, we shall be much relieved), or that Major’s brigade, when it shall arrive in that part of the country, may, with Steele’s and Bankhead’s troops, be sufficient to afford it protection.. It is a matter of the last importance that I should be informed whether Major-General Taylor will fall back by Niblett’s Bluff or not, and in what force. Depots are already provided there for him, but I must know whether 1 can depend upon him to on me in defending the pass, the river, and railroad in the neighborood.

I have the honor to state that I relieved Brigadier-General McCulloch from duty with the court-martial in which he was sitting, and from the command of the Eastern Sub-District, the moment I received LieutenantGeneral Smith’s order, placing him in command of the Northern SubDistrict, and directing him to proceed to Bonham. He will reach that place, it is expected, in a few days.

Begging that the general will give me his views by return of mail,

I