Indian Agent to Schmidt, December 24, 1861

Captain SCHMIDT, Commanding Fort Hoskins: SIR: I avail myself of a few leisure moments to again address you on such points as I deem of essential interest to the welfare and peace of this reservation. But before doing so permit me to thank you sincerely for the promptness with which you rushed to my assistance when I made a call on your command on the 15th instant. At the time the messenger started off I anticipated from the appearance of things that serious troubles might arise at any hour, and over which I was powerless to act, as the force at the block-house was only sufficient for the protection of that place. Your timely arrival here undoubtedly cowed the disaffected and prevented bloodshed. Aside from this it showed the Indians that there was still a Government and a power dangerous to resist, stories of secessionists to the contrary notwithstanding. Although the object of your mission was in part a failure, yet the effect has been a good one, and may lead to many good results. Your visit here has some connection with the proposition and suggestions which I will here make to you. In your march from Fort Hoskins to this place you were not insensible and unobservant of the many difficulties under which a military force accomplishes the task of reaching this point, the only road to which is a mule trail over barren and rugged mountains, through deep and rocky cañons, crossing bridgeless swamps and swift mountain streams, and the trail itself worn out and filled with the fallen timber. Your military eye undoubtedly saw how easy a few hostile Indians could have guarded the passes and cut off your entire command, but you reached here in safety, though much fatigued. I will not further speculate upon what was visible to your own vision, but will come at once to the main proposition, and that is that Fort Hoskins should be abandoned and a similar post established here. In support of this proposition it might be shown that said fort as now located affords no protection to this agency, and much less to the white settlements in the Willamette Valley. It is a well-known fact that there are numerous ways of passing and repassing the fort by other trails than the one spoken of, so that Indians so disposed could commit depredations on the settlements with comparative safety, so far as the military is concerned. The fort, therefore, as now located is a failure. It is not there, but here, that protection is needed. Again, it can be shown that a military force can be subsisted and supplied at a much cheaper rate here than at Hoskins. Eight miles from this place is a broad and deep body of water named Yaquina Bay, connected with the ocean by a comparatively deep and wide channel, with sufficient water at low tide to admit the largest class of vessels called schooners. Supplies can be landed here through said channel either from Portland or San Francisco at not to exceed $30 per ton during winter months, and not more than $25 per ton in summer months; whereas, via Portland, Corvallis, and Hoskins it cannot be carried for less than $150 per ton. It is through this channel that this agency has been supplied for the last five years. It can also be shown that the cost of repair for the buildings at Hoskins will be equal, if it does not exceed, in amount the construction of new ones here. There is a saw-mill now here in operation of sufficient capacity to supply any demand for the purposes proposed. Timber is plentiful and convenient and land rent nothing. Indian labor could be procured in any amount at very cheap rates. The post once established here would insure peace and tranquillity among these Indians and would obviate the necessity of land communication, and of maintaining two posts, as is now the case. At any rate, if this is not done the force here must be largely augmented. I have the most convincing proofs that the Indians intend so soon as the winter is over to make an outbreak, leave this reservation, and make their way down the coast to Rogue River, their furmer country. If these suggestions are heeded in time a bloody, savage, and expensive Indian war may be obviated. Hoping that you will immediately communicate the proposition and Suggestions to your superiors, and take such other measures as you Lael deem best to further the ends proposed above, I remain, yours, ruly,

B: ER, BIDDLE;