Isaac R. Trimble to George B. McClellan, July 30, 1862

GENERAL: I respectfully append the following as a continuation of the operations of the Seventh Brigade from June 28 to July 4 inclusive:

On June 28 the brigade rested on the field of battle, and was chiefly employed in taking care of the wounded and burial of the dead.

On Sunday, 29th, orders were received to march down the Chickahominy. During the delay of starting I halted about 9 o’clock at a dwelling on the battle-field and sent an officer up a tree which had been prepared by the enemy as an observatory. This officer could with a glass plainly see the Yankee forces moving southward from Reynoldsville (General McClellan’s headquarters). The smoke of burning stores could also be distinctly seen. I wrote a note addressed to General Lee or General Jackson stating these facts and that the Federal Army was certainly retreating. General Lee answered the note, and stated that the enemy were in heavy force on the right, and that he had tried to reach them with artillery, but without effect.

Meantime four large conflagrations had become plainly visible, and infantry, artillery, and wagons were seen moving amid clouds of dust in a southerly direction. I again wrote te General Lee, then 2 miles distant, communicating these facts, and expressing the opinion that the enemy were certainly retreating with great precipitation, as burning stores were asure indication, and ought to be vigorously pursued.

It was afterward known that General McClellan did break up the camps on Sunday morning at the place referred to and commenced a rapid retreat.

Under previous orders we continued our march about 10 o’clock, and after several halts reached the York River Railroad near Bottom’s Bridge about 2 o’clock with the Third Division. After marching and counter-marching several times a halt of several hours was made 2 miles north of the railroad. Several times in the afternoon I had called attention to the dense clouds of dust observed on the north side of the Chickahominy; that it plainly indicated a rapid retreat of the enemy, and that our forces should be thrown across that stream to intercept their flight or increase their disorder. A practicable ford was discovered near the point where we halted, and General Ewell had decided, under the discretion allowed him, to cross and attack them about 4 o’clock; but orders from General Jackson, conflicting with

this, prevented so important a movement. About 6p. m. the division was marched back. up the Chickahominy, crossed the stream in the

night at the new bridges, and bivouacked at Reynoldsville twelve —

hours after the enemy and General McClellan had abandoned that place. AS inal ick : It is deeply to be regretted that, from the sure indications of rapid retreat given by the Federal forces, some portion of our army was not thrown across the Chickahominy that day to fall on the flank of the

enemy’s retreating columns. This could have been safely and suddenly done at the ford before alluded to.

On Monday, 30th, by orders, we marched at an early hour over the same road taken by the enemy twenty-four hours before, and 3 miles distant passed the battle-field where General Longstreet had engaged the enemy the afternoon previous. At about 4 p.m. we reached the White Oak Swamp, where, after an hour’s engagement with artillery. General Jackson’s army bivouacked for the night, including General Whiting’s division.

On Tuesday, July 1, we marched, by orders, at sunrise; crossed White Oak Swamp, the bridge destroyed by the enemy causing some hours’ delay; continued by slow marches to Church, and formed line of battle on Poindexter’s farm, opposite the Malvern Hills, about 2p. m., the Seventh Brigade on the extreme left. _We remained in position about three hours, during the greater part of which time artillery and musketry firing was heard on our right a mile or two distant. At 5 p. m. Courtney’s battery was put in position, opened a brisk fire, angwered by heavy discharges from four or five batteries or the enemy posted on Malvern Hills. After half an hour’s engagement, doing good service, the battery was withdrawn reluctantly by an order of General Whiting, through a courier,* which turned out to have been intended for another battery.

At 3 p.m. that day, after the enemy’s position and the disposition of his forces had been well reconnoitered through a glass and plainly visible, I asked permission to move through the continuous woods to the left and attack the enemy by a surprise on his right. This proposal, forwarded to General Jackson, was declined by him.

About sundown orders were received to march the Seventh Brigade to the extreme right, where the battle had raged fiercely for some two hours and our troops repulsed. I moved quickly, guided by an officer of General D. H. Hiil’s staff, through a dense woods, in the dark, exposed for 15 miles to a continuous and rapid fire of the enemy’s artillery, and took up a position on that part of the field where General Magruder had made his disastrous charges across an open field, every yard of which could be swept by the adverse artillery. This field was about half a mile broad, skirted by woods on the left and a high and abrupt declivity descending to Turkey Creek on the right. I reported to General Ewell, and a few moments after to D. H. Hill, who ordered the brigade to remain in its position near the woods on the edge of the field. I proposed soon after to General Hill to ride forward under cover of the heavy darkness and reconnoiter the enemy’s position. It was then about 9 o’clock. We rode forward and approached within we were in. I suggested to General Hill the advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that it must be successful, as the enemy would not expect one from our position, and under cover of the darkness we could approach them undiscovered. General Hill did not seem inclined to make the movement. We rode back to the brigade, conversed some time, when I again urged the propriety of an attack, as we could approach so near undiscovered as to insure success, the enemy having no skirmishers in our front. But he declined as before

‘to order the attack, and directed me to make no further movement.

I occupied this position until about 12 o’clock, when all firing had ceased for more than two hours, and as General Ewell and General Hill had both been absent during this time I retired the brigade into the woods to bivouac for the night, as the men were completely wornout and no further action expected.

The next morning by dawn I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder—thousands of straggling men asking every passer-by for their regiments ; ambulances, wagons, and artillery obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching rain, presenting a scene of the most woful and disheartening confusion.

The Seventh Brigade, not having been fairly brought into action, was in good order next morning, and prepared to move in a body by 6 o’clock. Orders were received from General Jackson, whom I met. casually, to march to the church, near which we remained all day July 2.

Thursday, July 3, we had orders to march to the front; did so, and encamped about 8 miles from James River, opposite Westover.

July 4 we again.marched to the front ; reached a point about 4 miles from James River, where line of battle was formed and skirmishers thrown out half a mile in advance, who occasionally exchanged shots with the enemy’s scouts. At night one of my regiments was put on picket. We lay in camp until July 8, when we were ordered to move at dark to the rear, and on July 10 encamped 4 miles from Richmond, scarcely able to march from excessive fatigue and prostration, the result of constant fighting and marching in a country where air and water were both impure, and rapidly breaking down the health of the army.

I tienda below a list of killed and wounded in the before-mentioned engagements.*

respectfully,