Henry W. Slocum to Henry W. Halleck, September 19, 1863

By General Meade’s dispatch to you of yesterday, it appears that he desires your views and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. Iam not prepared to order or even advise an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the case presents mat-: ter for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two. armies confront each other across a small river, substantially mid-. way between the two capitals, each defending its own capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy’s infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add 50 per cent.. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men, stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000. General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle, but each can bring as. large a percentagein as theother. Fora battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee’s two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy’s 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from ashin ton, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee’s army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over: a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1863—6.30 p. m. Commanding Officer Twelfth Corps:

The major-general commanding directs me to inquire of you if you received my dispatch of 1.20 p. m. yesterday. It was sent by your orderly, and requested you to examine the vicinity of Morton’s Ford {particularly with a view to ascertaining the feasibility of effecting a crossing of the army at that place) and give your views to him. ‘The musketry you heard must have been the cavalry at Stevensburg discharging their carbines. No other report upon the subject than yours has reached these headquarters.

A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General, and Chief of Staff.

Hpers. TWELFTH Corps, ARMY OF THE Potomac, September 19, 1863. Maj. Gen. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: Incompliance with instructions contained in your letter of yesterday, [have examined the river from Raccoon Ford down to Stringfellow’s Ford. I am of the opinion that a crossing cannot be effected at Raccoon Ford without great loss. At Morton’s Ford it would be attended with less difficulty, but even at that point weshould labor under many disadvantages. The approaches to this ford from ‘both sides of the river are over a low, marshy ground about onefourth of a mile in width. There are positions for artillery on this ‘side of the river nearly as good as those on the opposite side, but the enemy have already thrown up one work to command this ford, and are, I think, constructing another.

At Stringfellow’s Ford the bluffs approach nearer the river than at either of the other points, and I think a.crossing could be effected there with less loss than at either of the other fords. I think, however, it would benecessary to throw a bridge across. I should judge from appearances that a better position could be secured there after crossing than at either of the other points. The enemy have thrown up a work to protect this ford, but I do not think the position has ‘been well taken, and unless they further strengthen it, I think we could make a crossing there. If a crossing is contemplated, I would recommend that an engineer officer be sent here to examine the position. Judging from the camp fires and other indications, I think the main body of the enemy opposite to us are in the vicinit of Raccoon Ford, with from four to six regiments at Morton’s Ford. At Stringfellow’s Ford I think their force at present is very light.

The contrabands at Dr. Morton’s state that Longstreet’s corps was sent to Tennessee about ten days since, while the contrabands at Thornton Stringfellow’s say it has only gone to Louisa County.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,