Henry Trescot to Señor Aldunate, May 3, 1882

Mr. Trescot to Señor Aldunate

Sir: You are aware that in my last confidential conversation with your predecessor, Señor Balmaceda, it was understood that if the opportunity offered, I was authorized to indicate to the provisional government of Peru certain possible modifications in the terms of peace stated in the protocol.

I have presented my credentials to General Monteroas Vice-President of the provisional constitutional government of Peru and have had several conferences with Señor Alvarez, his secretary of state for foreign affairs.

I found General Montero and his advisers fully aware of the importance of peace to Peru and not disposed to conceal from themselves or the country that at the end of an honorable, patriotic, but unsuccessful war, peace would have to be purchased at the cost of great sacrifices. He would have found himself unable to discuss the acceptance of the terms stated in the protocol. But if he was at liberty to assume that these terms were capable of modification, he would gladly, in concert with his ally, the Government of Bolivia, make every effort to reach such modification as would satisfy the just demands of Chili.

But you are aware that the President is only the executive officer of a government which is constitutional while it is provisional. A treaty signed by him, without the authority of the National Congress, especially if it should provide for the cession of territory, would be simply worthless.

It would seem therefore only reasonable that before the President makes any overtures looking to peace, he should have an assurance from the Chilian Government on two points:

1. That he will he recognized by the Chilian Government as the lawful executive representative of the provisional constitutional government of Peru.

I think it cannot be denied that at the present moment the government of General Montero, however reduced his forces or restricted his resources, does represent the existing nationality of Peru, and is recognized and obeyed by the Peruvian people.

2. In order to initiate the negotiations which it is hoped may lead to a secure and honorable peace, the President would have to receive the authority of the National Congress to make the necessary concessions. Is the Government of Chili willing to agree to such an armistice as would allow the President to summon Congress to meet him at Arequipa, the only place at which it could be conveniently assembled? If so, the President is prepared immediately to call Congress together to lay before them the condition of the country, the necessity for peace, and the terms upon which it may probably be obtained. I venture to express the earnest hope that you will find an acceptance of these preliminary conditions consistent with the rights and interests of your government.

It is needless for me to recall to you the fact that General Montero holds his office by virtue of the authority of Congress, which gave him power to make peace, but which forbade his doing so on the basis of cession of territory. It is therefore impossible for General Montero to make any promises implying territorial cession in advance. Such promises would have no official weight whatsoever; nor do I think that with due regard to his honor you could ask him to make assurances of such a nature. But I am of opinion that as all parties in Peru have recognized him as the constitutional head of the government, and as Chili has never denied the national existence of Peru, he may rightfully ask, when expressing, as he does, a sincere desire for peace, that his path may be thus far facilitated by your government, and recent instructions received from my government warrant me in expressing to you the earnest desire and hope of the United States that Chili may be able to agree to the request made by General Montero.

At present it seems to me that the anomalous conditions of the relations between Chili and Peru are the real obstacles to a satisfactory peace. Until Chili recognizes the existence of a lawful and responsible government in Peru, there is no authority with which to deal, and a peace—if such a solution can properly be called a peace— can be reached only by the imposition by force of such terms as Chili may dictate.

Nor can I perceive that these concessions would in the slightest degree weaken the present position of the Chilian Government. The terms upon which the armistice would be granted could provide that there should be no change in the military condition, either by increase of the Peruvian forces or the acquisition of supplies, while the full responsibility of accepting or rejecting the terms of peace would be placed where they must finally rest before any peace can be made secure upon the Peruvian people.

In making these suggestions you will understand that I am acting upon my last conversation with Señor Balmaceda, rather as a friendly mediator than in my official character as the special envoy to the belligerents. The views of General Montero, as I have expressed them, have been transmitted to my government.

I have furnished a copy of this letter to Señor Novoa, and I beg to request that, as it is most important for my government to be informed of the intentions of Chili, you will send an answer to Señor Novoa by cable as soon as possible.

I avail, &c.,