Henry J. Hunt to Brigadier-General GREGG, September 29, 1863

September 29, 1863. Brigadier-General GREGG:

The commanding general directs that, unless you have already done so, you withdraw your force from Watery Mountain. He also wishes that, if you have sufficient force for the purpose, you send an occasional scout. toward Amissville, as it is reported that the rebels have two regiments of North Carolina cavalry near that place.

Cc. C. SUYDAM, Assistant Adjutant-General.

YORKTOWN, September 29, 18638. Major-General FOstTER :

Have seen Captain Gillis. I have 434 infantry for duty here. Cannot spare any from Williamsburg. I can _use about 300 cavalry for a short ex adition if I had the troops. I think a regiment of infantry should take position at Gloucester Court-House, with battery and 200 cavalry atthe Isthmus of Matthews County, with gunboat adjacent at head of North River, while 200 cavalry scoured Matthews County, with another gunboat and transport at the courthouse to bring them off if retreat by land should be intercepted. Will write fully by mail.

I have not enough available infantry.

I. J. WISTAR, Brigadier-General.

*See page 197.

ForTRESS MONROE, September 29, 1863. General WISTAR, Yorktown :

If you will communicate a complete plan which you will engage to carry out, I will see that you haveall the means in men and boats, but I want a well-digested plan before I will give an order.

RAPPAHANNOCK, September 30, 1863. Brigadier-General GREGG: There is noenemy at Amissville, and the inhabitants report that none have been there. J. IRVIN GREGG, Colonel, Commanding.

ARTILLERY Hpgrs., ARMY OF THE Potomac, Camp near Culpeper, Va., September 30, 1863.

Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac :

GENERAL: In relation to the transportation of ammunition for the army, I have always been of opinion that it should be transported in caissons. These carriages are constructed cterett to transport ammunition, and for this reason alone it might safely be assumed that they are well adapted to the service and possess special advantages. y impression on this subject has been confirmed by experience.

The system of transporting ammunition in the ordinary wagons has led to grave inconveniences. The ammunition trains are apt to be mixed up with other supply trains.

Foreseeing this, I took special pains in the organization of the Artillery Reserve ammunition train in the Peninsula. I obtained orders from General McClellan that the wagons should be covered with black water-proof covers, in order that they might be distinguished at a glance. These orders were not complied with by your predecessor, and the result was much confusion. Itook Rbeuial patna to keep a hundred wagon loads of artillery ammunition of the Artillery Reserve always available. At Malvern Hill, the trains of the divisions having become mingled with the other trains, it was generally found impracticable to find them. I ordered my hundred wagons upon the hill, with direction to issue to all who needed. The consequence was that battery after battery of the different corps, whose supplies were exhausted, and which could not find their own trains, had their chests replenished, and were sent to the field again. I believe this circumstance, the careful watchfulness over this train, and bringing it on to the field of battle, was one of the main causes of our success.

I have frequently seen that trains could not be found when most needed when a battle was going on. It is important that this evil should. be removed; the substitution of caissons for army wagons would remove it. On the day of battle, trains of caissons could be easily found and would have unquestioned precedence of movement.

There would be numerous other advantages; the ammunition could always be inspected. Boxed up as it is now such inspection is imossible. It would be better protected. Wagons are now often unoaded of their ammunition that they may be used for other bee the ammunition being put in the mud or on wet ground, or, left exposed to the weather, rain beats in at the ends of the wagons, and the covers often leak. }

In fine, there can be no security for the condition of the ammunition as long as it is carried in wagons. On the field of battle the boxes must be taken from the wagons, unscrewed, and the ammunition transferred to the caisson, a waste of time when time is too precious to waste, and delay may cause disaster. If transported in caissons, a team from a battery can hitch in and gallop off with a new supply, exchanging an empty caisson for a full one.

There is another point. Each wagon carries 325 pounds of ammunition boxes (14 boxes). The boxes are lost, but the great evil is the transportation of so much unnecessary weight, 23 pounds for each

Properly manned, these caissons could be galloped upon the field and take their pines behind infantry brigades, replenish the cartridge boxes, with the help of the file closers, and leave again in ten minutes. There would be no further reports of regiments leaving the field for want of ammunition ; the men would not be weighted down with an oversupply and the consequent waste would be prevented. This, however, would require a higher organization than 1s required for the transport and supply of artillery ammunition, and that companies of foot artillery should be furnished to act as drivers and guards for the trains. I think this could be done with decided advantage, and the whole ammunition train composed of caissons.

I will add that the subject has been several times brought to the notice of higher authorities, but so far without results. Your deotis a is interested in the subject, and I am certain you will

nd on examination that the transport of ammunition may be more poe surely, and economically provided for than by the present system.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,