Gueroult to the Mexican loan, August 30, 1866

Subscribers to the Mexican loan.

The probable failure of the Mexican empire will not only ruin our countrymen residing in Mexico, but will seriously injure pecuniarily all who took part in the Mexican loan. It is already announced that the interest on the bonds will not be paid, and that the lottery their titles call for will not be drawn. Here, then, are 756,000 bonds scattered among 300,000 families, worth no more than waste-paper.

If the loan had been offered to the pubi c by private banks, without recommendation of the French government, we would pity the bad luck of the subscribers, because they could have no hope of compensation. They would have to bear their disappointment with resignation.

Unfortunately, such is not the case. The French government, wishing to keep Maximilian, encouraged the loan, and made public efforts for its success. A committee of Mexican finance was formed in Paris, with Count Germing at its head. M. Langlais, a state counsellor, was sent to Mexico to put financial affairs in order. The discount bank authorized by the government undertook to dispose of the Mexican loan, and in fine, receiver generals in France were authorized agents to receive subscriptions and forward them to the bank in Paris. These different measures, without binding the government directly, were equivalent to a recommendation, and it is not its custom to take an interest in any financial operation outside of its own loans.

And its public language in congress was favorable to the Mexican empire, promising a most brilliant prospect. M. Corta, who was sent on a financial mission to Mexico, gave the legislative body a most brilliant picture of M Mexican resources, and the minister of state used it to confirm the doubting, saying: “The great capabilty of the emperor Maximilian will assure prosperity to Mexican finances, and a certain guarantee to those who intrust him with their money.” The minister believed it, and he convinced others; and so the loan was a success. Would it have succeeded if the government had remained neutral, or M. Rouher and M. Corta had kept silence, or the discount bank kept out of it, or the minister of finance had not authorized the receiver generals to act as agents for it? We doubt it.

Another weight to the arguments of those on the subscribers’ side is, that out of the two hundred and forty-six millions realized, one hundred and two millions went into the French treasury to pay war expenses, &c. The French treasury has absorbed the subscribers’ money, then, and owes them nothing.

It is singular, and not generally known, that Maximilian got only thirty-four millions out of the two hundred and forty-six, together with twenty-two millions paid for him in London, making a total of fifty-six millions.

The situation being as we have described, the question that arises is this: Has the French government contracted any obligation towards the subscribers to the Mexican loan, and ought it to aid them in any way?

It is a serious question, and is worthy of serious discussion. One party says the French treasury has already sacrificed too much in this unfortunate expedition; that the government has not guaranteed the Mexican loan; that it did not promise a guarantee by encouraging the loan; that the public would oppose any increase of expenses; let the subscribers take care of themselves; their high interest and] lottery prizes were enough to compensate them; if the Mexican empire had succeeded, their gains would have been immense, and they would not have shared with the French treasury; but luck having gone against them, they have no reason to complain, and should not ask the nation to repair their losses. These reasonings are serious, and merit a profound examination.

The other side reasons thus: Though the government may not have guaranteed the loan, yet it sanctioned it morally by favoring it, permitting public institutions and officers to act as agents for it; by persuading the public of its validity; thus the loan was sustained. If these seeming encouragements, given in the beginning, cannot now be interpreted as insuring it, the government certainly acted imprudently. In fact, the government has made one hundred and two millions by it, which it now holds and still refuses to reimburse the subscribers. Three hundred thousand families are injured by it, and the government has made one million of enemies, and policy as well as justice condemns it.

These two opposing theses are not lacking in force or sound arguments. The affair is embarrassing, and its solution difficult. If we lived in England or Belgium, it is probable the immediate consequence would be a change of cabinet; but to those concerned the question would remain entire, and the new ministers, though not responsible for the past, would be bound to attend to the necessities of the future. With us, where there is no ministerial responsibility, a change of cabinet would do no good. Those who committed the error will have to repair it. How this is to be done we cannot say, but it is evident that something must be done.

The press puts the question, and the government must answer it.