Granville to Richard Lyons, 1st Viscount Lyons, February 5, 1873

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord: The French embassador placed in my hands some days ago the paper of which I inclose a copy, the object of it being to call the attention of Her Majesty’s government to the expediency, when the Emperor of China shall have obtained his majority, of a combined action on the part of the treaty powers at Peking for the personal reception of their representatives by the Emperor.

The question involved in this communication had for some time engaged the attention of Her Majesty’s government, and the communication which they had it under consideration to make to other powers has only been anticipated by that which I have now received from Count d’Harcourt. It is therefore fitting that I should now enable your excellency to explain to M. de Rémusat the view taken of the question by Her Majesty’s government.

They have considered it under the twofold aspect, namely, whether the admission of foreign representatives to audience of the Emperor of China would improve the position of the powers either politically or commercially, and whether the attempt to obtain it be successful or the reverse might not lead to serious complication, either as regards the stability of the Emperor’s throne or the maintenance of friendly relations with the Chinese Empire.

Her Majesty’s government are aware that an opinion has long prevailed among the foreign community in China that direct access to the Emperor would be attended with benefits to commerce, and establish a better state of relations between their countries and China. But, regarded in this point of view, it may be asked whether commerce has suffered, or friendly relations with China been impaired, under the exclusive system which has hitherto prevailed? It cannot be said in the face of the wonderful development assumed by trade, and which is yearly increasing, that the merchant suffers from the want of occasional direct communication with the Emperor; neither can it be said that friendly relations with China have suffered from it. There may be points of detail which might be regulated to the advantage of commerce, but it is not likely that the imperial interference could be invoked for the purpose; there might be greater cordiality in the personal relations of foreigners and Chinese, but the remedy for the absence of it could hardly be the result of diplomatic interference. It might be found, perhaps, in the greater disposition of the foreign community to study the language and to consult the prejudices of the people, to seek friendly and social intercourse with them, rather than to keep aloof from them, and to abstain from pressing questions in opposition to the sentiments and received traditions of the government authorities and people.

But be this as it may, it can hardly be doubted that whatever influence the Emperor of China, if a man of mature age and endowed with administrative talents, and of an enlightened mind, might have in reforming the system under which foreign relations are carried on in China, the young Emperor who has just assumed the government on the declaration of his majority at a very early age, could not be expected to have any at all, and that any attempt on his part to press forward innovations repugnant to the general feelings of the nation would either be disregarded or lead to disturbances in the empire.

But it is alleged that if the question of audience were pressed to a successful issue the result would have a very important influence on the authorities and people of China, who would see in it an acknowledgment on the part of the Emperor that he is not superior to other foreign sovereigns. But is there certain assurance of such a result if the audience were now to be insisted on, and would it be prudent to risk the consequences of a failure?

Assuredly the powers have a right under treaty to require that their representatives should be personally received by the Emperor. But if the Chinese government seek to evade the concession, or attach to it conditions which cannot be submitted to, what in such a state of things would be the position of the powers? Are they to submit to being baffled, and desist from their demand? But this would scarcely be consistent with their dignity, or the safety of their important relations with China.

Are they to resent the refusal by withdrawing their missions from Peking? But this, while it would probably be most acceptable to the Chinese government, would involve a return to the old vicious system, now happily discarded, and throw the powers back on the local authorities at the different ports, instead of dealing with those authorities by the supreme powers of the central government held responsible for the conduct of its subordinate authorities.

There remains indeed one alternative, which as regards themselves, indeed Her Majesty’s government are not prepared to encounter for such an object as the audience, and from which other powers would, in all probability, equally shrink, namely, a recourse to hostilities to obtain access for their representatives to the Emperor. But independently of all other considerations warfare, even in its most mitigated form of a blockade of the ports of China, and the consequent stoppage of foreign trade, would inflict a far greater amount of injury on the foreigners than on the Chinese, who might find some consolation in escape from holding intercourse with foreigners, and be content for that object to forego the financial benefit to the country which such intercourse brings with it. Still as it has been so long assumed that occasion would be taken by the powers, from the majority of the Emp eror, to bring forward the question of audience, they might expose themselves to some discredit if they let the opportunity pass by without some allusion to it.

Her Majesty’s government are, therefore, inclined to think that the foreign representatives at Peking might well, collectively or individually, state to Prince Kung that they are instructed to request his highness to convey to the Emperor the congratulations of their respective sovereigns on the attainment of his majority and his assumption of the government; that their governments would gladly have conveyed these congratulations directly to the Emperor in the manner and with the ceremonial observed at other courts; but as this would involve innovation in the practice of the Chinese empire, and might therefore produce inconvenience to the young Emperor at the moment of his accession, which the powers would be sorry to do, they are satisfied, without abandoning the right at a time which they reserve to themselves to fix, as they may find it expedient, to seek for their representatives audience of His Imperial Majesty, not to press the question at the present time, in the hope that experience of affairs will teach His Imperial Majesty the expediency of adopting the ordinary usages of nations in this matter, and in the belief that the alteration in the custom of the imperial court will be more satisfactory when inaugurated by the Emperor’s own matured judgment.

Your excellency will read and give a copy of this dispatch to M. de Rémusat, and a copy will also be communicated by Her Majesty’s ministers at other places to the governments to which they are accredited.

I am, &c., &c.,