Gortchacow to Count Brunnow, December 7, 1872

Prince Gortchacow to Count Brunnow.

B.

[Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Brunnow, December 29.]

No. 2.]

M. le Comte: Your excellency has already received a copy of Lord Granville’s dispatch of the 17th of October, which was communicated to us by Lord A. Loftus, by order of his government.

It refers to the affairs of Central Asia. Before answering it, it becomes necessary for me to recapitulate the different phases of the negotiation between us and the English cabinet upon this question.

The two governments were equally desirous to forestall any cause of disagreement between them in that part of Asia. Both wish to establish such a state of things as would secure peace in those countries and consolidate the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two governments.

They had, consequently, come to an agreement that it was expedient to have a certain “intermediary” zone, for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact.

Afghanistan seemed well fitted to supply what was needed, and it was consequently agreed that the two governments should use all their influence with their neighboring states toward preventing any collision or encroachment one side or the other of this “intermediary” zone. All that remained, in order to make the agreement between the two cabinets as complete in fact as it already was in principle, Was to trace the exact limits of the zone.

It was here that a doubtful point arose. The founder of the Afghan state, Dost Mahammed Khan, had left behind him a state of confusion which did not allow of the territorial extension which Afghanistan had acquired at certain moments of his reign being accepted as a basis.

It was consequently agreed that no territories should be taken into account but such as, having formerly recognized the authority of Dost Mahammed, were still in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.

It thus became necessary to ascertain, with all possible accuracy, what were the territories in his actual possession.

For this purpose it was requisite to have positive local data, which neither government possessed, with reference to these distant and imperfectly known countries.

It was agreed that the governor-general of Turkestan should be instructed to take advantage of his residence in the proximity of and his relations with the neighboring Khanates to collect all the information necessary to throw light upon the question, and to enable the two governments to come to a practical decision with the facts before them.

Such was the point, M. le Comte, as your excellency will recollect, at which our negotiations with the English cabinet had arrived.

In conformity with this decision M. l’Aide-de-Camp Général de Kaufmann had taken every possible measure toward carrying out this preliminary investigation. Owing, moreover, to difficulties arising out of the distances involved, the excessively complicated nature of the points to be elucidated, the absence of genuine sources of information, and the impossibility of a direct inquiry, he was unable to accomplish his task as speedily as we, no less than the government of Her Britannic Majesty, would have desired. Hence the delay pointed out in Lord Granville’s dispatch.

We have, however, already drawn attention to the fact that the cause of the delay is to be found in the serious attention which the imperial cabinet devoted to this affair. It would have been easy to rest content with hastily collected notions which, later, would have given rise to misunderstandings. We preferred to study the question conscientiously, since it was one of giving a solid and durable basis to the political organization of Central Asia, and to the good and friendly relations, present as well as future, which the two governments aimed at establishing between them on that basis.

At the beginning of last October the imperial ministry was able to announce to Lord A. Loftus and to your excellency that the councillor of state, Struve, to whom these inquiries had been intrusted, had at last just arrived at St. Petersburg, and that as soon as the materials he had collected had been put into shape the result would be communicated to the cabinet in London. It was while this work was going on that Lord Granville’s dispatch was communicated to us, informing us of the opinion which Her Britannic Majesty’s government had thought fit to form upon the point in discussion. The imperial cabinet, having in view the spirit of the agreement, arrived at in principle between the two governments, none the less thinks it its duty to transmit to the government of Her Britannic Majesty the particulars collected on the spot by order of the governor-general of Turkestan, and to lay before them most frankly the conclusions which, in its opinion, are their natural consequences.

These particulars and conclusions are contained in the letter, copy of which is inclosed, which M. 1’Aide-de-Camp Général de Kaufmann has just addressed to me, and in the memorandum which forms its inclosure.

I will sum them up.

The question to be settled had two sides:

• To ascertain the real state of possession at this moment, so far as it is possible to prove it in those countries.
• Starting from this status quo as a basis, to seek for a line of demarkation to be traced which will best answer the object of the present negotiations; that is, to remove as far as possible all cause of conflict or mutual encroachment between the neighboring khanates, and consequently assure, as far as can be done, the state of peace which henceforward the two governments should respectively use all their influence to cause to be respected.

Looking at the question from these two points of view, its study led to the following conclusions:

1. That to the north the Anion Daria forms, in fact, the proper frontier of Afghanistan from its confluence with the Kouktcha as far as the point of Khodja Saleh.

So far our data confirm the opinion of the government of Her Britannic Majesty, and the frontier in question seems the more reasonable that it can give rise to no disputes on the part of the inhabitants of the banks of the Amou Daria.

2. To the northeast the data we have collected give the confluence of that river with the Kouktcha as the limit of the districts over which Shere Ali Khan exercises actual, undisputed sovereignty.

Beyond that limit, and especially with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, it has been impossible to find any traces of such a sovereignty; on the contrary, all our information upon the subject goes to prove that these districts should be regarded as independent.

In the communication from Her Britannic Majesty’s government, which was made to us in November last, it is seen that according to the testimony of Major Montgomery the Ameer of Cabul has “considerable authority” in Badakshan, and that the Afghans have “assisted Mahmood Shah to upset the emir or chief of this country, Jehendar Shah.” But these facts themselves seem to point rather to the real independence of Badakshan than to its absolute subjection to the Ameer of Cabul. The information collected by M. Struye, and contained in his memorandum, supports this conclusion. Mention is made, it is true, of interference by the Afghan ameer in the internal disputes of Badakshan, and of attempts on his part to get his assistance paid for by a kind of tribute, but nowhere are the signs to be found which in Asia accompany the exercise of the rights of sovereignty; for instance, the presence in the country of Afghan officers and of officials to collect taxes.

The chiefs of Badakshan looked upon themselves, and were looked upon by their neighbors, as independent chiefs.

It follows that, from these facts, at the most, it may be granted that the Ameer of Cabul has on various occasions attempted to bring Badakshan under his dominion; that he has several times profited by internal discord to exercise over the country considerable control, based on his position as a neighbor and the superiority of his forces, but that it is impossible to deduce from them the existence of a real and uncontested sovereign power.

As to Wakhan, that country seems to have remained up to the present moment even more outside the circle of the direct action of the chiefs of Afghanistan.

3. We have next to inquire whether or not in this state of things, and in view of our common object, that is, the establishment in those regions of a permanent peace guaranteed by both governments it is well to recognize the rights claimed by the Ameer of Cabul over Badakshan and Wakhan, and to comprise these two countries within the territorial limits of Afghanistan. Such is not the opinion of M. l’Aide-de-Camp Général Kaufmann, and the imperial cabinet arrives at the same conclusions.

In the present state of things there is no dispute between Badakshan and her neighbors. Bokhara puts forward no claim to that country. The two states are, besides, too weak, too absorbed in their own affiairs, to wish to quarrel. England and Russia would consequently have nothing to do but to maintain this state of peace, as well between these khanates as between Afghanistan and Badakshan; and this task would not seem beyond their power. Far otherwise would it be the day that the Ameer of Cabul should extend his authority over Badakshan and Wakhan. He would find himself immediately in contact with Kashgar, Khokahd, and Bokhara, from which he is now separated by those two countries. From that moment it would be far more difficult to avoid contests due either to his ambition and consciousness of power, or to the jealousy of his neighbors. This would give a most precarious basis to the peace it is sought to establish in those countries, and compromise the two governments who would be called upon to guarantee it. This arrangement would consequently seem to us to go directly counter to the object which they have in common. It would appear to us much more in keeping with the object to allow the present state of things to continue. Badakshan and Wakhan would thus form a barrier interposed between the northern and southern states of Central Asia, and this barrier, strengthened by the combined action which England and Russia are able to bring to bear upon such of those states as are accessible to their influence, would effectually prevent any dangerous contact, and would, in our opinion, secure, as far as anything could do so, the peace of those countries.

4. As for the boundaries to be recognized as those of Afghanistan on the northwest, starting from Khodja Saleh, the information we have received equally throws doubts upon the de facto possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Leripool, Meimané, Chibirgan, and Andkhoi, which it is a question of comprising within the acknowledged boundaries of Afghanistan.

These districts, however, being divided from Bokhara by deserts, would not, if annexed to the Afghan territory, offer the same dangers of contact that we have pointed out on the northeast, and their annexation would not consequently be open to the same objections. If the government of Her Britannic Majesty adheres to its opinion of the expediency of comprising these places within the limit of the Afghan territory, we will not insist upon the principle from which we first started, namely, that no district should he acknowledged as part of Afghanistan hut such as had been under the rule of Dost Mahammed Khan, and were at this moment in actual subjection to Shere Ali Khan. In deference to the wish of the government of Her Britannic Majesty, the imperial cabinet would be disposed, as far as this portion of the boundary is concerned, to accept the line laid down in Lord Granville’s dispatch. Such, M. le Comte, are briefly the conclusions which we think the materials in our hands justify us in forming.

Be so good as to lay them before the chief secretary of state of Her Britannic Majesty. Our intention in communicating them to his excellency is not only to fulfill our promise. We believe that, in attempting the rational solution of a question which interests the two governments equally, we are best carrying out the purposes which have animated both ever since their first friendly interchange of ideas.

Receive, &c.,