Gideon Welles to Lorenzo Thomas, April 20, 1861

Col. L. THomas, Adjutant-General U. 8S. Army: I shall probably be attacked to-night, but believe I can hold the post. JNO. C. ROBINSON, Captain, Fifth Infantry.

BALTIMORE, Saturday, April 20, 1861—10 o’clock. [General ScottT:]

My DEAR GENERAL: There has been no arrival from the North. Some one or more bridges have been destroyed; where it is not known ; telegraph interrupted. Warford has sent by horses along the road to find where the trouble is; will send me and General Keim with his staff through by an express train, if locomotives are on the north side of the track.

This road must be under military control at once, and in charge of the Government. So must the road between here and Washington. This is absolutely indispensable. Our rapid communication with the North is otherwise cut off. Troops coming on your road could leave it about three miles from Baltimore, and by a march of five miles reach the Washington road some two and a half miles from the city on the Washington road. This would avoid the city. But the city must be under the Government control. You should not rely upon any sending dispatches. Trusty agents should keep you informed, and carry your directions. Depend upon it, a vigorous and efficient plan of action must be decided on and carried out, or we will have to give up the capital.

The communication with the South is perfect both by railroad and telegraph, and we must have the same, or we are gone. No arrivals from Philadelphia or New York, and no information. Rumor says the bridge across the Gunpowder is destroyed, and also a bridge some six or eight miles out of the city. The Northern Central should be the base of operations, and the communications by water be kept open. Havre

aa ce ail CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION.

de Grace, it seems to me, is a point at which our Pennsylvania troops

might concentrate with advantage, as from there they could reach here by water or Annapolis by rail. We could keep the railroad open easy from the east bank of the Susquehanna.

Let there be prompt action. Let the Government as soon as possible take possession of the railroad necessary to keep open communication with Washington. Take, if necessary, tow steamers here for transporting troops by water. A few thousand men with artillery on the high grounds about this city would secure it to us.

SATURDAY, April 20, 1861—11 o’clock. Have just heard that the bridges between Ashland and Cockeysville and two or three nearer towns are burned. Will advise the forces in Philadelphia and such as may be at Harrisburg to come upon this road as far as they can and protect the balance of the road, and protect while temporarily repairing the bridges, or so much as is necessary—the balance to come in force and well armed to within three miles of Baltimore and cross over to Washington, and if in our possession, as it should be, to proceed by rail to Washington; if not, to march by forced marches to Washington. Am about starting in carriages, and hope to get through without interruption to York, and there take express train to

Navy DEPARTMENT, April 20, 1861,

Sir: I respectfully suggest that a military force be established at Annapolis to protect the frigate Constitution and Government property there, which is now much exposed. Could not a portion of one of the regiments expected to land there to-day be detailed for that duty? The withdrawal of a considerable portion of the marines from this station for other duty leaves the navy-yard and Government property much exposed. I would therefore respectfully request that a military force be

detailed to aid in guarding that point.

respectfully, your obedient servant,