George B. McClellan to Seth Williams, March 29, 1862

General S. WILLIAMS:

Express just received from General Howard. He drove the enemy across the Rappahannock Bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the Rappahannock River. The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. General Howard will return to this camp to-mor- .

. row morning. a E. V. SUMNER, Brigadier-General.

The line of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap Railroad was thus left reasonably segure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy. 5 : – “On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court-House to discuss the military status. The President’s Order, No. 3, of March 8, was considered. The following is a memorandum

of the proceedings of the council:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac, Fairfax Court-House, March 13, 1862.

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion: X :

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion “of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, provided—

1st. That the enemy’s vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized; __

2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and s < CN :

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy’s batteries on the York River. °

* For report here omitted see “Reconnaissance to Cedar Run,” March 14-16, in Reports, post. — : ;

Ath. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) :

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Riehmond Railroads. (Unanimous.) e s

N. B.— That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank oceupied a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

This was assented to by myself and immediately communicated to

the War Department. The following reply was received the same day: `

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862.

The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself . and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to ibs execution :

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2. Leave Washington entirely secure. :

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomae, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. EDWIN M. STANTON,

: Secretary of War.

My preparations were at once begun in accordance with these directions, and on the 16th of March the following instruetions were sent to Generals Banks and. Wadsworth : !

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac, : March 16, 1862.

Sin: You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. .

Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap Railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester and thoroughly scour the country south-of the railway and, up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be advantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry, well intrenched. Block-houses should be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as soon as the railway bridge is repaired.

Great activity should be observed by the cavalry.. Besides the two regiments at

Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal to scout towards the ^

Occoquan, and probably a fourth towards Leesburg.

To recapitulate, the most important points which should engage your attention are as follows : a

1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas—perhaps even Centreville; and another force (a brigade), also well intrenched, near Strasburg.

9. Block-houses at the railway bridges. i

3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front.

4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction, and in advance as far as the RappahanBee i posible : i

5. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early informatio;

6. The general object is to cover the line of the Paaa and Washington: ares

The above is communicated

by command of Major-General McClellan.