George Cadwalader to Robert Patterson, June 18, 1861
MAsor: Seven soeinbits of my division and the First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry remained on the other side of the river all night, notwithstanding my positive orders to withdraw to this side. The only way I can account for this is by the supposition that the order may not have been properly communicated to them by the commanders of brigades. I must inquire into this.
Finding when the troops left here last night for Hagerstown that those expected did not arrive, I used every effort to communicate with their commanding officers without success, I having no mounted men at my disposal. One of those, named Downs, at the suggestion of Ward H. Lamon, U.S. marshal, now with a regiment here, was sent a mile and a half from here on the other side of the river. Expecting from time to time that our troops would come over, and hearing no firing on the other side, as it became late we concluded not to send more troops over, but to remain in a state of readiness to cover their retreat or to defend this position in case of our being attacked. We had a force ready at the ford and a regiment advanced up the river westwardly all night. We intended at daylight to cross the river if occasion should require it. Iam happy now to report the safety of our forces on the other side in Virginia, and that we are withdrawing them as speedily as
ha Keath, we can without loss or injury to property. The ford is about four feet deep at present, and there are many large stones or rocks that are in the way and render us liable to accidents in crossing.
I am now endeavoring to reach the truth in relation to whether or not there is really a large force of rebels near to us, as is universally asserted here. I shall make another attempt to bring here George W. Curtis, who is referred toin the note I send. It was stated he saw the force; that he was confident that there could not have been less than 14,000 men, and that General Johnston was with them. How any plans are to be formed without knowing the truth of this report appears to me to be impossible, and it may be intended that he is to be ubiquitous, and that he is at one time to threaten Washington by uniting with the forces there, and at another to appear here or in the West, keeping our forces moving around the outside of a circle, whilst he is moving across the center. It may be that our movement on Sunday to the other side of the river has invited him to take up a position at Martinsburg to follow our rear, his position being stated to be two miles southeast of that place. General Johnston knew, no doubt, the number of our
wagons, and that we would not have been prepared to subsist our column without receiving supplies from the rear, fase he would have been in a position to cut off.
You will observe from Colonel Wallace’s letter fine he thinks the troops went westward after abandoning Harper’s Ferry. He speaks of their attacking General Morris. Our movement over the river may have drawn them back. I send you the order which I sent over the river last night by the man who was shot, and which they did not receive. It was brought back to me this morning. As soon as we can ascertain with certainty the position of Johnston and his troops we will be able to know what to do. Two messengers have just come in, confirming accounts of large forces near Martinsburg and Darkesville. Major Sherman is here. I will write again.
Very respectfully, yours,
Commanding First Division.