Frederick F. Low to To the Guardian General of Foo-Ping Prefecture, June 20, 1871

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish

Sir: My dispatches Nos. 70 and 71 informed you of all that had occurred up to the 2d instant, including the hostile reception the smaller vessels met with while absent on a surveying expedition. In addition, the latter contained my opinions with reference to what should be done immediately, without waiting further instructions, to prevent danger to the lives and property of our people in China as well as Corea. A careful review of the situation in consultation with the admiral, confirmed me in the opinions I had formed; and also that the dignity of the Government of the United States would be seriously compromised unless reparation be sought, and enforced if necessary, for the unprovoked assault upon the vessels. It also seemed reasonable that a demonstration such as was contemplated would, if successful, convince the Government that we would not tamely submit to insult and injury, and so impress it with a sense of our ability to redress wrongs as to cause it to be more careful in the future. Nor did it seem likely that such a step would by any possibility lessen the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them, for evidences were multiplying that all our overtures made in a conciliatory spirit would be peremptorily rejected. Although fully impressed with this belief, and skeptical in regard to any favorable results coming through delay, I still deemed it my duty to discourage hasty action, and advised delay in seeking forcible redress and retaliation until the Government should have had time to learn the facts and disavow its responsibility for the outrage, if the course of the military authorities was unauthorized. In this view the admiral fully concurred; and besides, our success would be rendered more certain by a delay of ten days, as the state of the tides would then be more favorable, which would insure greater safety to the vessels and more efficiency to their co-operation. It was also decided to confine the movement to the capture and destruction of the forts that had participated in the attack upon our vessels, and not go beyond that point, although abundant precedent could be found to justify the infliction of the most extreme punishment and damage upon this government and people, after unprovoked hostilities had once been inaugurated by them in such a treacherous manner. I was the more inclined to confine our hostile efforts within these limits, because I doubted whether the President contemplated the use of force further than the redress of wrongs and insults, and because the capture and destruction of these defensive works would be likely to produce the same effect upon the government as any more extensive operations which did not include the occupation of the capital.

The correspondence with the local officials, copies and translations of which are herewith inclosed, will show the earnest and persistent efforts that were made to adjust the difficulty amicably, and the stubborn reticence of the government touching this particular affair, as well as all matters connected with my mission.

I deem it proper to observe, in this connection, that the history of negotiations and intercourse between western nations and oriental governments goes to prove that every artifice which human ingenuity can devise will be resorted to to maintain their own superiority, and prove to their people the absolute inferiority of foreigners. Refusal to negotiate is usually the first step, and when compelled by force or otherwise to recede from that position, every effort is made to induce foreign ministers to treat with native officials of low rank and position. In illustration of this peculiarity, I beg to call your attention to the communication from the King of Corea to the board of rites, Peking, (inclosure 5.) You will observe that a reply to my letter is evaded rather than refused. The King affirms, however, that “a minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state,” and prays “that the Emperor (of China) will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct” me in my duties.

My own observation add experience, as well as the experience of others, convinced me that concession on these points would lower my position, lessen my influence, and thus render the task more difficult; I therefore determined to adopt a firm and dignified policy—to demand as a right, and not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one nation to another; to submit to no semblance of inferiority by consenting to consult or correspond with officials of inferior rank that might, and probably would, be put forward to meet me; to seek such guarantees as would render reasonably safe the lives and property of American citizens that might be wrecked upon these shores as a right which the United States could properly claim for its citizens and not as a concession which Corea could grant or refuse with equal propriety. This course I have steadily pursued; and when officials of low rank came in person or wrote letters the secretaries were deputed to meet them and reply to their communications. This will explain why it is that the correspondence with the local officials has been conducted in the name of Mr. Drew.

The local Official near here and his superior, the governor of Kang-Hoa, were informed that a disavowal of responsibility for the outrage was expected from the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress. (See inclosures 2 and 6.) The replies of these officials (inclosures 3 and 4) contain, you will observe, nothing that can be construed into an apology. They simply express regret at the necessity, but approve of the acts of the military authorities. Indeed I feel sure that the governor of Kang Hoa has military as well as civil jurisdiction, and is really the person who planned the attack and issued the orders to fire upon the vessels. So great was the anxiety of the admiral as well as myself to avoid, if possible, further hostilities, that orders were given to Captain Blake and Mr. Drew (inclosures 7 and 8) to cause hostilities to be suspended whenever they could obtain any reasonable assurance that peaceful negotiations would be assented to by the government. They did receive, while on the way up to the forts and before the attack was made, a communicatian from the Kang-Hoa magistrate, (inclosure 9) but as it contained only a repetition of his former statement they very properly paid no attention to it.

The expedition started on the 10th and returned on the 12th instant. The work it was sent to do was successfully and fully accomplished. Five forts were taken, which, with the munitions of war found in them, were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty of the enemy’s dead were counted lying on the field, fifty flags and several prisoners were captured and brought away; among the latter were some-wounded. Several books, manuscripts, orders, &c., were found. The contents of these documents are interesting, and enable a better and more reliable estimate to be made respecting the attitude and action of the government than was possible from our previous sources of information.

It was deemed advisable to bring away but few prisoners, only a number sufficient to demonstrate that we do not treat prisoners that fall into our hands cruelly, and that wounded men, although enemies, are humanely and tenderly cared for. Our loss was three killed and nine wounded. For full particulars of the engagement I beg to refer you to the Navy Department, where complete reports of the admiral will be found.

All accounts concur in the statement that the Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equaled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to prisoners, they concluded to perish fighting, even after all hope of success was gone; either this, or that their government had threatened the soldiers defending that particular fort with dire retribution in case of defeat. Some such reasons must have existed, because there were outside of the fort, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept at bay by the field artillery with small effort. Instead of recklessly rushing on to destruction, these troops showed little inclination to come within the range of the weapons of our troops. A proposition was made to release the prisoners on parole, (inclosure 10.) to which a reply was returned (inclosure 11) saying that the prisoners had incurred a severe penalty from their own government by surrender, and it was immaterial whether they were released or not. After a detention of a few days they were all unconditionally released. It is to be hoped that our humane treatment and release of these prisoners may disabuse the minds of the common people of their unjust suspicions regarding foreigners, and induce the government to spare the lives of those who may by misfortune or reverses in war fall into their hands.

The officers and men engaged in the expedition all behaved nobly. Their gallantry and heroism were conspicuous, reflecting upon themselves great credit, and upon the Navy and the Government represented by it honor and renown. I should be doing less than my duty were I to omit to add my testimony to these acts of devotion, or to acknowledge my obligations for the cheerful co-operation of Admiral Rodgers, and the zealous and efficient support of the officers of the fleet in all things where the honor or interests of the United States are involved.

On the 15th instant, addressed a dispatch to the King, (inclosure 15,) and caused it to be sent to the prefect of Foo-Ping-Foo with a request that it should be sent to the capital. It was returned on the 17th instant with a note from the prefect (inclosure 16) saying that, he dare not forward a dispatch to his sovereign. To this I caused a reply to be sent (inclosure 17) requesting him either to send the dispatch or inform the court that I desired to communicate with His Majesty or a high minister. This met with the same refusal as the former one had, (see inclosure 18.)

The first opportunity that offers will be availed of to open communication with the government, if it can be done without discredit, nor will my efforts to accomplish, what the Government desires be relaxed until all reasonable and honorable means are exhausted, and I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I have, however, little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms. Everything goes to prove that the government from the first determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even discussion; and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of defiance to all other nations.

I have the honor, &c.,