Frederick F. Low to P. S.—Since writing the foregoing I have received your dispatch of 18th April. With reference to your suggestion about the Yantic, I have to say that, if her presence is not absolutely needed elsewhere, I would be glad if she were ordered to Chefoo, May 13, 1873

Mr. Low to Admiral Jenkins.

Admiral: I have the honor to transmit copy of a note which I have addressed to Commander Bunce, of the Ashuelot.

In further explanation of the reasons for wishing to detain the Ashuelot at Tientsin, I would observe that within the last four weeks a large number of Chinese troops have been concentrated near the river, between Tien-tsin and Taku, where entrenchments are being thrown up. It is also said that a new fortification is being built near the place where these soldiers are concentrated.

From information which may be considered reliable, I estimate the number of troops now encamped along the river between Tien-tsin and Taku at 15,000 to 20,000. There are also at other camps, away from the river, but within ten or fifteen miles of Tien-tsin, as many more, probably.

What these warlike demonstrations mean I am unable to say. It is not impossible the government thinks that this demonstration of force will have the effect to intimidate the foreign ministers who have made a request for personal audience of the Emperor, or it may be a preparation for possible contingencies in case the demand is refused and foreign governments decline to submit quietly to the rejection of their demand. My own impression is, however, that the reason for assembling these troops at this moment may be set down to a desire on the part of the Chinese to make something of a display of force, as an intimation to the Japanese embassy now here that unreasonable demands will be resisted. I do not anticipate in any event an offensive movement, either against the Japanese or foreigners generally.

But while this is my belief, I cannot shut my eyes to the possible danger there may be in these movements, nor to the necessity of adopting every reasonable precaution for the protection of the lives and property of our citizens in this vicinity.

In view of these considerations I should regret to see the navalforce now at Tien-tsin withdrawn. I may add that Commander Bunee’s apparent anxiety to leave Tien-tsin is because his vessel needs repairs. But even if repairs are necessary to render her safe and serviceable at sea, they would not, I imagine, add to her usefulness in her present position.

If, however, it should be decided to withdraw the Ashuelot from Tien-tsin, I would most respectfully suggest that the Monocacy be sent to relieve her, and that the former should remain until relieved by the latter.

I have, &c.,