Frank P. Blair to Orders, Hpqrs. Dept. Of The Tennessee, February 1, 1863
February 1, 1863.
February 1, 1863.
General F. P. BLAIR:
Srr: Knox, the correspondent of the New York Herald, was brought into my presence last night, and in the presence of Dr. MeMillan, Col. T. Kilby Smith, Major Hammond, and Captain Dayton, and no others I had his printed assertions of matters on the Yazoo read to him, and invariably he gave you as authority for most of his general and specific assertions. Though I cannot believe him after your specific denial to me in the presence of Generals Steele and Stuart, yet his reiterated assertions and reference to you as his authority tor a statement of facts warrant me in calling on you for answers to specific questions.
Did you not know that I was ordered to leave Memphis December 18, in concert with other large armies and the fleet of gunboats?
Was there any delay in embarking or reaching the point of attack that I could have prevented ?
Did I not on December 23 furnish division commanders general instructions as specific as the case then admitted ?
Did I not daily during the movement make an order of the day and send it to division commanders explaining the movements of the day?
Was it not difficult, if not impossible, on our reaching the place of disembarkation to get information of the exact condition of the country lying between it and Vicksburg, and had we not to reconnoiter the bayou under very close fire?
Did you or do you know anything of the ground in front of A. J. Smith’s division ?
Did you or do you know anything of the ground in front of Morgan L. Smith’s position ?
Do you not know that the best point of assault was at Morgan’s position ?
Was not Morgan there with his three brigades at the time of the assault?
Were not your brigede and Thayer’s on the spot with orders and prepared to support Morgan in the assault?
Was not General Hovey’s brigade known to be close at hand?
Did not these six brigades, or two divisions, compose more thar half of my command?
Did you at any time before, at the time, or after advise any other mode or plan of attacks?
Did you not and do you not approve the withdrawal of my forces from Yazoo Island ?
Were not my orders specific that nothing should be left behind except a few barrels of pork and some hard bread, which your commissary reported to me in person could not be moved back ?
Do you know of a gun, a cartridge, ax, spade, wagon, or anything left behind but the pork and bread referred to, and what was its quantity ?
§82 WEST TENN. AND NORTHERN MISS, (Cuar. XXIX
Do you not know that £ personally remained in our camp at the bayou till every particle of orduance, wagons, &., and all the troops but ihe rear guard had reached the river? ,
Do you not know that I communicated with General McClernand before leaving the Yazoo? Do you not know that I remained at Yazoo Landing till every transport was off?
Was there any haste or confusion in re-embarking our command other than what is incident to large fleets and masses of men?
Have you not reason to know the enemy did not regard it as a retreat, but advised the people to look out for us in some other quarters?
Do you believe my force, independent of Grant’s and Banks’, could have taken and held Vicksburg ?
Do you not know that the attack on Haines’ Bluff was not attempted because Admiral Porter declared it to be too hazardous ?
I ask this of you as an officer and a gentleman, because Knox quotes you all through. I do not design it for publication, but purpose to send your answer to my brother, John Sherman, that he may partially protect me from the effect of the base accusations and slanders published to the world and dated on the Continental (Blair’s headquarters boat).
Cae W. T. SHERMAN ada Major-General.
CaMP BEFORE VIOKSBURG, February 1, 1863. Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN:
GENERAL: I have this moment received your letter in regard to the statement made by Mr. Knox, correspondent of the New York Herald, in your presence and in the presence of a number of other officers named by you in your letter, and have to request that you will read my answer to the same gentlemen.
It is a matter of mortification to me to receive such a letter from you after the conversation which occurred between yourself, Generals Steele and Stuart, and myself, and to which you refer in your letter.
I made no statement to Mr. Knox at any time which would serve as the foundation of his criticism upon you. All the conversation which occurred was in the presence of General Steele and his staff, and I recollect of saying nothing which could have wounded your feelings had you been present. I remarked on one or two occasions that I had understood that General Steele advised the first attack to be made on Haines’ Bluff, and [ thought that, as at this point we should have had the help of the gunboats, it was a great error to go where they could not assist us. I did not make the remark with a view of furnishing a text for criticism upon you, but simply in course of discussions such as often arise under such circumstances.
I will also say candidly that upon the application of Mr. Knox I allowed him to read a copy of my official report of the transactions upon the Yazoo, which had been sent to you through my immediate commander, with authority to make use of any statement of facts contained in it.
And now, after the preliminary statement, I proceed, in compliance with your request, to answer your specific questions; and inasmuch as from the tenor of your letter it would appear that these questions grow out of the attacks made on you, and for which I am quoted as authority therefore I shall take the liberty, in addition to my general denial of
Cnar, XXIX.) CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.— UNION.
having instigated attacks on you, to say in reference to each specific question whether I made any remarks to any one touching the matters involved in it that could have given ground for any assault on you.
First question. Did I not know that you were ordered to leave Memphis December 18, in concert with other large armies and the fleet of gunboats?
Answer. I knew that you had been so ordered, and the only comment I ever made on it was in commendation of the promptitude with which the movement was made.
Second question. Was there any delay m embarking or reaching the point of attack that you could have avoided ?
Answer. My answer to the first question answers this, and I have never made any statement to any one which contradicts it.
Third question. Did you not on December 23 furnish division commanders general instructions as specific as the case then admitted ?
Answer. You furnished instructions at the time mentioned to the division commanders, which were in turn furnished to brigade commanders, which I presume gave all the information you thought necessary or important. I have never made any comment complaining of you to Mr. Knox or any one.
Fourth question. Did you not daily during the movement make an order of the day and send it to division commanders explaining the movements of the day ?
Answer. You did; and I never said anything to the contrary.
Fifth question. Was it not difficult, if not impossible, on our reaching the place of debarkation to get information of the exact condition of the country lying between it and Vicksburg, and had we not to reconnoiter the bayou under very close fire ?
Answer. I answer both questions in the affirmative. I have never myself nor did I ever hear any one-deny either of the propositions.
Sixth question. Did I or do I know anything of the ground in front of General A. J. Smith’s division ?
Answer. I did not and do not, and never made any pretense of knowing.
Seventh question. Did I or doI know anything of the ground in front of General M. L. Smith’s division?
Answer. I saw what could be seen of it by looking at it with a glass across the bayou during the 28th. I thought it very formidable, and I have since been informed that it was defended by works which had not been discovered when I left that point. In speaking of this position I have always held this language.
Eighth question. DoI not know that the best point of assault was at Morgan’s position? —
Answer. From what I know, and have ascertained from others, Iam of the opinion that, with the exception of Haines’ Bluff, Morgan’s position was the best for the assault; but with the aid of the gunboats I think that Haines’ Bluff would have been our best point. I confess, however, that I knew nothing of the ground at Haines’ Bluff except from conversation with others, and my opinion is grounded upon my faith in the heavy guns of the navy, strengthened by witnessing the execution done by them at Arkansas Post. I think it unfortunate that a point of attack should have been selected for assault which made it impossible to move with the co-operation of the navy.
Ninth question. Was not Morgan there with his three brigades at the time of the assault ?
Answer. I presume such to be the fact. I think only two regimenta of his whole division ever got into the enemy’s works. I saw no more, and have said so very often.
Tenth question. Were not my brigade and Thayer’s on the spot with orders and prepared to support Morgan in the assault ?
Answer. My brigade and Thayer’s were on the spot with orders and prepared to support Morgan in the assault. I have stated to many persons that instead of supporting Morgan’s division Thayer’s brigade and my own went in advance of him. My whole brigade was in the works before a single regiment of Morgan’s appeared, and General Thayer stated to me that when he entered the enemy’s works he found two regiments of Morgan’s lying down in the first line of rifle-pits. When we were repulsed I came out of the works at the same time with General Thayer, and we both saw Colonel De Courcy, commanding one of Morgan’s brigades, outside of the works with a large body of troops formed in column under the bluft upon which the first line of rifle-pits was built. He refused to take or order his men into the enemy’s works. I have often made these statements, and I have also stated that General Morgan ordered me to assault without giving me a particle of information as to the nature of the ground over which I was to assault or giving me time to reconnoiter and obtain it, and that he did this against my earnest and repeated protest.
Eleventh question. Was not General Hovey’s brigade close at hand? Answer. It was.
Twelfth question. Did these six brigades, or two divisions, compose more than onehalf your command.
Answer. I believe so.
Thirteenth question. Did I at any time before, at the time, or after advise any other mode or plan of attack?
Answer. I did not, and never made a suggestion to any one that I had been guilty of such presumption.
Fourteenth question. Did I not and dol not approve the withdrawal of your forces from Yazoo Island?
Answer. I do not recollect to have expressed any opinion on the subject, but I have no hesitation in saying that I approved and still approve the withdrawal of the forces from the Yazoo. I have no doubt
the sen had been largely re-enforced and greatly exceeded us in number.
Fifteenth question. Were not your orders specific that nothing should be left behind except a few barrels of pork and some hard bread, which my commissary reported to you in person could not be moved back ?
Answer. I answer the whole of the above in the affirmative, and add that when my commissary reported to me that he had left some barrels of pork and hard bread by your orders, I sent him and my quartermaster back to bring it up, and told the commissary he had no bus:mess to go to the general-in-chief at such a moment to inform him that he could get no transportation; that it was not to be supposed that at such a moment you could give attention to such a matter; that his business was to impress all transportation that he could find unemployed and bring in the supplies. The quartermaster and commissary went back with a regiment, furnished by General Hovey, and brought in all the provisions except sixteen barrels of pork, which had been rolled into the bayou and was not considered of sufficient value to wet the men in the effort to get it. I believe a small amount of damaged bread was also left: behind. Sixteenth question. Do I know of a gun, cartridge, ax, spade, wagon, or anything left behind but the pork and bread referred to, and what was its quantity ? Answer. I know of nothing left behind except as stated in my last answer, which is as accurate as to quantity as I am able to state. Seventeenth question. Do I not know that you personally remained in our camp
at the bayon till every particle of ordnance, wagons, &c., and all the troops but the rear guard had reached the river?
Answer. I believe such to be the fact.
Eighteenth question. Do I not know that you communicated with General McClernand before leaving the Yazoo? Do I not know that you remained at the Yazoo Landing until every transport was off?
Answer. I answer that it is my impression that such was the case, although I know nothing except what I heard.
Nineteenth question. Was there any haste or confusion in re-embarking our command other than what is incident to large fleets and masses of men?
Answer. I observed no haste or confusion in the re-embarkation. The feeling was that the enemy would confer a great favor on us by leaving his works and giving us battle on equal terms.
Twentieth question. Have I not reason to know the enemy did not regard it as a retreat, but advised the people to look out for us in some other quarter?
Answer. I have reason to believe this. Such advice I believe was given in the public prints, and their conduct was in accordance with the advice.
Twenty-first question. Do I believe your force, independent of Grant’s and Banks’, could have taken and held Vicksburg?
Answer. My opinion has been that our whole force, aided by the gunboats, would have taken Haines’ Bluff and held it if we had attacked it immediately upon our arrival in the Yazoo, and that we could thence not only have communicated with Grant but we could also by means of the Yazoo have united his force to ours, and with our combined forces we could have operated on the eneimny’s communications with Vicksburg and forced them to give us battle on our own ground or evacuate the place.
Twenty-second question. DoI not know that the attack on Haines’ Bluff was not attempted because Admiral Porter declared it too hazardous ?
Answer. I understand that such was Admiral Porter’s opiaion after it was ascertained that Grant had fallen back to Memphis. It could not have been his opinion on the evening of December 30 last, because he advised the attack that night, and we all agreed to it, and had pre pared to make it. But for the dense fog it would have been made, and I have heard you since express the opinion that it would have been successful; Steele had no doubt of it. We all thought then that we could have intrenched ourselves, and, with the gunboats to protect our flanks, held it.
I have given you candid and specific answers to all of your questions. I confess myself greatly mortified and annoyed in being caJled on to answer such interrogatories under such circumstances.
Some days since, in the presence of Generals Stecle and Stuart, you called my attention to a letter in the Missouri Republican and stated positively that it was written by some one in my brigade. I told you it was not so; but you were evidently unconvinced. IJ have sinee as586 WEST TENN. AND NORTHERN MISS. {Cuar. XX1X
certained who wrote the letter to the Republican by a letter written from Saint Louis to Lieutenant-Colonel Peckham, who showed the paragraph to Capt. Charles McDonald, assistant adjutant-general to General Stuart, and I have taken other steps to advise you in regard to it. I now give you the means by referring to General Steele and his staff, who were on the Continental and heard my conversations, of ascertaining whether this letter is not in strict consonance with what I said in their hearing, and whether J have not invariably expressed myself in the kindest manner toward you, and in a manner entirely becoming in a brother officer engaged in a common object.
I am well aware, also, that you planned and in a great measure executed the movement against Arkansas Post, and have not failed to say what I knew of it on proper occasions.
I hope to receive no more letters of the same character from you and shall not answer them in the samespiritif Ido. 1 have forborne something I thought was due to myself in making this response after the very explicit declarations 1 made to you some days since in the presence of Generals Steele and Stuart.
Very respecttully,
your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General.
P. S.—I repeat that I desire this letter may be made known to the
officers present at the examination of Mr. Knox, and then you can make
any use you please of it. I donot place the restrictions on its use
which you impose on yourself in your letter.
GENERAL ORDERS, Hpqrs. DEPT. OF THE TENNESSEE,
No. 12. Young’s Point, La., February 1, 1863.