Francis J. Lippitt to R. C. Drum, U.S. Army, April 24, 1862

Maj. R. C. Drum, U.S. Army, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific :

MAJOR: Since my personal examination of this country I have abandoned all idea of the possibility of capturing or subduing the Humboldt Indians (the only ones now in open hostility) by any military operations whatever in the usual sense of the term. This country alone contains some 3,000 square miles, and is made up of steep mountain ridges and covered, three-fourths of it, with dense forests, packed full of undergrowth and chaparral, all but impenetrable to white men, and with no communications but rough and difficult mountain trails in many places next to impassable. The task of bringing in the Indians scattered over such a country as this, stealthily moving about in small parties, never traveling in the known trails, always unseen, though constantly watching our movements by their spies and scouts; hiding when they stop in the most inaccessible places, would be like the task of bringing in all the ground squirrels or the foxes, and will have to be performed somewhat in a similar way. You will readily perceive that a combined movement over any section of the country by two or more columns of troops with the view of hemming them in is entirely out of the question, as such an operation would require a very large army. On completing my reconnaissance I saw that the first thing to be done as being the most urgent was to make such dispositions of the troops as to protect, so far as possible, the settlements which the Indians had yet spared and the principal routes. It was with this view that the three new posts were established on the Van Dusen, on Mad River, and on Redwood Creek. The commanders of these posts were instructed to keep one-half of their effective force constantly in the field for the capture of Indians. This instruction has been faithfully carried ont, except when the want of mules for the transport of supplies has prevented. But it is obvious that these desultory operations over a few isolated spots can accomplish but very little toward the object in view.

The utmost that can be expected from them is the occasional capture of a few Indians by some lucky chance. The Indians can suddenly attack and destroy at some unexpected point, and immediately scatter and disappear as they have hitherto done. Whenever the troops approach they will have only to shift from one to another of the innumerable hiding places with which the whole country is covered, and the work of capturing them and bringing them in would never be completed. In view of these difficulties the only feasible plan, as it seems to me, to be adopted is, to start from Humboldt Bay as a base; to begin the district immediately around it and comprised within the semi-circle having the short line as its diameter, and described from this post as a center, with a radius of, say, twenty miles (the district is mostly covered with a dense forest, in many parts never yet explored by white men, and known to be constantly infested with the very Indians who have been committing some of the late outrages, and probably furnishing secure hiding places for large numbers of them); to keep a force ainply sufficient for the purpose constantly employed in scouring this district in every direction, until every square yard has been explored, every rancheria destroyed, and every Indian in it has been killed, captured, or permanently driven away. -When this has been done, when so much ground has been permanently recovered from the enemy, and not before, to describe another semi-circle from the same center concentric with the former and exterior to it, and with an increase of radius of, say, twenty miles. Reconquer this from the enemy in the same manner, and so continue until the entire country is cleared of them. The region included between the shore of the bay, Mad River on the north and Hel River on the south, and as far back as the Iaqua Ranch, would be about such a district as I have first described. I gave this district, calling it the Fort Humboldt District, in charge to Captain Akey, commanding the cavalry company garrisoning this post. In the one or two short scouts he made he killed 2 Indians and captured some 30 more, but the limited number of men that he could keep in the field I found to be entirely insufficient for the purpose in view, and since the recent outrages have compelled me to use up his company in detachments, escorts, and expresses, these expeditions have had to be, of course, abandoned entirely. In fact, to carry out the plan I have described promptly and effectually a whole regiment ought to be used, but two companies would certainly be the minimum required.

In this semi-ellipse, A-H represents the shore of the Humboldt Bay; its two nodes, A and H, Arcata and Fort Humboldt, respectively. Now, the only communication between Arcata and Fort Humboldt are, first, by water, a very expensive one, and second, by a trail around the bay of fifteen miles, the worst in the country and destructive to animals. A and H must, therefore, be each an independent base and pivot of operations. If one company be posted at each of these points the two together might perhaps suffice, by unremitting exertions, to clear the entire segment of the semi-ellipse of the Indians, but certainly not less than this force could be expected to do it. I trust that this statement explains why I reported in my last letter two more companies (besides one to garrison this post) to be indispensable. Considering the probableincrease of the number of Indian prisoners and the great num. ber of general prisoners, some thirty or more now about to be tried for their lives, that Captain Akey has only some fifteen privates, more or less, for duty, allof whom are much needed in the field, I think myself bound to report another and a well-disciplined company for no other duty than to garrison this post to be also indispensable, and respectfully request that one may be sent here, if the exigencies of the service will permit, as soon as practicable. Being compelled to keep a portion of the mounted company here as a garrison, the detachment posted at Liscombe’s Hill to furnish the necessary escorts and expresses was about half what was needed. The result is that, as reported to me whilst I am now writing, the horses of that detachment are fast breaking down from overwork; one of them has just died on the road. They will have to be relieved as fast as they give out by fresh horses from the stables here, which are still in a rather poor condition. To recall that detachment would be to leave our communications exposed, our supply trains without escorts, and settlements unguarded. The service these twenty-seven men are now rendering makes them equivalent to at least two companies of infantry. All the settlers agree that if the Hoopas and Klamaths should rise we would have a long and bloody war on our hands, and that whenever they do rise their first step will be to attack Fort Gaston, which has no defenses whatever, and peculiarly liable, from its location, to surprise. Deeming it of the first importance to prevent any such event and to hold these tribes in check until we have disposed of the hostile Indians in this neighborhood, and at the same time to quiet the alarm expressed on this point throughout the community, I have sent the two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Olney’s command to that post. Captain Johns will now be able to place detachments at so many points that all the movements of the Hoopas ‘an be watched, and if not able to apprehend those of them that are said to be constantly leaving their valleys to take part in the present hostilities, will be at least able to verify the fact and to enforce at once such severe measures upon the leading men of the tribe residing around the fort as may be necessary to repress the evil. Captain Johns was here yesterday, and I gave him full verbal instruction on the subject. The twocompanies have left, each with its second lieutenant in command, the other company officers with Lieutenant-Colonel Olney having to remain here on the court-martial, which willlast several weeks. The inclosed correspondence in relation to the shooting of two Indians by Lieutenant Flynn near Trinidad will explain itself. Ihave only to add that I am informed on good authority that the Indian spoken of as an old man was about thirty-five or forty years of age

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,