Floyd. Ihave sent a flag to General Grant, March 14, 1862

The position we occupied was invested on February 11 by a fois which

we estimated to be about 20,000 strong. This force had approached us

partly by water, but mainly by land, from Fort Henry. I considered the force we had sufficient to repulse the assault of this force. We repulsed everywhere a vigorous assault made by the enemy against our position.

Fresh troops, however, continued [to arrive ] every day by water until the 14th. We are satisfied the enemy’s forces were not short of 30,000 men. Our impressions of his strength were confirmed by information derived from prisoners we had taken on that day. That evening the enemy landed thirteen steamboat loads of fresh troops.

It was now manifest we could not long maintain our position against

such overwhelming numbers. I was satisfied that their last troops were

of General Buell’s command. We felt the want of re-enforcements, but did not ask for them, because we knew they were not to behad. I had just come from Bowling Green, and knew that General Johuston could not spare a man from his position; he had, in fact, already so weakened himself that he could not have maintained his position against a vigorous assault. Under these circumstances, deeming it utterly useless to apply for re-enforcements, we determined to make the best possible

. defense with the force in hand.

Our investment by a force of 30,000 men on the 14th being completed,

and the enemy on that evening having received thirteen boat loads of _ fresh troops, a council of general officers was convened by General Floyd,

at which it was determined to give the enemy battle at daylight next day, so as to cut up the investing force, if possible, before the fresh troops were in position.

In that council I proposed, as the plan of attack, that with the force in the intrenchments of our left wing and Colonel [R. W.] Hanson’s regiment, of General Buckner’s division, I would attack the enemy’s main force on his right, and, if “successful, that would roll the enemy on his line of investment to a ‘point opposite General Buckner’s position, when he would attack him in flank and rear, and drive him with our united commands back upon his encampments at the river.

To this proposition, so far as allowing me to have Colonel Hanson’s regiment, General Buckner objected, and I waived the point, saying I only asked the assistance of that regiment because my portion of the labor to be performed was by far the greatest, and that upon my success depended the fortunes of the day, and that a very large portion of the force I had to fight were fresh troops and badly armed.

General Buckner then proposed, as a modification of my plan of battle, that he should attack the enemy simultaneously with my attack ; that his attack should be against the position on the Wynn’s Ferry road, where he had a battery nearly opposite the center of the left wing, and that he would thus lessen the labors for my command and strike the enemy in a more vital point. To this modification I agreed, as an improvement upon my proposed plan.

In earrying out this plan thus agreed upon it became proper for Colonel Heiman’s brigade to maintain its position in the line, otherwise the enemy might turn the right of General Buckner’s position and take his forces on the right flank, and thus defeat our success. It was arranged accordingly.

General Floyd approved this plan of battle and ordered that it should be carried out next morning at daylight. I then sent for all the commanders of brigades, to explain to them our situation (being invested), our purpose and plan of battle, and to assign to each brigade its position in my column; all of which was done, and I gave orders to have my whole force under arms at 4.30 o’clock and to be ready to march out of our works precisely at 5 o’clock.

At 4 o’clock I was with my command, all of which was in position, except Colonel Davidson’s brigade, none of which was present. Iimmediately directed General B. R. Johnson, who was present, and to whose immediate command Colonel Davidson’s brigade belonged, to dispatch officers for that brigade, and to ascertain the cause of its delay. He did so. I likewise sent several officers of my staff upon the same duty. Both sets of officers made the same report, viz, that Colonel Davidson had failed to give any orders to the colonels of his brigade, and that Colonel Davidson was sick. It is proper to state that he was complaining of being unwell when the orders were deii The instructions to the brigade commanders were given about 2 o’clock that morning. My command was delayed in its advance about half an hour by the necessity of bringing up this brigade.

My column was finally ready and put in motion about 5.15 o’clock. I moved with the advance, and directed General B. R. Johnson to bring up the rear. The command of Colonel Davidson’s brigade devolved upon Colonel Simonton, which, owing to the reasons already stated, was brought into column in the rear and into action last, under General J ohnson, to whose report for its good behavior on the field I particularly refer, having in my original report omitted to state its position on the field.

. Many of these incidents, not deemed essential to the proper under- . Standing of the main features of the battle of February 15, were omitted = jn my original report, but are now given as parts of its history. In my original report I gave the after operations in the battle of February 15, and shall now pass over all the events occurring until the council of general officers, held on the night of the 15th. “The lodgment of the enemy’s force in the rifle pits of General Buckner’s extreme right, late in the evening of the 15th of February, induced General Floyd to eall . ameeting of general officers at my headquarters on that night. “a We had fought the battle of the 15th to open the way through the enemy’s line of investment to retire to the interior. The battle had = occupied the day, and we were until about 12 o’clock that night bring- ¡ing in the wounded. At about 1 clock we had all the commanders of = regiments and brigades assembled, and given orders to the entire command to be under arms at 4 o’clock, to march out on the road leading towards Charlotte. I had given instructions to Major Haynes, my commissary, and Major Jones, my quartermaster, immediately after our evaeuation of the place to burn all their stores. About 3 o’clock (perhaps a little earlier) we received intelligence from the troops in the trenches that they heard dogs barking around on the outside of our lines and they thought the enemy were reinvesting our position. General Floyd immediately directed me to send out scouts to = ascertain the fact. This duty was performed ; when the scouts returned _ they reported the enemy in large force occupying his original positions — and closing up the routes to the interior. Not being satisfied with the truth of the report, I directed Colonel Forrest to send out a second set of scouts, and at the same time directed him to send two intelligent men p up the bank of the river, to examine a valley of overflowed ground lying to the rear and right of the enemy’s position, and if the valley of over- —. flowed ground could be crossed by infantry and cavalry, and to ascertain if the enemy’s forces reached the river*bank. The one set of scouts returned and confirmed the previous reports, – viz, that the woods were full of the enemy, occupying all of his previous ‘ positions in great numbers. The scouts sent up the river to examine the overflow reported that the overflowed valley was not practicable for infantry; that the soft mud was about half-leg deep, and that the water was about saddle-skirt deep to the horses, and that there was a good — deal of drift in the way. We then sent for a citizen, whose name is not . remembered, said to know that part of the country well, and asked his opinion. He confirmed the reports of the river scouts. In addition to the depth of the water, the weather was intensely cold. Many of the _ troops were frost-bitten, and they could not have stood a passage through a sheet of water.

With these facts all before Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself (the two former having remained at my quarters all the inter vening while), General Floyd said: “Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done?” Neither General Buckner nor myself having answered promptly, Genf eral Floyd repeated his inquiry, addressing himself to me by name. My reply was that it was diffieult to determine what was best to be done, — but that I was in favor of cutting our way out. He then asked General Buckner what he thought we ought to do. General Buckner said his command was so worn down, eut: up, and demoralized that he could not make another fight; that he thought we would lose three-fourths of the . command we had left in eutting our way out, and that it was wrong; that no officer had the right to sacrifice three-fourths of the command

to save one-fourth; that we had fought the enemy from the trenches, we

MORTE S had fought his gunboats, and had fought him in the open field, to cut ‘ our way through his line of investment; that we were again invested with an immense force of fresh troops ; that the army had done all it was possible to do, and that duty and honor-required no more. General Floyd then remarked-that his opinion coincided with General Buckner’s.

his quarters in the field, and was not present. In my original report I stated it was my impression Major Gilmer was consulted, and coneurred in the opinion of Generals Buckner and Floyd; but, from subsequent conversation with Major Gilmer, I learned from him that he had retired to another room and laid down, and was not present at this part of the conference; and I am therefore satisfied that I was mistaken in the statement in regard to him.

The proposition to cut our way out being thus disposed of, I remarked that we could hold our position another day and fight the enemy from our trenches; that by night our steamboats that had taken off the prisoners and our mounted men would return; that during the next night we could set our troops on the right bank of the river, and that we could make our escape by Clarksville, and thus save the army.

To this proposition General Buckner said: “Gentlemen, you know the enemy occupy the rifle pits on my right, and ean easily turn my position and attack me in rear or move down on the river battery. I am satisfied he will attack me at daylight, and I cannot hold my position half an hour? Regarding General Buckners reply as settling this proposition in the negative—for I had quite enough to do with my heavy losses in the battle of the previous day to defend my own portion of the line and I could give him no re-enforcements—I then said: “Gentlemen, if we cannot eut our way out nor fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation, and I am determined that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself a prisoner. I will die first.” General Floyd remarked that that was his determination; that he would die before he would do either. General Buckner said that sueh determination was personal, and that personal considerations should never influence official action. General Floyd-said he acknowledged it was personal with him, but nevertheless such was his determination. Thereupon General Buckner said that, beitig satisfied that nothing else could be done, if he was placed in command he would surrender the command and would take the fate of the command.

General Floyd immediately said: “General Buckner, I place you in command; will you permit me to draw out my brigade?” General Buckner promptly replied: ” Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication.” General Floyd immediately remarked : * General Pillow, I turn over the command.” I replied instantly: “I pass it.” General Buckner said: “I assume it; bring on a bugler, pen, ink, and paper.” General Buckner had received pen, ink, and paper, and sat down to the table and commenced writing, when I left and crossed the river, passing outside the garrison before General Buckner prepared his communication to the enemy, and went to Clarksville, by land, on horseback.

I did not know what he had written until I saw the published correspondence with General Grant. It may be asked if I was in favor of cutting our way out, why, when the command was turned over to me, I did not take it out. My reply is that, though technically speaking the command devolved on me when turned over by General Floyd, it was turned over to General Buckner in point of fact, All parties so under- —

_ stood it. In proof of this, General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner, aetually withdrew with a “large portion “of his brigade by setting them across the river in the steamer General Anderson, that arrived just before daylight. In further proof of this I embody in this report an order of General Buckner’s to General B. R. Johnson after he had assumed command.

i The following is a copy of the order: j j HEADQUARTERS, Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862. ) Sin: The command of the forces in this vicinity has devolved upon me

by order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence