Edward Stanley to Francis Clare Ford, November 16, 1867

Lord Stanley to Mr. Ford

Sir: In my despatch to Sir Frederick Bruce, No. 191, of the 10th of September, I confined myself to a mere statement of the substance of a despatch from Mr. Seward, which Mr. Adams had communicated to me, in reply to my despatch, No. 117, of the 24th of May, respecting the claims arising on either side out of the events of the late civil war io the United States.

Her Majesty’s government having, since the date of ray despatch, fully considered the terms of Mr. Seward’s despatch, I will no longer delay in acquainting you, for communication to that minister, with the impression which it has made upon them.

Her Majesty’s government observe that the President of the United States considers the terms used in my despatch, with reference to the so-called “Alabama” claims, to be at once comprehensive and sufficiently precise to include all the claims of American citizens for depredations upon their commerce during the late rebellion, which have been the subject of complaint upon the part of the government of the United States, those terms being, to quote the precise words of my despatch of the 24th of May, applicable to this class of claims, and which, in substance, repeats those used by me in my despatch of the 9th of March, that the question on which Great Britain was ready to go to arbitration was “whether, in the matters connected with the vessels out of whose depredations the claims of American citizens have arisen, the course pursued by the British government, and by those who acted upon its authority, was such as would involve a moral responsibility on the part of the British government to make good, either in whole or in part, the losses of American citizens.”

In the same, and in previous despatches, it will befound that, whilst agreeing to this limited reference as regards the so-called “Alabama” claims, I have repeatedly stated that her Majesty’s government could not consent to refer to a foreign power to determine whether the policy of her Majesty’s government, in recognizing the Confederate States as belligerents, was or was not suitable to the circumstances of the time when the recognition took place. After referring, however, to the terms of my despatch of the 24th of May, Mr. Seward goes on to say that, in the view taken by the United States government, that government would deem itself at liberty to insist before the arbiter that the actual proceedings and relations of the British government, its officers, agents, and subjects, towards the United States, in regard to the rebellion and the rebels, as they occurred during that rebellion, are among the matters which are connected with the vessels whose depredations are complained of, just as in the case of the general claims alluded to by me the actual proceedings and relations of her Majesty’s government, its officers, agents, and subjects, in regard to the United States, in regard to the rebellion and the rebels, are necessarily connected with the transactions out of which those general claims arise.

The language thus used by Mr. Seward appears to her Majesty’s government to be open to the construction that it is the desire of the United States government that any tribunal to be agreed upon in dealing either with the so-called “Alabama” claims, or with the “general claims,” might enter into the question whether the act or policy of her Majesty’s government in recognizing the Confederate States as a belligerent power, was or was not suitable to the circumstances of the time when the recognition was made, a construction which, after the distinct and repeated avowal of her Majesty’s government that they could not consent to a reference of such a question, her Majesty’s government can hardly suppose that it was intended by Mr. Seward that the passage in his despatch should bear.

But to prevent any misapprehension on this subject, her Majesty’s government think it necessary distinctly to say, both as regards the so-called “Alabama” claims brought forward by citizens of the United States, and as regards the general claims, that they cannot depart, either directly or indirectly, from their refusal to “refer to a foreign power to determine whether the policy of recognizing the Confederate States as a belligerent power was or was not suitable to the circumstances of the time when the recognition was made.”

As regards the so-called “Alabama” claims, the only point which her Majesty’s government can consent to refer to the decision of an arbiter, is the question of the moral resposibility of her Majesty’s government, on the assumption that an actual state of war existed between the government of the United States and the Confederate States; and on that assumption it would be for the arbiter to determine whether there had been any such failure on the part of the British government, as a neutral, in the observance, legally or morally, of any duties or relations towards the government of the United States, as could be deemed to involve a moral responsibility on the part of the British government to make good the losses of American citizens caused by the “Alabama” and other vessels of the same class.

As regards the general claims, the question of moral responsibility on the part of her Majesty’s government does not and cannot come into dispute at all.

Mr. Seward rightly supposes that her Majesty’s government contemplate two tribunals for the adjudication—one of the “Alabama” claims, the other of the general claims; the one being in the first instance, at all events, the tribunal of an arbiter who would be called upon to pronounce on the principle of the moral responsibility of the British government, and on the nature of whose decision would depend the question of the appointment of a mixed commission for the examination, in detail, of the several claims of citizens of the United States to which that decision applied, namely: those arising out of the depredations of the “Alabama” and other similar vessels, and the adjudications of the sums payable in each case; the other, in its commencement and to its close, a purely mixed commission for the examination of the general claims of the subjects and citizens of both countries, arising out of the war, and the adjudication of the sums payable by either country in each case.

The distinction between the two classes of claims is clear; the one may never come before a mixed commission, and, therefore, may not require the assistance of an arbiter to decide differences of detail arising between the commissioners; the other, though originally brought before a mixed commission, may possibly require the intervention of an arbiter, in case of a difference of opinion among the members of the commission which could not be otherwise reconciled, and for which case provision would be made in the ordinary way in the convention for the settlement of the mixed claims, by the insertion of articles in regard to the selection of an arbiter.

The functions of such an arbiter, as well as of an arbiter for a like purpose in the other mixed commission, for which provision would have to be made to meet the contingency of the so-called “Alabama” claims coming eventually under the cognizance of a mixed commission, would have nothing in common with the functions of the arbiter to whom the question of principle involved in the last-mentioned class of claims would be referred.

Her Majesty’s government cannot but apprehend that if Mr. Seward really requires unrestricted arbitration as applicable to both classes of claims, and that the tribunal in both classes of cases should proceed upon the same principles, and be clothed with the same powers, he has not fully considered the wide and inevitable distinction which exists between the classes; and in directing you to submit to the consideration of Mr. Seward the explanations and observations contained in this despatch, I have to instruct you to express the earnest hope of her Majesty’s government that the government of the United States will, on further reflection, accept, without hesitation, the proposal made in my despatch to Sir Frederick Bruce, No. 54, of the 9th of March, and No. 117, of the 24th of May, both of this year, namely: “limited reference to arbitration in regard to the so-called ‘Alabama’ claims, and adjudication, by means of a mixed commission, of general claims.”

You will furnish Mr. Seward with a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c,