department of foreign affairs—memorandum on the question of limits with paraguay., October 14, 1873

department of foreign affairs—memorandum on the question of limits with paraguay.

There are two periods to the negotiation with Paraguay.

• In the first, Dr. Quintana could not obtain an understanding with Baron Cotegipe, in reference to certain previous declarations intended to define the obligation taken by Brazil, to protect the territorial rights of the Argentine Republic as far as Bahia Negro.
• In the second, General Mitre was unable to come to an understanding with the Paraguayan government, notwithstanding the unlimited countenance offered by the empire, according to the agreement of November 19, celebrated in Rio de Janeiro, 1872, where useless efforts of two of the most distinguished men of the republic are alone sufficient to prove that the negotiations with Paraguay contain something more than difficulties about limits. In fact the war with Paraguay so completely prostrated that country, that its own sons doubt the possibility of preserving its national independence.

The death of Lopez gave it liberty; a constitution irreproachable in a theoretical point of view has confirmed it; but the civilization, customs, and power necessary to maintain it are wanting; and it is the general conviction that Paraguayan liberties for a long time will be at the mercy of daily insurrectionists.

Under these circumstances, a negotiation in which this republic only defends its national integrity, presents a complicated problem of difficult solution, and the undersigned, minister of foreign affairs, when a resolution is about to be taken which may be of incalculable consequence, feels the necessity of setting forth in writing the motives for his opinion.

Paraguay, withdrawn by the Dictator Francia from the general movement of manipulation in 1810, when that movement commenced, was a province of the vice-royalty, and bound by the rivers Paraguay and Parana; even the line of the Parana was only de facto, because her true limits on that side was the river.

The province of Paraguay in colonial times did not permanently occupy any point whatever on the left margin of the river Parana, nor of the right bank of the river Paraguay, the Villa Occidental being of much later origin, as also the Tranguera de Lareto upon the Parana.

The treaty of May 1, (Alliance, 1865,) establishing, as it does by Article XVI, the right to exact the definitive treaty-limits on the following bases: the Argentine Republic shall be separated from the republic of Paraguay by the rivers Parana and Paraguay until the limits of Brazil are met, these being at Bahia Negro, on the right bank of the river Paraguay, did nothing more than corroborate the truth of facts and right.

The Argentine Republic neither received nor increased a single right through victory.

In the first negotiation, nevertheless, Baron Cotegipe did not wish to admit any declaration which might oblige the empire to countenance claims which passed to the north of the Pilcomayo.

In the second, the marquis of San Vincent admitted the force of the treaty of alliance in all its points; but it appears that his government reserved to itself the right again to deny its approval beyond the Pilcomayo, Señor Magalhaens having said in Asuncion that he said San Vicente had disobeyed his instructions by not thus stating in the agreement of November 19.

The question, therefore, of the Chaco with Paraguay, is only on the territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro; or rather in the Villa Occidental, which Paraguay does not wish to lose, and which Brazil wishes her to keep.

The Argentine Republic as a danger to the independence to Paraguay; as a menace to her commerce.

It may here be asked, is the real danger for Paraguay, perchance, to come from the Argentine Republic? Could not the alleged inconveniences to her commerce be settled by customs agreements? Is not the independence of Paraguay recognized by the Argentine government and guaranteed by the allies? But the answer to all these questions would carry me too far, and I must sacrifice them to brevity, only occupying myself with the attitude which it becomes the republic to assume in this delicate situation.

The Argentine negotiator decided in favor of the cession of the Villa Occidental, and all the territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro, with the promise on the part of Paraguay to recognize to the Argentine Republic dominion over the missions, island of Cerrito, and Chaco from the frontiers of Sante Fé to the Pilcomayo.

On my part I have maintained my previous negotiation with Bolivia, and during the present one with Paraguay, that the Villa Occidental ought to belong to the Argentine Republic, its northern boundary being the nearest stream or river, and ceding the remainder up to Bahia Negro to the republic which first treated with us.

The reasons on which we both founded our different-opinions are extensively set forth in the notes exchanged during the negotiations, and it seems useless to repeat them now. In this memorandum I ought to limit myself to considerations of another order, which corroborate my opinion before omitted, to wit, the cession of the Villa Occidental, were it granted, would import its immediate evacuation, thus repudiating our own conduct when we occupied it. By this cession our frontier on that side would de facto be withdrawn to the populated part of the province of Sante Fé, [Note by translator.—Seven hundred miles down the river,] leaving the intermediate bank subject to new settlements de facto, of Paraguay, such as those realized from 1810 to 1850.

Paraguay being master of the banks from twenty degrees to twenty-five degrees thirty minutes of latitude, would hold the power to again impede the navigation of the river, and withdraw itself from the civilizing influences of commerce and contact with other nations.

The weakness of the present government of Paraguay offers no security that it would not fall before the compact which contained such a cession could be constitutionally ratified; or that the successor would refuse to continue it; or congress, on its part, to approve it; then the Argentine government would have entered upon the road of concession, in which it would not be possible to stop.

The instability of the Argentine government, and the resistance of its congress to: a treaty made by the executive upon the above-mentioned basis, are not to be feared to the same degree; nevertheless, in prudence, they ought not to be forgotten, because it is not impossible that, for the purpose of rejecting such a treaty, we might witness a coalition of those who formerly opposed the alliance on account of its enemies, no matter in what form it might have been made, because they are the enemies of the empire, whose little friendly influence in this emergency could not be concealed.

But, supposing all for the best, while the Argentine Republic, fulfilling its word, should immediately evacuate the Villa Occidental, Paraguay, through the Brazilian forces, would be subject to an agreement which could not be evaded for much time, neither from considerations of public order in Paraguay, nor from the guarantee offered in the Cotegipe treaties, or from the want of participation of the republic of Uruguay; this fact constitutes a greater danger than the want of treaties with Paraguay.

I do not believe that the good name and patriotism of the Argentine government ought to be exposed to so many and great inconvenience in order that a conventional law may grant that which she already possesses; and, on my part, I propose as follows:

• That within the time fixed by the Paraguayan government, it be informed that the last word of the Argentine government is arbitration, exclusively applied to the territory confined between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro, including the Villa Occidental; or, instead of this, the definitive line of the Pilcomayo by way of transaction, saving to the Argentine Republic the Villa Occidental.
• That this same communication be made simultaneously to the Brazilian government by means of its envoy extraordinary near the Argentine government, Baron de Araguaya, expressing to him, at the same time, the desire that he receive instructions to support either of these pacific solutions; or, in defect thereof, agree to the evacuation of Paraguay, according to article 6th of the agreement of November, 1872.