Charles P. Stone to Seth Williams, November 2, 1861

GENERAL:

The persistent attacks made upon me by the friends (so .

called), of the lamented late Colonel Baker, through the newspaper press, have made it my duty to call the attention of the major-general commanding to distinct violations of my orders and instructions to that officer in the affair of October 21st ultimo, more pointedly than it has been my wish to do in an official report concerning one who is no more.

Painful as it may be to censure the acts of one who has gallantly died .

on the field of battle, justice to myself and to those who served under . me requires that the full truth should be made to appear: Up to this time duties more imperative have engrossed my time. 1 could not, for the purpose of shielding myself from unjust popular censure, neglect the care which I owed to the comfort and well-being of the thousands of men under my command, and especially the measures necessary to the comfort and recovery of the numerous wounded in our hospitals. Meantime I have been fiercely attacked in some newspapers, which have not waited for official reports, but have seized upon every word of any friend of the late colonel who might choose to invent or color a description of the disaster. Every false statement has been pronounced to be true, unless denied by myself, who have had too many and too important duties to permit me to write to the public prints, even were such a course allowable to a soldier.

I will, in anticipation of my final report, which cannot be presented until the subordinate reports shall all come in, relate a few facts which will clearly show who was responsible for the defeat of our troops at Ball’s Bluff. At 7 o’clock in the morning there were between Harrison’s Island and Leesburg, on the Virginia side, only six companies of our troops, which, under the cover of two guns then on the island, of four guns on the Maryland shore, and the large infantry force there, might easily have been withdrawn even in the face of a largely-superior force, and with the means of transportation which I knew to be there. It was my strongly expressed desire that, if a respectable force should threaten, this one should be withdrawn, and Colonel Baker left me at Edwards Ferry with a full knowledge of my desire and with full power to withdraw it. He knew as well as I that should he attempt to re-enforce them – his means of transportation were very limited, and yet before he ever

. . Oma XIV] BALI/S BLUFF AND EDWARDS FERRY, VA.

reached the island he stated to Lieutenant Howe, Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, that he should cross over with all the force at his command. At the distance I was from his position I could only judge that

he was satisfied of his ability to cross in force in time to meet the enemy,

for he then knew, what had not reached my ears and did not for more

than half an hour afterwards, that a hostile force had approached Col-. onel Devens and diseovered him and his command.

It has been asserted and published that Colonel Baker received an

order from me to attack Leesburg on Sunday, the 20th. It is absurd.

Colonel Baker did not receive an order from me of any kind on Sunday, nor any order until about 2 o’clock on Monday morning, when he received one directing him to send one regiment to Conrad’s Ferry and to hold the remainder of his brigade in readiness to march. (A copy of this order is herewith forwarded.) He was notin any manner informed of the objeet of the movement, which was intended solely to insure the safe return of Colonel Devens and his command, until his arrival at Edwards Ferry on Monday morning. The order, stained with blood, found in his hat has been somewhat altered either by the stains or by “friendly” hands, which may easily happen in a pencil order; but even in that as published, and still stronger as it was written, he was to use his discretion about crossing his force or retiring that already over. The” friends” of Colonel Baker state that on his receiving that order

^ he exclaimed, “I will obey General Stone’s order, but it is my deathwarrant.” Shame upon them to put false words in the mouth of the brave dead! Colonel Baker received that order from my own hands on the field and at his own request, that he might “have some written authority for assuming command” (I use his own words), and seemed delighted at receiving it; this after the fullest and freest explanation in person of all that was known up to that time to have transpired—a full statement of the slight means of transportation across the river, and the use that could be made of artillery and infantry from this side and from the island in covering the return of the force then over.

The change of destination of five companies of infantry which I had ordered into a strong mill on the right of Devens line was sanctioned by Colonel Baker, whose object seems to have been not that of, under any circumstances, withdrawing our small force from the face of a superior one, but the holding of that superior force in check until he could try conclusions with it, and this with a full knowledge of what he knew I must be ignorant of, viz, that the small force had been discovered and engaged. “There was plenty of time for withdrawing those troops, and he alone, within reporting distance, had the power to withdraw them. -Colonel Devens received notification early in the day that Colonel Baker had assumed command, but received no order or message from him until 2.15 p. m., when he (Devens) had been pressed back to the final line of battle. That Colonel Baker was determined at all hazards to fight a battle is clear from the fact that he never crossed to examine the field, never gave an order to the troops in the advance, and never sent forward to ascertain their position until he had ordered over his force and passed over a considerable portion of it. From the time. that he left me for several hours but one message was received by me directly from him, and that one was simply to state that he had decided to cross, and was increasing his means of transportation by a large boat lifted from the canal. I warned him, when I ascertained it, that I believed 4,000 troops would be opposed to him; there was still time to retire, and when he replied, «I shall not retire,” I had no doubt, and

have now no doubt, that he felt perfectly able to meet that force.

Imust now touch a point that I would gladly leave unnoticed, but which the friends of the late colonel, in their efforts to crush another, force to the light. The troops were most unfortunately posted, whether the intention was to drive the enemy or to hold the position assumed and await re-enforcements. Colonel Baker had on the field between 1,600 and 1,700 bayonets. .A short distance in his rear was a steep . bluff, and immediately behind that bluff the river Potomac. On his left was a valley, and on the opposite side of that valley (which opened on: the river) was a wooded hill. This wooded hill, giving access to the rear of his left flank, might have been expected to be taken advantage of by an active enemy, and from the nature of the position a reserve – could be valuable only at the edge of the bluff. Yet Colonel Baker sacrificed from his line four stout companies to form a reserve near the center, which reserve could do nothing in the battle but shoot down his own men in the line, and at the same time they were posted so near the line and so in the open ground as to be exposed to a galling fire from the enemy during the entire action.

A second reserve was posted near the opening of the valley guarding , – the left flank, the true point of defense of which was far in advance, and only two companies of skirmishers were thrown out to the left flank. The two eompanies of skirmishers were’able to arrest the progress of an entire regiment moving to turn his left flank, and they bravely held. that regiment at bay for 20 minutes, but were finally overcome and destroyed. How different the result would have been if his two reserves had been employed in extending his line to cover his weak point it is mournful now to think. “

When the determined two companies of the California regiment brought an entire regiment on the charge to a halt, and forced it first to open fire, and then to waver before their well-maintained fire from the wood, had the two reserves been there to charge, instead of standing – idle lookers-oú and yet exposed to a galling fire, the force which at last turned his left flank would have been thrown in eonfusion upon the enemy’s right, and victory would have been Baker’s, instead of defeat and death. As the troops were arranged on the field I feel that increased force would only have given us increased loss. The plain truth is that this brave and impetuous officer was determined at all hazards to bring on an aetion, and made use of the discretion allowed him to do it. Had his eye for advantage of ground in posting troops equaled his daring courage, he would have been to-day an honored, victorious general of the Republic, instead of a lamented statesman lost too soon to the country.

Very respectfully, I am, general, your most obedient servant,