Albin F. Schoepf to George H. Thomas, December 18, 1861

(Received December 20, 1861.) General GEORGE H. THOMAS, : Commanding First Division, Lebanon:

GENERAL: In my communication of yesterday I suggested that I intended to crowd the enemy to-day.

Accordingly at sunrise this morning I proceeded by two columns, one of three regiments and four pieces of artillery under my immediate command and the other of two regiments and two pieces of artillery under command of General Carter.

Proceeding about 3 miles, the road became impassable for artillery and the pieces were left, while I advanced with the infantry to a point about 6 miles farther and about 24 miles from the enemy’s fortified position near Mill Springs, at which point we came in contact with the enemy’s cavalry, and a few shots were exchanged between them and a small detachment of mine under Major Coffee.

General Carter, advancing on the other road (to the south of my route and nearly parallel), proceeded to within about the same distance of the enemy’s position, when he met-with about 80 of his cavalry, but having no cavalry, General Carter could only use his artillery at long-range across Fishing Creek against him, dispersing his cavalry, however, and cansing him to make a hasty retreat.

From my own observation, as well as from reliable information obtained, from different sources, it is evident that if the enemy will not come out for a field fight, which he does not seem inclined to do, he can only be taken at the point of the bayonet under many disadvantages, and a probable heavy loss of life on our side.

The country adjacent to his intrenchments is of that broken and hilly nature that it would be difficult to get artillery in a commanding position, and, if got there, would be in great danger of being lost unless we were positively certain of success, a retreat with any degree of promptness being impracticable. If, however, we should drive him from his intrenchments, his next move would be to recross the river, and, if he succeeded in doing so, would instantly shell us out of his works from the commanding cliffs on the opposite side of the river.

Again, if I were to cross the river at Waitsborough some 12 miles above Mill Springs, and place myself in his rear on the cliffs and open on him from that point, he would then push his way unmolested to the north and east, and become a troublesome visitor along the route from Somerset to London and toward Cumberland Gap. i

Under these circumstances I hardly know what move is best to be made. With my present force I can hold him in check where he i is, and perhaps whip him if I can coax him out, which I shall still try to do.

In a former communication you spoke of Wolford’s cavalry joining me. It would be extremely desirable to have at least four companies of good cavalry. The two which I have are poorly clad, and armed with only a musket, wholly unsuited to that arm of service. Can you not give me four of Wolford’s best companies, with suitable arms? With this addition to my command I should bein a much better condition for service. Major Coffee could command this battalion, and the two companies now here could join their regiment and provide themselves with lo and more suitable arms.

I avail myself of the mail facilities between this point and your hands ) quarters, for the reason that I have no horses suitable for express services, and the difference in time being so small that not much would be gained by using express.

Shouid any thin g urgent occur, however, 1 will forward by special express by hiring a horse.

Iinclose a note just handed me by Colonel Hoskins, now encamped near the river at Waitsborough.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,